better-auth versions before 1.6.2 fail to validate the OAuth state parameter against the stored nonce when using cookie-backed state storage without PKCE. Attackers can forge the state parameter and supply an attacker-controlled authorization code to create authenticated sessions bound to the attacker's external identity or persistently link attacker accounts to victim profiles.
better-auth versions before 1.6.2 fail to validate the OAuth state parameter against the stored nonce when using cookie-backed state storage without PKCE. Attackers can forge the state parameter and supply an attacker-controlled authorization code to create authenticated sessions bound to the attacker's external identity or persistently link attacker accounts to victim profiles.
better-auth versions before 1.6.2 fail to validate the OAuth state parameter against the stored nonce when using cookie-backed state storage without PKCE. Attackers can forge the state parameter and supply an attacker-controlled authorization code to create authenticated sessions bound to the attacker's external identity or persistently link attacker accounts to victim profiles.
### Am I affected?
Users are affected if all of the following are true:
- The application uses `better-auth` at a version below `1.6.2` (or `@better-auth/sso` paired with such a version).
- `betterAuth({ account: { storeStateStrategy } })` is set to `"cookie"`. The default `"database"` is not affected.
- The application wires at least one OAuth provider through `genericOAuth({ config })` with `pkce: false`, or it supplies a custom `getToken` or `tokenUrl` that does not require the stored `codeVerifier`. Stock social providers with PKCE on are not affected.
- The provider returns arbitrary `code` values to the configured callback URL.
If users are on `[email protected]` or later, they are not affected.
Fix:
1. Upgrade to `[email protected]` or later (current stable is `1.6.10`).
2. If users cannot upgrade, see workarounds below.
### Summary
In `parseGenericState`, the cookie branch decrypted the `oauth_state` cookie and validated expiry, but did not compare the incoming OAuth `state` query parameter to the nonce that `generateGenericState` issued at sign-in. Any callback to `/api/auth/oauth2/callback/<providerId>` that arrived with a forged `state` and any `code` was therefore accepted as long as the browser still held a live `oauth_state` cookie. With `pkce: false` (or any `getToken` path that does not enforce a code-verifier round-trip), an attacker who forced the victim to deliver an attacker-controlled authorization code to the callback would mint a session bound to the attacker's external identity in the victim's browser. Account-linking flows behaved the same way, binding the attacker's external account to an authenticated victim row.
### Details
The cookie branch of `parseGenericState` did not compare the cookie's stored nonce to the incoming `state` parameter. The database branch (the default) was not affected because the verification row is keyed by `state` and the lookup itself enforces equality.
The fix re-binds the cookie to the nonce: `generateGenericState` writes `oauthState: state` into the encrypted payload before storage, and `parseGenericState` rejects when `parsedData.oauthState !== state`. The same primitive covers every caller (`generic-oauth`, social, account-link, oauth-proxy passthrough, OIDC SSO, SAML relay state).
### Patches
Fixed in `[email protected]` via [PR #8949](https://github.com/better-auth/better-auth/pull/8949) (commit `9deb7936a`, merged 2026-04-09). The cookie branch of `parseGenericState` now rejects when the encrypted payload's nonce does not match the incoming `state` parameter; the database branch gained a defense-in-depth equality check.
### Workarounds
If users cannot upgrade immediately:
- **Switch `storeStateStrategy` back to `"database"`** (the default). This closes the cookie-only bypass without a code change.
- **Enable `pkce: true`** on every affected `genericOAuth` provider. The `codeVerifier` is the missing primitive that the attacker cannot supply.
### Impact
- **Forced-login (CSRF on OAuth callback)**: the attacker forces the victim's browser into an authenticated session bound to the attacker's external identity, allowing the attacker to observe the victim's actions inside the application.
- **Persistent account linking**: account-link flows bind the attacker's external account to the victim's authenticated row, granting persistent access until the link is removed.
### Credit
Reported by @Jvr2022 via private advisory disclosure, and by @alavesa (PatchPilots audit) via the public duplicate [issue #8897](https://github.com/better-auth/better-auth/issues/8897).
### Resources
- [CWE-352: Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF)](https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/352.html)
- [CWE-345: Insufficient Verification of Data Authenticity](https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/345.html)
- [CWE-287: Improper Authentication](https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/287.html)
- [RFC 6749 §10.12: Cross-Site Request Forgery](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc6749#section-10.12)
- [RFC 7636: Proof Key for Code Exchange](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc7636)
EUVD source date text has no stated timezone and is retained without inventing a UTC instant. Related bulletin membership is not an alias, common cause or applicability claim. A missing vector with a zero score is treated as unrated. Complete vendor/product and underlying source evidence remains in the original JSON.
Original publisher date fields
datePublished: Aug 1, 2026, 12:22:17 PM
dateUpdated: Aug 3, 2026, 3:38:08 PM
No normalized affected-package data is projected for this source revision. The original publisher record may contain additional product and version evidence; this does not establish that a package is unaffected.
NVD analysis and CPE criteria are source context, not proof that a package or your environment is affected. Complete affected data, logical configurations and SSVC are retained in the original JSON.
Source analysis status: Deferred
Weakness classifications: CWE-287
Original publisher date fields
published: 2026-08-01T13:17:04.403
lastModified: 2026-09-08T20:34:34.997
No normalized affected-package data is projected for this source revision. The original publisher record may contain additional product and version evidence; this does not establish that a package is unaffected.