better-auth versions before 1.6.11 contain insecure cryptographic defaults in the oidcProvider and mcp plugins that advertise the none algorithm and accept plain PKCE by default. Attackers can exploit algorithm negotiation to accept unsigned tokens or intercept authorization codes when PKCE plain is used instead of the required S256 method.
better-auth versions before 1.6.11 contain insecure cryptographic defaults in the oidcProvider and mcp plugins that advertise the none algorithm and accept plain PKCE by default. Attackers can exploit algorithm negotiation to accept unsigned tokens or intercept authorization codes when PKCE plain is used instead of the required S256 method.
better-auth versions before 1.6.11 contain insecure cryptographic defaults in the oidcProvider and mcp plugins that advertise the none algorithm and accept plain PKCE by default. Attackers can exploit algorithm negotiation to accept unsigned tokens or intercept authorization codes when PKCE plain is used instead of the required S256 method.
### Am I affected?
Users are affected if all of the following are true:
- Their application uses `better-auth` at a version below the patched release.
- Their application enables `oidcProvider()` from `better-auth/plugins/oidc-provider` or `mcp()` from `better-auth/plugins/mcp` (the mcp plugin delegates to `oidcProvider` and inherits both defaults).
- For the algorithm-negotiation impact: relying parties of the application's OIDC server use a JWT verification library that performs algorithm negotiation from the discovery document without pinning to a specific signing algorithm.
- For the PKCE impact: the authorization URL is exposed to any party other than the user agent and the application's OP.
If the application only uses `@better-auth/oauth-provider` (the canonical replacement) and have not enabled the legacy plugins, it is not affected. The new package's discovery document excludes `none` and its authorize schema rejects `plain` at parse time.
Fix:
1. Upgrade to `[email protected]` or later.
2. Migrate from the deprecated `oidcProvider` and `mcp` plugins to `@better-auth/oauth-provider` when feasible.
3. If developers cannot upgrade their applications, see workarounds below.
### Summary
The legacy `oidcProvider` and `mcp` plugins exhibit two related defects in their OIDC discovery and authorize surfaces.
The discovery document advertises `"none"` in `id_token_signing_alg_values_supported` (and, for `mcp`, in `resource_signing_alg_values_supported` on the OAuth protected-resource metadata). Any relying party that performs algorithm negotiation from this metadata without pinning to a real signing algorithm may accept unsigned tokens.
PKCE `plain` is enabled by default. The runtime gate in the authorize handler accepts `code_challenge_method=plain` under this default, and a missing `code_challenge_method` parameter is silently downgraded to `"plain"` before the allowlist check. Discovery advertises `code_challenge_methods_supported: ["S256"]`, contradicting the runtime acceptance of `plain`. RFC 9700 §2.1.1 (OAuth 2.1) explicitly forbids `plain`.
### Details
The metadata builders unconditionally inject `"none"` into the alg list. The runtime authorize gate is structured so a buggy client that strips the `code_challenge_method` parameter still enters the plain code path because the handler rewrites the missing value to `"plain"` before the allowlist check fires.
`@better-auth/oauth-provider` (the deprecation target for `oidcProvider`) is not affected by either defect. The metadata builder uses a `JWSAlgorithms` type union that structurally excludes `"none"`. The authorize schema is `code_challenge_method: z.literal("S256").optional()`, which rejects `plain` at parse time.
### Patches
Fixed in `[email protected]`. The legacy `oidcProvider` and `mcp` plugins now:
- Drop `"none"` from `id_token_signing_alg_values_supported` (both plugins) and from `resource_signing_alg_values_supported` (`mcp`). Discovery no longer advertises the unsigned-token option.
- Default `allowPlainCodeChallengeMethod` to `false`. A request that explicitly passes `code_challenge_method=plain` is rejected with `invalid_request` unless the integrator opts in.
- Reject a `code_challenge` without an accompanying `code_challenge_method` instead of silently rewriting the missing value to `plain`. Clients that send `code_challenge` must also send `code_challenge_method=S256`.
Discovery and runtime behavior align on `S256` only by default.
Integrators who must keep plain PKCE for legacy clients can restore the previous shape with `oidcProvider({ allowPlainCodeChallengeMethod: true })` (and likewise for `mcp`). With the opt-in set, a request that omits `code_challenge_method` is treated as `plain` again, preserving backwards compatibility while keeping the secure default for everyone else. Both legacy plugins are deprecated long-term; the recommended migration is `@better-auth/oauth-provider`, which never advertised `none` or accepted plain PKCE.
### Workarounds
If developers cannot upgrade their applications immediately:
- **Disable plain PKCE explicitly**: set `oidcProvider({ allowPlainCodeChallengeMethod: false })` (and the equivalent on `mcp`). Closes the runtime acceptance of `plain` even though the silent downgrade still rewrites missing methods.
- **Override the metadata** to drop `"none"` from `id_token_signing_alg_values_supported`. For `oidcProvider`, pass `metadata: { id_token_signing_alg_values_supported: ["RS256"] }`. For `mcp`, set the same on `options.oidcConfig.metadata`. Verify by curling the `.well-known` endpoint.
- **Migrate to `@better-auth/oauth-provider`**: the package is the deprecation target and is unaffected by both defects.
### Impact
- **Algorithm-negotiation downgrade**: relying parties that read the discovery document without pinning may accept unsigned (`alg: "none"`) tokens.
- **Authorization-code interception**: PKCE `plain` does not protect the authorization code if the URL leaks (Referer headers, browser history, screen capture, proxy logs). PKCE `S256` is what protects against that exposure; with `plain` the protection is absent.
- **OAuth 2.1 / RFC 9700 non-conformance**: deployments shipping the defaults are non-compliant with current standards.
### Credit
Reported by @subhanUmer.
### Resources
- [CWE-327: Use of a Broken or Risky Cryptographic Algorithm](https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/327.html)
- [CWE-757: Selection of Less-Secure Algorithm During Negotiation](https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/757.html)
- [CWE-1188: Insecure Default Initialization of Resource](https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/1188.html)
- [RFC 9700 §2.1.1: PKCE](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc9700#section-2.1.1)
- [RFC 9700 §2.1.2: Token Replay Prevention](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc9700#section-2.1.2)
- [RFC 8414 §2: Authorization Server Metadata](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc8414#section-2)
EUVD source date text has no stated timezone and is retained without inventing a UTC instant. Related bulletin membership is not an alias, common cause or applicability claim. A missing vector with a zero score is treated as unrated. Complete vendor/product and underlying source evidence remains in the original JSON.
Original publisher date fields
datePublished: Aug 1, 2026, 12:22:18 PM
dateUpdated: Aug 3, 2026, 3:23:44 PM
No normalized affected-package data is projected for this source revision. The original publisher record may contain additional product and version evidence; this does not establish that a package is unaffected.
NVD analysis and CPE criteria are source context, not proof that a package or your environment is affected. Complete affected data, logical configurations and SSVC are retained in the original JSON.
Source analysis status: Deferred
Weakness classifications: CWE-327
Original publisher date fields
published: 2026-08-01T13:17:04.557
lastModified: 2026-09-08T20:34:34.997
No normalized affected-package data is projected for this source revision. The original publisher record may contain additional product and version evidence; this does not establish that a package is unaffected.