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OliveTin: StartActionAndWait Endpoints Bypass `logs` Permission and Return Action Output

CVSS 3.1 4.3 MEDIUMEUVD CVSS 3.1 4.3 CVSS 3.1 · [email protected] · Secondary 4.3 MEDIUMCVSS_V3 Publisher rating MODERATEFixed by github.com/OliveTin/OliveTin 0.0.0-20260708085316-e421780c9885osv · severity unknownFixed by github.com/OliveTin/OliveTin 0.0.0-20260708085316-e421780c9885KEV status unknown

cve-program · CVE-2026-67439

Published

OliveTin gives safe and simple access to predefined shell commands from a web interface. Prior to 3000.17.0, the service/internal/api/api.go StartActionAndWait and StartActionByGetAndWait endpoints return full LogEntry output after execution without enforcing the logs permission, allowing a user with exec permission but logs:false to read action output. This issue is fixed in version 3000.17.0.

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euvd · EUVD-2026-50565

Published

OliveTin gives safe and simple access to predefined shell commands from a web interface. Prior to 3000.17.0, the service/internal/api/api.go StartActionAndWait and StartActionByGetAndWait endpoints return full LogEntry output after execution without enforcing the logs permission, allowing a user with exec permission but logs:false to read action output. This issue is fixed in version 3000.17.0.

Read the publisher's advisory

nvd · CVE-2026-67439

Published

OliveTin gives safe and simple access to predefined shell commands from a web interface. Prior to 3000.17.0, the service/internal/api/api.go StartActionAndWait and StartActionByGetAndWait endpoints return full LogEntry output after execution without enforcing the logs permission, allowing a user with exec permission but logs:false to read action output. This issue is fixed in version 3000.17.0.

Read the publisher's advisory

osv · GHSA-jm28-2wcr-qf3h

Published

## Summary The synchronous execution RPCs `StartActionAndWait` and `StartActionByGetAndWait` return the full `LogEntry` for the just-executed action without checking whether the caller is allowed to read that action's logs. OliveTin's ACL model separates `exec` from `logs`. A deployment can intentionally allow a user to run an action while denying access to its historical or live output. That separation is enforced in `GetLogs`, `GetActionLogs`, `ExecutionStatus`, and `EventStream`, but it is not enforced in the synchronous `...AndWait` endpoints. As a result, any user who can execute an action through these endpoints can read the action output immediately even when the action's ACL explicitly sets `logs:false`. ## Details OliveTin defines separate per-action permissions: ```go // service/internal/config/config.go type PermissionsList struct { View bool `koanf:"view"` Exec bool `koanf:"exec"` Logs bool `koanf:"logs"` Kill bool `koanf:"kill"` } ``` The normal log and streaming paths correctly enforce `logs` permission: ```go // service/internal/api/api.go func (api *oliveTinAPI) isLogEntryAllowed(e *executor.InternalLogEntry, user *authpublic.AuthenticatedUser) bool { if user == nil || !isValidLogEntry(e) { return false } return acl.IsAllowedLogs(api.cfg, user, e.Binding.Action) } ``` That check is used by: - `GetLogs` - `GetActionLogs` - `ExecutionStatus` - `EventStream` However, the synchronous execution endpoints directly return the created `LogEntry` without any `logs` ACL check: ```go // service/internal/api/api.go func (api *oliveTinAPI) StartActionAndWait(ctx ctx.Context, req *connect.Request[apiv1.StartActionAndWaitRequest]) (*connect.Response[apiv1.StartActionAndWaitResponse], error) { ... internalLogEntry, ok := api.startActionAndWaitRun(binding, args, user) if !ok { return nil, connect.NewError(connect.CodeNotFound, fmt.Errorf("execution not found")) } return connect.NewResponse(&apiv1.StartActionAndWaitResponse{ LogEntry: api.internalLogEntryToPb(internalLogEntry, user), }), nil } func (api *oliveTinAPI) StartActionByGetAndWait(ctx ctx.Context, req *connect.Request[apiv1.StartActionByGetAndWaitRequest]) (*connect.Response[apiv1.StartActionByGetAndWaitResponse], error) { ... internalLogEntry, ok := api.executor.GetLog(execReq.TrackingID) if ok { return connect.NewResponse(&apiv1.StartActionByGetAndWaitResponse{ LogEntry: api.internalLogEntryToPb(internalLogEntry, user), }), nil } return nil, connect.NewError(connect.CodeNotFound, fmt.Errorf("execution not found")) } ``` And `internalLogEntryToPb()` includes the full output: ```go // service/internal/api/api.go func (api *oliveTinAPI) internalLogEntryToPb(logEntry *executor.InternalLogEntry, authenticatedUser *authpublic.AuthenticatedUser) *apiv1.LogEntry { pble := &apiv1.LogEntry{ ActionTitle: logEntry.ActionTitle, Output: logEntry.Output, ExitCode: logEntry.ExitCode, ExecutionTrackingId: logEntry.ExecutionTrackingID, ... } ... return pble } ``` The executor separately enforces `exec` permission, but there is no subsequent check that the response should omit or deny `Output` when `logs:false`. ## Local Reproduction I verified this locally with a one-off test against the real `StartActionAndWait` handler. Configuration used: - action `secret_action` with shell `echo SECRET_FROM_ACTION` - user `low` matched by ACL: - `exec: true` - `logs: false` - `view: false` - `kill: false` Then I invoked `StartActionAndWait` as `low` through the real handler path using header-based auth. Observed output from the test run: ```text === RUN TestTempStartActionAndWaitLeaksOutputWithoutLogsPermission time="2026-03-12T23:36:33+01:00" level=info msg="Action requested" actionTitle=secret-action tags="[]" time="2026-03-12T23:36:33+01:00" level=info msg="Action parse args - Before" actionTitle=secret-action cmd="echo SECRET_FROM_ACTION" time="2026-03-12T23:36:33+01:00" level=info msg="Action parse args - After" actionTitle=secret-action cmd="echo SECRET_FROM_ACTION" time="2026-03-12T23:36:33+01:00" level=info msg="Action started" actionTitle=secret-action timeout=5 time="2026-03-12T23:36:33+01:00" level=info msg="Action finished" actionTitle=secret-action exit=0 outputLength=40 timedOut=false temp_acl_bypass_test.go:56: output="S\x00E\x00C\x00R\x00E\x00T\x00_\x00F\x00R\x00O\x00M\x00_\x00A\x00C\x00T\x00I\x00O\x00N\x00\r\x00\n\x00" blocked=false action="secret-action" --- PASS: TestTempStartActionAndWaitLeaksOutputWithoutLogsPermission (0.03s) ``` The UTF-16LE formatting is from Windows `echo`, but the key result is that the response returned the real command output even though the caller's ACL explicitly denied log access. ## Impact - **Bypass of log confidentiality controls:** Operators may configure actions to be executable but not log-readable. The `...AndWait` endpoints break that separation. - **Disclosure of secrets printed by actions:** Many OliveTin actions wrap administrative scripts and commands whose stdout/stderr may contain credentials, internal paths, hostnames, tokens, or sensitive operational data. - **Adjacent to previous output-leak bugs:** OliveTin already had an EventStream output disclosure bug. This is a separate response-path authorization gap on the synchronous execution APIs. ## Recommended Fix Enforce `logs` permission before returning `LogEntry` content from synchronous execution endpoints. Two reasonable fixes: 1. Deny the endpoint response when `logs:false` ```go if !acl.IsAllowedLogs(api.cfg, user, binding.Action) { return nil, connect.NewError(connect.CodePermissionDenied, fmt.Errorf("permission denied to view action output")) } ``` 2. Or redact log-bearing fields when `logs:false` ```go pb := api.internalLogEntryToPb(internalLogEntry, user) if !acl.IsAllowedLogs(api.cfg, user, binding.Action) { pb.Output = "" pb.ExitCode = 0 } return connect.NewResponse(&apiv1.StartActionAndWaitResponse{LogEntry: pb}), nil ``` The same fix should be applied to both: - `StartActionAndWait` - `StartActionByGetAndWait` ## References - `service/internal/api/api.go` - `service/internal/config/config.go` - `service/internal/acl/acl.go`

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osv · GO-2026-6144

Published

OliveTin: StartActionAndWait Endpoints Bypass `logs` Permission and Return Action Output in github.com/OliveTin/OliveTin

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Affected versions, risk and source history

cve-program · CVE-2026-67439

Published

OliveTin

Vendor product

Publisher's version information

Shown as published. These rules are not interpreted as NuGet package version ranges.

{
                    "vendor": "OliveTin",
                    "product": "OliveTin",
                    "versions": [
                        {
                            "version": "< 3000.17.0",
                            "status": "affected"
                        }
                    ]
                }

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euvd · EUVD-2026-50565

Published

EUVD source date text has no stated timezone and is retained without inventing a UTC instant. Related bulletin membership is not an alias, common cause or applicability claim. A missing vector with a zero score is treated as unrated. Complete vendor/product and underlying source evidence remains in the original JSON.

Original publisher date fields

datePublished: Jul 29, 2026, 8:58:24 PM

dateUpdated: Jul 30, 2026, 2:40:26 PM

No normalized affected-package data is projected for this source revision. The original publisher record may contain additional product and version evidence; this does not establish that a package is unaffected.

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nvd · CVE-2026-67439

Published

NVD analysis and CPE criteria are source context, not proof that a package or your environment is affected. Complete affected data, logical configurations and SSVC are retained in the original JSON.

Source analysis status: Deferred

Weakness classifications: CWE-863

Original publisher date fields

published: 2026-07-29T21:17:48.253

lastModified: 2026-07-30T19:21:23.297

No normalized affected-package data is projected for this source revision. The original publisher record may contain additional product and version evidence; this does not establish that a package is unaffected.

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osv · GHSA-jm28-2wcr-qf3h

Published

github.com/OliveTin/OliveTin

Go

SEMVER · introduced 0 → fixed 0.0.0-20260708085316-e421780c9885

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osv · GO-2026-6144

Published

github.com/OliveTin/OliveTin

Go

SEMVER · introduced 0 → fixed 0.0.0-20260708085316-e421780c9885

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

ChangeIntel

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