rclone is a command-line program to sync files and directories to and from different cloud storage providers. Prior to 1.75.0, the shared HTTP CONNECT helper in lib/proxy/http.go parses proxy CONNECT responses with http.ReadResponse over an unrestricted buffered reader, allowing a malicious or compromised configured proxy, or an active on-path actor controlling a plaintext HTTP proxy hop, to send oversized headers that grow memory until the rclone process fails. The affected helper is used by FTP and SFTP proxy connections, and SFTP reaches the parser before SSH server authentication, so target host key validation does not constrain a malicious proxy. This issue is fixed in 1.75.0.
rclone is a command-line program to sync files and directories to and from different cloud storage providers. Prior to 1.75.0, the shared HTTP CONNECT helper in lib/proxy/http.go parses proxy CONNECT responses with http.ReadResponse over an unrestricted buffered reader, allowing a malicious or compromised configured proxy, or an active on-path actor controlling a plaintext HTTP proxy hop, to send oversized headers that grow memory until the rclone process fails. The affected helper is used by FTP and SFTP proxy connections, and SFTP reaches the parser before SSH server authentication, so target host key validation does not constrain a malicious proxy. This issue is fixed in 1.75.0.
rclone is a command-line program to sync files and directories to and from different cloud storage providers. Prior to 1.75.0, the shared HTTP CONNECT helper in lib/proxy/http.go parses proxy CONNECT responses with http.ReadResponse over an unrestricted buffered reader, allowing a malicious or compromised configured proxy, or an active on-path actor controlling a plaintext HTTP proxy hop, to send oversized headers that grow memory until the rclone process fails. The affected helper is used by FTP and SFTP proxy connections, and SFTP reaches the parser before SSH server authentication, so target host key validation does not constrain a malicious proxy. This issue is fixed in 1.75.0.
## 1. Summary
The shared HTTP CONNECT helper parses a proxy response with `http.ReadResponse` over an unrestricted buffered reader. The production helper accepted a valid response containing a 2 MiB header in three consecutive runs. A malicious or compromised configured proxy, or an active on-path actor controlling a plaintext HTTP-proxy hop, can grow memory until the process fails.
The security impact is process-wide exhaustion, not loss of access through the malicious proxy, which the proxy already controls. The victim must configure and use the proxy, so UI is Required and the rating is Medium.
## 2. Affected Assets & Attack Surface
- Verified rclone revision: `a0c09f1381ae93e2a9a33c529d170186c61ad058` (`v1.74.0-240-ga0c09f138`)
- Current-master check: `lib/proxy/http.go` was unchanged at master commit `961266888fe797390c535386f3b3aa46f4853602` on 2026-07-18
- Shared helper: `lib/proxy/http.go:23-81`
- SFTP use: `backend/sftp/ssh_internal.go:25-45`
- FTP use: `backend/ftp/ftp.go:465-479`
- Proxy peer: configured malicious/compromised proxy or active on-path actor for a plaintext HTTP proxy
- TLS boundary: HTTPS proxy connections authenticate the proxy before this response is parsed, so an on-path actor must also defeat TLS
## 3. Technical Root Cause Analysis
`HTTPConnectDial` invokes `http.ReadResponse(br, req)` directly. This call does not inherit `http.Transport.MaxResponseHeaderBytes`. In the Go implementation used for validation, exported `textproto.Reader.ReadMIMEHeader` passes `math.MaxInt64` limits, and `textproto.NewReader` explicitly instructs callers to use `io.LimitReader` or an equivalent bound for denial-of-service resistance. Rclone supplies no bound or total CONNECT-handshake deadline. The helper additionally returns the raw connection, so a safe remediation must preserve any tunnel bytes already buffered after the CONNECT response.
## 4. Proof-of-Concept & Evidence
1. Configure the helper to use a test proxy.
2. Accept rclone's CONNECT request.
3. Return `HTTP/1.1 200 Connection Established` with an `X-Fill` header containing 2 MiB of data.
4. The actual helper parses and accepts the entire response without a fixed ceiling; this succeeded in all three reruns.
The test establishes unbounded parsing behavior without intentionally exhausting the host.
## 5. Impact Assessment
Large or concurrent CONNECT responses can terminate the rclone process and interrupt unrelated FTP/SFTP remotes and mounts. Runtime OOM cannot be contained by RC panic recovery. SFTP reaches this parser before SSH server authentication, so target host-key validation does not constrain a malicious proxy; HTTPS proxy authentication does constrain ordinary on-path attackers.
## 6. Remediation Guidance
- Enforce a total CONNECT status/header budget before parsing.
- Add a fixed total handshake deadline as well as idle deadlines.
- Close the connection on an oversized or malformed response.
- Return a wrapper that consumes already buffered post-response tunnel bytes before the raw connection.
- Test large single/multiple headers, slow streaming, and concurrent handshakes.
EUVD source date text has no stated timezone and is retained without inventing a UTC instant. Related bulletin membership is not an alias, common cause or applicability claim. A missing vector with a zero score is treated as unrated. Complete vendor/product and underlying source evidence remains in the original JSON.
Original publisher date fields
datePublished: Aug 5, 2026, 8:17:14 PM
dateUpdated: Aug 31, 2026, 2:53:51 PM
1 related source bulletins · separate from aliases
WID-SEC-W-2026-2679: rclone: Mehrere Schwachstellen
No normalized affected-package data is projected for this source revision. The original publisher record may contain additional product and version evidence; this does not establish that a package is unaffected.
NVD analysis and CPE criteria are source context, not proof that a package or your environment is affected. Complete affected data, logical configurations and SSVC are retained in the original JSON.
Source analysis status: Awaiting Analysis
Weakness classifications: CWE-400 · CWE-770
Original publisher date fields
published: 2026-08-05T21:16:58.573
lastModified: 2026-09-09T20:50:00.950
No normalized affected-package data is projected for this source revision. The original publisher record may contain additional product and version evidence; this does not establish that a package is unaffected.