rclone is a command-line program to sync files and directories to and from different cloud storage providers. Prior to 1.75.0, a valid but nondefault FTP filename encoding in backend/ftp/ftp.go can restore raw CR/LF immediately before an attacker-controlled path is interpolated into the line-oriented FTP control channel, and github.com/jlaffaye/ftp formats the argument through textproto.Conn.Cmd without rejecting CR or LF, allowing a filename such as victim CRLF DELE other-secret CRLF NOOP to inject an independent authenticated FTP command when the victim copies or syncs to a more-privileged FTP destination. This issue is fixed in 1.75.0.
rclone is a command-line program to sync files and directories to and from different cloud storage providers. Prior to 1.75.0, a valid but nondefault FTP filename encoding in backend/ftp/ftp.go can restore raw CR/LF immediately before an attacker-controlled path is interpolated into the line-oriented FTP control channel, and github.com/jlaffaye/ftp formats the argument through textproto.Conn.Cmd without rejecting CR or LF, allowing a filename such as victim CRLF DELE other-secret CRLF NOOP to inject an independent authenticated FTP command when the victim copies or syncs to a more-privileged FTP destination. This issue is fixed in 1.75.0.
rclone is a command-line program to sync files and directories to and from different cloud storage providers. Prior to 1.75.0, a valid but nondefault FTP filename encoding in backend/ftp/ftp.go can restore raw CR/LF immediately before an attacker-controlled path is interpolated into the line-oriented FTP control channel, and github.com/jlaffaye/ftp formats the argument through textproto.Conn.Cmd without rejecting CR or LF, allowing a filename such as victim CRLF DELE other-secret CRLF NOOP to inject an independent authenticated FTP command when the victim copies or syncs to a more-privileged FTP destination. This issue is fixed in 1.75.0.
## 1. Summary
A valid but nondefault FTP filename encoding can restore raw CR/LF immediately before an attacker-controlled path is interpolated into the line-oriented FTP control channel. The dependency does not reject CR or LF in command arguments, so a filename can inject an independent authenticated command. A real test server observed the injected `DELE` command.
The default FTP encoding and the configuration-wizard examples include `Ctl` and are not vulnerable to the demonstrated filename. A manual custom encoding that omits `Ctl`/`CrLf` is mandatory and is reflected as High attack complexity. The credible trust boundary is a lower-trust source namespace feeding a more-privileged FTP destination: if the attacker already has equivalent rights on that destination, the report establishes a bug but no privilege gain. Protocol framing must still be enforced at the command sink because a filename-compatibility encoder is not a safe substitute for command-argument validation.
## 2. Affected Assets & Attack Surface
- Verified rclone revision: `a0c09f1381ae93e2a9a33c529d170186c61ad058` (`v1.74.0-240-ga0c09f138`)
- Current-master check: the relevant paths remained present at commit `961266888fe797390c535386f3b3aa46f4853602` on 2026-07-18
- rclone FTP encoding: `backend/ftp/ftp.go:232-248`, `768-785`
- Encoder masks/conversion: `lib/encoder/encoder.go:36-68`, `121-152`, `1144-1165`
- FTP command sinks: `backend/ftp/ftp.go:1071-1173`, `1309-1428`
- Dependency: `github.com/jlaffaye/[email protected]`
- Dependency command formatting: `ftp.go:604-610`, with path-bearing callers at `ftp.go:893-947`, `1010-1026`, and `1069-1080`
- Preconditions: an attacker can create a filename in a source namespace, the victim copies/syncs it to an FTP destination with greater authority, and that destination uses a manually configured encoding that leaves CR/LF raw
- Platform note: Unix and some remote backends can supply newline-bearing names; a local Windows source cannot create the demonstrated filename
## 3. Technical Root Cause Analysis
Rclone represents control characters safely in its internal Standard encoding. Immediately before an FTP operation, `FromStandardPath` decodes that representation and applies the configured backend mask. If the mask omits `Ctl`/`CrLf`, raw newlines are restored. The dependency then formats the resulting argument onto a CRLF-delimited control stream through `textproto.Conn.Cmd` without validating it. Reversible filename representation is therefore being used as the only protection for a protocol-command boundary.
## 4. Proof-of-Concept & Evidence
The source filename was equivalent to:
```text
victim\r\nDELE other-secret\r\nNOOP
```
With the default encoding, no raw newline reached the command. With the valid nondefault configuration `encoding = Slash`, `FromStandardPath` restored raw CRLF. During a real FTP path operation, the server parsed `DELE other-secret` as an independent authenticated command. This establishes injection, not merely unsafe serialization. The test did not establish confidentiality impact or operating-system command execution.
## 5. Impact Assessment
Injected commands run with the configured FTP account's permissions. Demonstrated direct impact is deletion of a different path, with corresponding integrity and availability loss inside that account. Other FTP filesystem commands may be reachable, but confidentiality and arbitrary operating-system command execution are not claimed. The privilege-boundary case requires the victim's FTP account to have more authority than the attacker has in the source namespace.
## 6. Remediation Guidance
- Reject CR and LF in every FTP command argument at the lowest command-construction boundary.
- Apply the check to paths, usernames, passwords, rename arguments, and all other formatted fields.
- Return an error rather than silently normalizing an unsafe argument.
- Keep the default encoder protection as defense in depth and reject an FTP encoding configuration that can restore CR/LF.
- Add end-to-end tests for CR, LF, CRLF, and each path command.
EUVD source date text has no stated timezone and is retained without inventing a UTC instant. Related bulletin membership is not an alias, common cause or applicability claim. A missing vector with a zero score is treated as unrated. Complete vendor/product and underlying source evidence remains in the original JSON.
Original publisher date fields
datePublished: Aug 5, 2026, 8:33:32 PM
dateUpdated: Aug 6, 2026, 6:44:51 PM
1 related source bulletins · separate from aliases
WID-SEC-W-2026-2679: rclone: Mehrere Schwachstellen
No normalized affected-package data is projected for this source revision. The original publisher record may contain additional product and version evidence; this does not establish that a package is unaffected.
NVD analysis and CPE criteria are source context, not proof that a package or your environment is affected. Complete affected data, logical configurations and SSVC are retained in the original JSON.
Source analysis status: Awaiting Analysis
Weakness classifications: CWE-93
Original publisher date fields
published: 2026-08-05T21:16:58.727
lastModified: 2026-09-09T20:50:00.950
No normalized affected-package data is projected for this source revision. The original publisher record may contain additional product and version evidence; this does not establish that a package is unaffected.