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Lemur: Any user can revoke arbitrary certificates at the CA by uploading a duplicate record and revoking it

CVSS 3.1 7.3 HIGHCheck source for fixed versionsKEV status unknown

cve-program · CVE-2026-71417

Published

Lemur manages TLS certificate creation. Prior to 1.9.3, POST /api/1/certificates/upload allowed a non-read-only user to create a duplicate row using another certificate body, authority_id, serial, or external_id without requiring permission on the underlying authority. PUT /api/1/certificates//revoke authorized the caller against only the selected Lemur row, so the creator of the duplicate bypassed CertificatePermission. The duplicate had no cert.endpoints, which also bypassed the safeguard that prevents revocation of deployed certificates. Issuer plugins then revoked the real CA-side certificate using certificate.body or external_id under the stored authority credentials. An attacker could therefore revoke arbitrary managed certificates and cause fleet-wide TLS denial of service. The fix rejects duplicate authority_id and serial identities, requires authority access on upload, and checks every matching row during revocation. This issue is fixed in version 1.9.3.

Read the publisher's advisory

Affected versions, risk and source history

cve-program · CVE-2026-71417

Published

lemur

Vendor product

Publisher's version information

Shown as published. These rules are not interpreted as NuGet package version ranges.

{
                    "vendor": "Netflix",
                    "product": "lemur",
                    "versions": [
                        {
                            "version": "< 1.9.3",
                            "status": "affected"
                        }
                    ]
                }

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

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Sources read 21 Nov 11:24 UTC · 274 of 275 readable · 270 fully read · documentation 469/469 current