SiYuan before v3.7.4 Information Disclosure via getBlockAttrs
Collected exploitation and prediction evidence
Risk source coverageCISA KEV is observed exploitation evidence. FIRST EPSS is a dated prediction of exploitation in the next 30 days. Missing scores are unknown. This collector requests predictions only for explicit CVE aliases in the public NuGet archive; Microsoft release views retain their existing prediction scope.
No collected risk observation for these identifiers. This does not establish absence of exploitation or a zero probability.
cve-program · CVE-2026-72803
PublishedSiYuan versions before v3.7.4 fail to enforce publish-access checks in the getBlockAttrs and batchGetBlockAttrs endpoints. Attackers can retrieve block attributes including names, aliases, memos, and custom fields from protected documents by sending POST requests with block IDs.
- Source published
- 12 Aug 2026 19:07:48 UTC
- Source modified
- 14 Aug 2026 16:52:09 UTC
- Observed here
- 23 Oct 2026 15:48:27 UTC
- Source terms
- CVE Program Terms of Use
Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON
This view projects the publisher's source fields for reading; the original JSON retains additional fields and CVE enrichment containers. Attribution: cve-program · CVE Program Terms of Use. Source text is retained; field grouping and change labels are provided by ChangeIntel.
CVSS 4.0 · 6.9 CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:L/VI:N/VA:N/SC:L/SI:N/SA:N
CVSS 3.1 · 5.8 CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:L/I:N/A:N
nvd · CVE-2026-72803
PublishedSiYuan versions before v3.7.4 fail to enforce publish-access checks in the getBlockAttrs and batchGetBlockAttrs endpoints. Attackers can retrieve block attributes including names, aliases, memos, and custom fields from protected documents by sending POST requests with block IDs.
NVD analysis and CPE criteria are source context, not proof that a package or your environment is affected. Complete affected data, logical configurations and SSVC are retained in the original JSON.
Source analysis status: Deferred
Weakness classifications: CWE-862
Original publisher date fields
published: 2026-08-12T20:17:52.247
lastModified: 2026-10-24T15:10:00.190
- Source published
- 12 Aug 2026 20:17:52 UTC
- Source modified
- 24 Oct 2026 15:10:00 UTC
- Observed here
- 25 Oct 2026 15:19:03 UTC
- Source terms
- NIST NVD usage terms; underlying source attribution retained
Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON
This view projects the publisher's source fields for reading; the original JSON retains additional fields and CVE enrichment containers. Attribution: nvd · NIST NVD usage terms; underlying source attribution retained. Source text is retained; field grouping and change labels are provided by ChangeIntel.
CVSS 4.0 · [email protected] · Secondary · 6.9 CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:L/VI:N/VA:N/SC:L/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X
CVSS 3.1 · [email protected] · Secondary · 5.8 CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:L/I:N/A:N
osv · GHSA-qvq9-hq6p-v378
Published**CVE:** This vulnerability corresponds to [CVE-2026-72803](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-72803). ### Summary `POST /api/attr/getBlockAttrs` and `POST /api/attr/batchGetBlockAttrs` return a block's full attribute set (IAL) with no publish-access check. Both are `CheckAuth`-only, so they are reachable by the publish `RoleReader` token and by the anonymous account when `Publish.Auth.Enable` is `false`. An anonymous reader supplying a block ID receives the block's name, alias, memo, bookmark, tags, and every `custom-*` attribute including for blocks in publish-forbidden and password-protected documents. The batch variant accepts an ID list, making it a bulk extraction primitive. ### Details Neither handler applies a filter: ```go // /api/attr/getBlockAttrs (router line 301) ret.Data = sql.GetBlockAttrs(id) // /api/attr/batchGetBlockAttrs (router line 302) ret.Data = sql.BatchGetBlockAttrs(idList) ``` `sql.GetBlockAttrs` is a direct database read returning the block's entire IAL: `name`, `alias`, `memo`, `bookmark`, `tags`, and any `custom-*` key/value the user has set. Several of these are user-authored free text memos in particular are freeform notes attached to a block so this is document content, not merely structural metadata. `batchGetBlockAttrs` takes an arbitrary list of block IDs in a single request, so an attacker holding a set of block IDs can sweep attributes across the entire workspace in one call. **Guarded-sibling asymmetry.** The sibling metadata endpoint `getBlockInfo` calls `checkBlockPublishAccess(c, id, ret)` before returning; `getBlockAttrs` and `batchGetBlockAttrs` call nothing. Verified at `origin/master`: both handler bodies contain no publish-access, publish-ignore, or readonly-role check, and both routes are registered `CheckAuth` without `CheckAdminRole`. ### Proof of Concept Precondition: publish mode enabled (default port 6808); anonymous when `Publish.Auth.Enable` is `false`, otherwise any publish reader account. A document is marked publish-forbidden (or password-protected) and contains a block with a memo and a custom attribute set. **Single-block disclosure:** ``` POST http://127.0.0.1:6808/api/attr/getBlockAttrs {"id":"<BLOCK_ID_IN_PROTECTED_DOC>"} ``` Returns the block's IAL: `name`, `alias`, `memo`, `bookmark`, `tags`, and all `custom-*` values. **Bulk disclosure:** ``` POST http://127.0.0.1:6808/api/attr/batchGetBlockAttrs {"ids":["<ID1>","<ID2>","<ID3>"]} ``` Returns the attribute sets for every supplied ID in one response, with no per-ID authorization. **Control:** the sibling `getBlockInfo` with the same block ID is refused by `checkBlockPublishAccess`, confirming the boundary is enforced elsewhere and omitted here. ### Impact An anonymous reader (publish mode with auth disabled) or any publish `RoleReader` can read block attributes belonging to publish-forbidden and password-protected documents, including user-authored memos and arbitrary `custom-*` values. The batch endpoint turns this into a bulk primitive: given a set of block IDs, an attacker retrieves attributes across the whole workspace in a single request. Confidentiality-only. ### Suggested fix Call `checkBlockPublishAccess` in `getBlockAttrs` before returning, matching `getBlockInfo`. For `batchGetBlockAttrs`, apply the check per ID and drop unauthorized entries from the response rather than failing the whole batch.
- Source published
- 3 Sep 2026 22:58:29 UTC
- Source modified
- 10 Sep 2026 15:25:29 UTC
- Observed here
- 24 Oct 2026 13:19:41 UTC
- Source terms
- GitHub Advisory Database · CC-BY-4.0
Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON
This view projects the publisher's source fields for reading; the original JSON retains additional fields and CVE enrichment containers. Attribution: osv · GitHub Advisory Database · CC-BY-4.0. Source text is retained; field grouping and change labels are provided by ChangeIntel.
CVSS_V3 · CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:L/I:N/A:N
Publisher rating · MODERATE
osv · GO-2026-6404
PublishedSiYuan: Missing publish-access filter on getBlockAttrs and batchGetBlockAttrs discloses block attributes (name, alias, memo, custom fields) of protected documents in github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan/kernel
- Source published
- 10 Sep 2026 14:48:42 UTC
- Source modified
- 10 Sep 2026 15:15:14 UTC
- Observed here
- 24 Oct 2026 13:19:41 UTC
- Source terms
- OSV · upstream source license applies
Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON
This view projects the publisher's source fields for reading; the original JSON retains additional fields and CVE enrichment containers. Attribution: osv · OSV · upstream source license applies. Source text is retained; field grouping and change labels are provided by ChangeIntel.