Budibase is an open-source low-code platform. Prior to 3.39.24, POST /api/public/v1/roles/assign called validateGlobalRoleUpdate without checking appBuilder.appId or role.appId in packages/server/src/api/controllers/public/globalRoleValidation.ts. An app-scoped builder could scope the request to an app they control and then grant themselves builder access or an arbitrary role in another app, exposing that app data, datasource configuration, and automations. This issue is fixed in version 3.39.24.
Budibase is an open-source low-code platform. Prior to 3.39.24, POST /api/public/v1/roles/assign called validateGlobalRoleUpdate without checking appBuilder.appId or role.appId in packages/server/src/api/controllers/public/globalRoleValidation.ts. An app-scoped builder could scope the request to an app they control and then grant themselves builder access or an arbitrary role in another app, exposing that app data, datasource configuration, and automations. This issue is fixed in version 3.39.24.
Budibase is an open-source low-code platform. Prior to 3.39.24, POST /api/public/v1/roles/assign called validateGlobalRoleUpdate without checking appBuilder.appId or role.appId in packages/server/src/api/controllers/public/globalRoleValidation.ts. An app-scoped builder could scope the request to an app they control and then grant themselves builder access or an arbitrary role in another app, exposing that app data, datasource configuration, and automations. This issue is fixed in version 3.39.24.
### Summary
Budibase `3.39.19` (commit `03fbabae4`) is affected by a privilege-escalation / missing-authorization flaw in the public role-assignment API. An **app-scoped builder** (a user who builds only specific apps — `user.builder.apps = [appA]`, not a global builder or admin) can grant **themselves builder access to ANY other app in the tenant**, or assign themselves/any user an arbitrary data-plane role (e.g. `ADMIN`) in any app, by calling `POST /api/public/v1/roles/assign`. The endpoint only authorizes the two *global* flags (`admin`, `builder`); the per-app `appBuilder` and `role:{appId,roleId}` grant vectors are passed to the backend **without any authorization check that the caller controls the target app**. Reproduced in a local authorized lab using the verbatim authorization-gate and SDK logic.
This is an incomplete fix of the role-assignment hardening in commit `d63d1d9054` ("Inline public user global role validation"), which only ever validated the global flags.
### Details
The issue is caused by authorization being implemented as a **flag-level allowlist** (`admin`/`builder`) instead of validating the *scope* the caller is granting.
Relevant code paths:
- `packages/server/src/api/controllers/public/globalRoleValidation.ts` — `validateGlobalRoleUpdate(ctx, roleUpdate)` only checks `roleUpdate.admin` (requires `isAdmin`) and `roleUpdate.builder` (requires `isGlobalBuilder`). The `GlobalRoleUpdate` interface declares only `{ builder?, admin? }`; `appBuilder` and `role` are not referenced.
- `packages/server/src/api/controllers/public/roles.ts` — `assign()` does `const { userIds, ...assignmentProps } = ctx.request.body; validateGlobalRoleUpdate(ctx, assignmentProps); await sdk.publicApi.roles.assign(userIds, assignmentProps)`. The `appBuilder`/`role` props pass through unvalidated.
- `packages/pro/src/sdk/publicApi/roles.ts` — `assign()`: for `opts.appBuilder` it sets `user.builder = { apps: existing.concat([getProdWorkspaceID(opts.appBuilder.appId)]) }`; for `opts.role` it sets `user.roles[getProdWorkspaceID(opts.role.appId)] = opts.role.roleId`. No check that the caller builds the target app, and `userIds` is an arbitrary list (`bulkGet`). The only gate is the `isExpandedPublicApiEnabled()` license check.
- `packages/server/src/api/routes/public/index.ts` — `applyAdminRoutes(roleEndpoints)` attaches **only** `middleware.builderOrAdmin` (no `publicApi`, no `authorized(PermissionType.USER, …)`).
- `packages/backend-core/src/middleware/builderOrAdmin.ts` — with a `workspaceId` present, it only requires `isBuilder(ctx.user, workspaceId)`. The attacker sets `x-budibase-app-id` to **their own** app (appA), so the gate passes.
- `packages/backend-core/src/middleware/builderOnly.ts` — on the worker, `POST /api/global/self/api_key` only requires `hasBuilderPermissions(ctx.user)`, which is true for app-scoped builders, so the attacker can self-issue a public API key.
- `packages/shared-core/src/sdk/documents/users.ts` — `isGlobalBuilder` is false for app-scoped builders (so the global `builder` flag is correctly blocked), while `isBuilder(user, appA)` and `hasBuilderPermissions(user)` are true.
Attack flow:
1. Attacker is an app-scoped builder of `appA` only (no global builder/admin).
2. `POST /api/global/self/api_key` (worker) — passes `builderOnly` via `hasBuilderPermissions` → attacker obtains a public API key.
3. `POST /api/public/v1/roles/assign` with header `x-budibase-app-id: <appA prod id>` and body `{"userIds":["<self>"],"appBuilder":{"appId":"<appB>"}}` — `builderOrAdmin` passes (`isBuilder(user, appA)`), `validateGlobalRoleUpdate` ignores `appBuilder`, the SDK pushes `appB` into `user.builder.apps`.
4. Attacker is now a builder of `appB` (and, via the `role` vector, can set any data-role such as `ADMIN` in any app).
Security boundary crossed:
- **Before:** builder of `appA` only.
- **After:** builder of `appB` (and any other app) → read/modify all rows, read datasource configs and exfiltrate stored datasource credentials, edit automations (including the `bash`/`executeScript`/`executeQuery` steps); plus arbitrary data-role assignment in any app.
- **Why disallowed:** the per-app builder model is meant to isolate builders to their assigned apps; a builder of one app must not gain authority over apps they were never granted.
### PoC
Environment:
- Budibase version: `3.39.19`, commit `03fbabae4`
- Deployment: Business/Enterprise license required (`isExpandedPublicApiEnabled`)
- Attacker role: app-scoped builder (`user.builder.apps=[appA]`), not global builder/admin
- Mock services: none needed for the unit-level proof; HTTP PoC script provided for a licensed lab
Steps (unit-level proof, no license needed — verbatim auth-gate + SDK logic):
1. Run the verification harness:
```bash
cd D:/CVE-Hunting/budibase-audit-output/lab
node harness/verify-privesc-authz.cjs
```
2. Observed result (evidence: `evidence/lab-privesc-authz.log`):
```text
[PASS-VALIDATION] appBuilder:{appId:APP_B} -> NOT rejected
[PASS-VALIDATION] role:{appId:APP_B, roleId:'ADMIN'}-> NOT rejected
[BLOCKED 403] builder:true (global) -> Only global builders or admins ...
[BLOCKED 403] admin:true (global) -> Only global admins ...
after : builder={"apps":["app_A...","app_B..."]} roles={"app_B...":"ADMIN"}
isBuilder(attacker, APP_B) now = true <-- escalated to builder of APP_B
```
Steps (HTTP PoC for a licensed lab — `poc/privesc-roles-assign.sh`):
```bash
# 1) self-issue API key
curl -X POST http://localhost:10000/api/global/self/api_key -H "Cookie: <attacker session>" -d '{}'
# 2) escalate: grant self builder of appB
curl -X POST http://localhost:10000/api/public/v1/roles/assign \
-H "x-budibase-api-key: <KEY>" -H "x-budibase-app-id: <appA prod id>" \
-H "content-type: application/json" \
-d '{"userIds":["<self global id>"],"appBuilder":{"appId":"<appB>"}}'
```
3. Expected result:
```text
The request should be rejected (403) — an app-scoped builder must not be able to grant
itself builder/role access to an app it does not control. Instead it returns 200 and the
grant is applied.
```
Evidence files:
- `evidence/lab-privesc-authz.log`
- `poc/verify-privesc-authz.cjs`, `poc/privesc-roles-assign.sh`
**Runtime limitation:** full HTTP end-to-end requires a Business/Enterprise license (`isExpandedPublicApiEnabled`); no license was cracked. The authorization defect is proven at unit level with the verbatim validation + SDK logic, and the route→validation→SDK call chain was independently verified by source review.
### Source PoC
[Budibase-GHSA-Reports.zip](https://github.com/user-attachments/files/29161435/Budibase-GHSA-Reports.zip)
### Impact
An attacker holding an **app-scoped builder** role on a single app in a licensed (Business/Enterprise) tenant can:
* escalate to builder of **every other app** in the tenant (cross-app/workspace isolation bypass);
* read and modify all rows in those apps;
* read those apps' datasource configurations and **exfiltrate stored datasource credentials**;
* edit automations in those apps, including server-side execution steps;
* assign arbitrary data-plane roles (e.g. `ADMIN`) in any app to any user, including themselves.
It does **not** grant the global `admin`/`builder` flags (those are validated), so it is not a direct global-admin takeover; but cross-app builder is effectively a tenant-wide app/data-plane compromise. No real secrets were accessed during testing; the lab used canary-only data.
EUVD source date text has no stated timezone and is retained without inventing a UTC instant. Related bulletin membership is not an alias, common cause or applicability claim. A missing vector with a zero score is treated as unrated. Complete vendor/product and underlying source evidence remains in the original JSON.
Original publisher date fields
datePublished: Aug 13, 2026, 10:05:02 PM
dateUpdated: Aug 18, 2026, 1:46:32 AM
No normalized affected-package data is projected for this source revision. The original publisher record may contain additional product and version evidence; this does not establish that a package is unaffected.
NVD analysis and CPE criteria are source context, not proof that a package or your environment is affected. Complete affected data, logical configurations and SSVC are retained in the original JSON.
No normalized affected-package data is projected for this source revision. The original publisher record may contain additional product and version evidence; this does not establish that a package is unaffected.