Budibase is an open-source low-code platform. Prior to 3.39.18, packages/server/src/integrations/mysql.ts enabled multipleStatements and inserted an unescaped tableName into a DESCRIBE statement. An attacker able to create a MySQL table with a backtick and stacked statement in its name could wait for a Budibase administrator to run schema discovery, causing the second statement to execute. The fix applies quoteMySqlIdentifier before constructing the query. This issue is fixed in version 3.39.18.
Budibase is an open-source low-code platform. Prior to 3.39.18, packages/server/src/integrations/mysql.ts enabled multipleStatements and inserted an unescaped tableName into a DESCRIBE statement. An attacker able to create a MySQL table with a backtick and stacked statement in its name could wait for a Budibase administrator to run schema discovery, causing the second statement to execute. The fix applies quoteMySqlIdentifier before constructing the query. This issue is fixed in version 3.39.18.
Budibase is an open-source low-code platform. Prior to 3.39.18, packages/server/src/integrations/mysql.ts enabled multipleStatements and inserted an unescaped tableName into a DESCRIBE statement. An attacker able to create a MySQL table with a backtick and stacked statement in its name could wait for a Budibase administrator to run schema discovery, causing the second statement to execute. The fix applies quoteMySqlIdentifier before constructing the query. This issue is fixed in version 3.39.18.
### Summary
**This is a related but independently fixable vulnerability to GHSA-qqf5-x7mj-v43p
(PostgreSQL SQL injection), reported in the same original disclosure and
split per GitHub CNA guidance (rule 4.2.11) since it affects a separate
integration, has a distinct attack precondition, and requires a separate
patch.**
The MySQL integration enables `multipleStatements: true` on the connection,
permitting semicolon-separated multi-statement execution. During table
introspection, table names retrieved from `INFORMATION_SCHEMA.TABLES` are
interpolated into a `DESCRIBE` query wrapped in backticks, but embedded
backticks in the table name are never escaped — allowing a malicious table
name to break out and inject a second, attacker-controlled statement.
### Details
**Vulnerable Code:**
File: `packages/server/src/integrations/mysql.ts`, lines 172, 305
```typescript
this.config = { ...config, multipleStatements: true, ... } // line 172
...
{ sql: `DESCRIBE \`${tableName}\`;` } // line 305 — backtick NOT escaped
```
Because `multipleStatements` is enabled, any statement appended after the
backtick break-out executes as a second query in the same round trip.
### Step-by-Step Reproduction
1. An attacker with the ability to create tables in the target MySQL
database (e.g. a lower-privileged database user, or a malicious actor in
a multi-tenant database) creates a table named:
``foo`; DROP TABLE users; --``
2. In Budibase, an administrator triggers schema introspection for that
database (e.g. opening the datasource or refreshing its table list).
3. Budibase reads the malicious table name from `INFORMATION_SCHEMA.TABLES`
and interpolates it into the `DESCRIBE` query.
4. The unescaped backtick terminates the identifier early, and the
semicolon-separated payload (enabled by `multipleStatements: true`)
executes as a second statement.
### Impact
Arbitrary SQL execution triggered during routine schema discovery. Unlike
the PostgreSQL and MS SQL Server findings, this does not require the
attacker to control the Budibase datasource configuration directly — only
the ability to create a maliciously named table in the underlying database
beforehand, with an administrator's normal use of the introspection feature
serving as the trigger.
EUVD source date text has no stated timezone and is retained without inventing a UTC instant. Related bulletin membership is not an alias, common cause or applicability claim. A missing vector with a zero score is treated as unrated. Complete vendor/product and underlying source evidence remains in the original JSON.
Original publisher date fields
datePublished: Aug 13, 2026, 10:04:53 PM
dateUpdated: Aug 14, 2026, 6:06:29 PM
No normalized affected-package data is projected for this source revision. The original publisher record may contain additional product and version evidence; this does not establish that a package is unaffected.
NVD analysis and CPE criteria are source context, not proof that a package or your environment is affected. Complete affected data, logical configurations and SSVC are retained in the original JSON.
Source analysis status: Deferred
Weakness classifications: CWE-89
Original publisher date fields
published: 2026-08-13T22:17:25.810
lastModified: 2026-09-08T20:56:50.520
No normalized affected-package data is projected for this source revision. The original publisher record may contain additional product and version evidence; this does not establish that a package is unaffected.