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NextAuth.js: OAuth state, nonce, and PKCE check cookies are not bound to the provider that created them

CVSS 3.1 6.8 MEDIUMEUVD CVSS 3.1 6.8 CVSS 3.1 · [email protected] · Secondary 6.8 MEDIUMCVSS_V3 Publisher rating MODERATEFixed by @auth/core 0.41.3Fixed by next-auth 5.0.0-beta.32Fixed by next-auth 4.24.15KEV status unknown

cve-program · CVE-2026-73419

Published

NextAuth.js provides authentication for Next.js. Prior to@auth/core 0.41.3 and next-auth 4.24.15 and 5.0.0-beta.32, Auth.js stores the OAuth/OIDC anti-CSRF checks state, nonce, and the PKCE verifier in global cookies that are not bound to the provider that created them. On callback, a check value minted during a sign-in started with one provider can satisfy the callback for a different provider because the stored cookie is not verified against the callback provider's identity, including the provider ID, issuer, client ID, or redirect URI. In a multi-provider application that permits account linking while logged in, when one provider's authorization request is observable and a target provider callback can be satisfied without a PKCE verifier, an attacker can lure a victim into starting a legitimate same-origin flow and link the attacker's target-provider account to the victim's Auth.js user. The linked provider grants the attacker persistent sign-in to the victim's account, while cross-site request forgery alone is insufficient. This issue is fixed in @auth/core 0.41.3 and next-auth 4.24.15 and 5.0.0-beta.32.

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euvd · EUVD-2026-57601

Published

NextAuth.js provides authentication for Next.js. Prior to@auth/core 0.41.3 and next-auth 4.24.15 and 5.0.0-beta.32, Auth.js stores the OAuth/OIDC anti-CSRF checks state, nonce, and the PKCE verifier in global cookies that are not bound to the provider that created them. On callback, a check value minted during a sign-in started with one provider can satisfy the callback for a different provider because the stored cookie is not verified against the callback provider's identity, including the provider ID, issuer, client ID, or redirect URI. In a multi-provider application that permits account linking while logged in, when one provider's authorization request is observable and a target provider callback can be satisfied without a PKCE verifier, an attacker can lure a victim into starting a legitimate same-origin flow and link the attacker's target-provider account to the victim's Auth.js user. The linked provider grants the attacker persistent sign-in to the victim's account, while cross-site request forgery alone is insufficient. This issue is fixed in @auth/core 0.41.3 and next-auth 4.24.15 and 5.0.0-beta.32.

Read the publisher's advisory

nvd · CVE-2026-73419

Published

NextAuth.js provides authentication for Next.js. Prior to@auth/core 0.41.3 and next-auth 4.24.15 and 5.0.0-beta.32, Auth.js stores the OAuth/OIDC anti-CSRF checks state, nonce, and the PKCE verifier in global cookies that are not bound to the provider that created them. On callback, a check value minted during a sign-in started with one provider can satisfy the callback for a different provider because the stored cookie is not verified against the callback provider's identity, including the provider ID, issuer, client ID, or redirect URI. In a multi-provider application that permits account linking while logged in, when one provider's authorization request is observable and a target provider callback can be satisfied without a PKCE verifier, an attacker can lure a victim into starting a legitimate same-origin flow and link the attacker's target-provider account to the victim's Auth.js user. The linked provider grants the attacker persistent sign-in to the victim's account, while cross-site request forgery alone is insufficient. This issue is fixed in @auth/core 0.41.3 and next-auth 4.24.15 and 5.0.0-beta.32.

Read the publisher's advisory

osv · GHSA-x445-f3h2-j279

Published

## Summary Auth.js stores the OAuth/OIDC anti-CSRF checks (`state`, `nonce`, and the PKCE verifier) in global cookies that are not bound to the provider that created them. On callback, a check value minted during a sign-in started with one provider can satisfy the callback for a different provider, because the stored cookie is not verified against the callback provider's identity (provider id, issuer, client id, or redirect URI). In a multi-provider app that allows account linking while logged in, this provider-confusion / mix-up condition can let an attacker link their account at a second provider to a victim's user. ## Am I affected? You may be affected if **all** of the following hold: - You use `next-auth` `<= 4.24.14` or `>= 5.0.0-beta.1, <= 5.0.0-beta.31`, or `@auth/core` `<= 0.41.2`. - You configure multiple OAuth/OIDC providers. - You allow users to link additional providers while logged in. - At least one configured provider's authorization request is observable by an attacker, and at least one target provider's callback can be satisfied without a PKCE verifier (i.e. it relies only on `state` or only on `nonce`). You are **not** affected if you use a single OAuth provider, do not allow logged-in account linking, or all providers enforce PKCE. ## Impact - Account-linking confusion: an attacker can get their account at a target provider linked to the victim's Auth.js user, granting the attacker persistent sign-in to the victim's account through that linked provider. - Exploitation requires luring the victim into starting a legitimate same-origin flow; it cannot be performed by cross-site request forgery alone, which reduces practical likelihood. ## Patched version The fix binds the OAuth check cookies to the provider/authorization flow that created them, so a callback cannot consume a check value minted for a different provider. Upgrade to the first releases containing this fix (pending; this advisory will be updated with exact patched versions before publication). ## Workarounds If you cannot upgrade immediately: - Enable PKCE (`checks: ["pkce"]`, in addition to `state`/`nonce`) on every provider that supports it; PKCE blocks the practical code-swap variant because the attacker cannot observe the relying party's verifier. - Avoid offering logged-in account linking across multiple providers where one provider is lower-trust or attacker-observable. - Treat `events.linkAccount` as sensitive: add audit logging, user notification, or out-of-band confirmation so that any unexpected link is visible (defense-in-depth, not a root-cause fix). ## Credit Reported by @Nadav0077. Thank you for the responsible disclosure.

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Affected versions, risk and source history

Related advisories and sources

Publishers link these advisories through the identifiers shown below. A shared identifier or date alone does not tell you whether your software is affected or whether the advisories describe the same cause.

CVE-2026-73419 · CVE overview and exploitation status

EUVD-2026-57601

GHSA-x445-f3h2-j279

cve-program · CVE-2026-73419

euvd · EUVD-2026-57601

nvd · CVE-2026-73419

osv · GHSA-x445-f3h2-j279

Related changes

Linked by CVE identifier

No related changes are available here.

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