CKAN MCP Server: MQA server allowlist bypass via unanchored regex (`isValidMqaServer`)
cve-program · CVE-2026-73845
PublishedCKAN MCP Server is a tool for querying CKAN open data portals. Prior to 0.4.112, the ckan_get_mqa_quality and ckan_get_mqa_quality_details tools in src/tools/quality.ts use isValidMqaServer to validate the server_url parameter with a prefix-only regular expression for dati.gov.it, allowing suffix-host and URL-userinfo values to target an attacker-controlled host and return a spoofed response. This issue is fixed in version 0.4.112.
Read the publisher's advisoryeuvd · EUVD-2026-58725
PublishedCKAN MCP Server is a tool for querying CKAN open data portals. Prior to 0.4.112, the ckan_get_mqa_quality and ckan_get_mqa_quality_details tools in src/tools/quality.ts use isValidMqaServer to validate the server_url parameter with a prefix-only regular expression for dati.gov.it, allowing suffix-host and URL-userinfo values to target an attacker-controlled host and return a spoofed response. This issue is fixed in version 0.4.112.
Read the publisher's advisorynvd · CVE-2026-73845
PublishedCKAN MCP Server is a tool for querying CKAN open data portals. Prior to 0.4.112, the ckan_get_mqa_quality and ckan_get_mqa_quality_details tools in src/tools/quality.ts use isValidMqaServer to validate the server_url parameter with a prefix-only regular expression for dati.gov.it, allowing suffix-host and URL-userinfo values to target an attacker-controlled host and return a spoofed response. This issue is fixed in version 0.4.112.
Read the publisher's advisoryosv · GHSA-83x6-42hr-jc76
Published## Summary The `ckan_get_mqa_quality` and `ckan_get_mqa_quality_details` tools restrict their `server_url` argument to `dati.gov.it` via a regular expression. The regex is anchored only at the start and places no boundary after the host, so any URL whose host merely **begins with** `dati.gov.it` — or that uses `dati.gov.it` as URL *userinfo* before an `@` — passes validation while actually targeting an attacker-controlled host. ## Affected code ```js // src/tools/quality.ts const ALLOWED_SERVER_PATTERNS = [ /^https?:\/\/(www\.)?dati\.gov\.it/i // <-- no end anchor / host boundary ]; export function isValidMqaServer(serverUrl: string): boolean { return ALLOWED_SERVER_PATTERNS.some(pattern => pattern.test(serverUrl)); } ``` All of the following return `true`: | URL | Real host | |-----|-----------| | `https://dati.gov.it.attacker.com/x` | `dati.gov.it.attacker.com` (attacker) | | `http://dati.gov.it.evil.example/api` | `dati.gov.it.evil.example` (attacker) | | `https://[email protected]/x` | `attacker.com` (userinfo trick) | After passing this check, `server_url` flows into `getMqaQuality`/`getMqaQualityDetails`, which call `makeCkanRequest(serverUrl, "package_show", { id })`. The server therefore issues a request to the attacker-controlled host and returns its (parsed) response to the caller. ## Impact - The intended "dati.gov.it only" trust boundary for the MQA tools is defeated; they can be driven against arbitrary external hosts. - The attacker host receives the request (including the `dataset_id`) and controls the response body that is surfaced back to the model/user — enabling response spoofing and, in an agentic setting, indirect prompt-injection content delivered under the guise of a trusted-portal tool. - Contributes to SSRF surface: while `makeCkanRequest` blocks private/internal IPs, this bypass removes the domain restriction that the code intends to enforce for these tools. The `@`-userinfo variant is the most severe form because validation passes on a string whose *actual* host is fully attacker-chosen. ## Proof of concept `poc/mqa-allowlist-poc.mjs` runs the verbatim regex over benign and malicious URLs: ``` accepted expected_legit url true true https://dati.gov.it/opendata <- legit true false https://dati.gov.it.attacker.com/x <- BYPASS true false http://dati.gov.it.evil.example/api <- BYPASS true false https://[email protected]/x <- BYPASS ``` ## Remediation Validate the parsed host, not the raw string. For example: ```js function isValidMqaServer(serverUrl) { let u; try { u = new URL(serverUrl); } catch { return false; } if (u.protocol !== "https:") return false; const h = u.hostname.toLowerCase(); return h === "dati.gov.it" || h === "www.dati.gov.it"; // or: h === "dati.gov.it" || h.endsWith(".dati.gov.it") } ``` Anchoring the regex end-to-end (`/^https:\/\/(www\.)?dati\.gov\.it(\/|$)/i`) also closes the suffix trick, but URL-parsing + exact host comparison is the robust fix and also neutralizes the `@`-userinfo variant.
Read the publisher's advisoryAffected versions, risk and source history
Exploitation and risk
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cve-program · CVE-2026-73845
PublishedCKAN MCP Server: MQA server allowlist bypass via unanchored regex (`isValidMqaServer`)
CKAN MCP Server is a tool for querying CKAN open data portals. Prior to 0.4.112, the ckan_get_mqa_quality and ckan_get_mqa_quality_details tools in src/tools/quality.ts use isValidMqaServer to validate the server_url parameter with a prefix-only regular expression for dati.gov.it, allowing suffix-host and URL-userinfo values to target an attacker-controlled host and return a spoofed response. This issue is fixed in version 0.4.112.
- Source published
- 14 Aug 2026 16:45:06 UTC
- Source modified
- 14 Aug 2026 18:06:04 UTC
- Saved here
- 23 Oct 2026 15:48:27 UTC
- Source terms
- CVE Program Terms of Use
Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON
Source: cve-program · CVE Program Terms of Use. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.
CVSS 3.1 · 5.3 CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N
euvd · EUVD-2026-58725
PublishedCKAN MCP Server is a tool for querying CKAN open data portals. Prior to 0.4.112, the ckan_get_mqa_quality and ckan_get_mqa_quality_details tools in src/tools/quality.ts use isValidMqaServer to validate the server_url parameter with a prefix…
CKAN MCP Server is a tool for querying CKAN open data portals. Prior to 0.4.112, the ckan_get_mqa_quality and ckan_get_mqa_quality_details tools in src/tools/quality.ts use isValidMqaServer to validate the server_url parameter with a prefix-only regular expression for dati.gov.it, allowing suffix-host and URL-userinfo values to target an attacker-controlled host and return a spoofed response. This issue is fixed in version 0.4.112.
Additional publisher context
EUVD source date text has no stated timezone and is retained without inventing a UTC instant. Related bulletin membership is not an alias, common cause or applicability claim. A missing vector with a zero score is treated as unrated. Complete vendor/product and underlying source evidence remains in the original JSON.
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datePublished: Aug 14, 2026, 4:45:06 PM
dateUpdated: Aug 14, 2026, 6:06:04 PM
- Source published
- Aug 14, 2026, 4:45:06 PM (timezone not stated)
- Source modified
- Aug 14, 2026, 6:06:04 PM (timezone not stated)
- Saved here
- 11 Nov 2026 16:06:16 UTC
- Source terms
- ENISA EUVD · source terms and attribution apply
Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON
Source: euvd · ENISA EUVD · source terms and attribution apply. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.
EUVD CVSS 3.1 · 5.3 CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N
nvd · CVE-2026-73845
PublishedCKAN MCP Server is a tool for querying CKAN open data portals. Prior to 0.4.112, the ckan_get_mqa_quality and ckan_get_mqa_quality_details tools in src/tools/quality.ts use isValidMqaServer to validate the server_url parameter with a prefix…
CKAN MCP Server is a tool for querying CKAN open data portals. Prior to 0.4.112, the ckan_get_mqa_quality and ckan_get_mqa_quality_details tools in src/tools/quality.ts use isValidMqaServer to validate the server_url parameter with a prefix-only regular expression for dati.gov.it, allowing suffix-host and URL-userinfo values to target an attacker-controlled host and return a spoofed response. This issue is fixed in version 0.4.112.
Additional publisher context
NVD analysis and CPE criteria are source context, not proof that a package or your environment is affected. Complete affected data, logical configurations and SSVC are retained in the original JSON.
Source analysis status: Deferred
Weakness classifications: CWE-20 · CWE-625 · CWE-918
Original publisher date fields
published: 2026-08-14T17:20:36.820
lastModified: 2026-09-18T20:09:01.757
- Source published
- 14 Aug 2026 17:20:36 UTC
- Source modified
- 18 Sep 2026 20:09:01 UTC
- Saved here
- 25 Oct 2026 15:19:09 UTC
- Source terms
- NIST NVD usage terms; underlying source attribution retained
Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON
Source: nvd · NIST NVD usage terms; underlying source attribution retained. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.
CVSS 3.1 · [email protected] · Secondary · 5.3 CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N
osv · GHSA-83x6-42hr-jc76
PublishedCKAN MCP Server: MQA server allowlist bypass via unanchored regex (`isValidMqaServer`)
## Summary The `ckan_get_mqa_quality` and `ckan_get_mqa_quality_details` tools restrict their `server_url` argument to `dati.gov.it` via a regular expression. The regex is anchored only at the start and places no boundary after the host, so any URL whose host merely **begins with** `dati.gov.it` — or that uses `dati.gov.it` as URL *userinfo* before an `@` — passes validation while actually targeting an attacker-controlled host. ## Affected code ```js // src/tools/quality.ts const ALLOWED_SERVER_PATTERNS = [ /^https?:\/\/(www\.)?dati\.gov\.it/i // <-- no end anchor / host boundary ]; export function isValidMqaServer(serverUrl: string): boolean { return ALLOWED_SERVER_PATTERNS.some(pattern => pattern.test(serverUrl)); } ``` All of the following return `true`: | URL | Real host | |-----|-----------| | `https://dati.gov.it.attacker.com/x` | `dati.gov.it.attacker.com` (attacker) | | `http://dati.gov.it.evil.example/api` | `dati.gov.it.evil.example` (attacker) | | `https://[email protected]/x` | `attacker.com` (userinfo trick) | After passing this check, `server_url` flows into `getMqaQuality`/`getMqaQualityDetails`, which call `makeCkanRequest(serverUrl, "package_show", { id })`. The server therefore issues a request to the attacker-controlled host and returns its (parsed) response to the caller. ## Impact - The intended "dati.gov.it only" trust boundary for the MQA tools is defeated; they can be driven against arbitrary external hosts. - The attacker host receives the request (including the `dataset_id`) and controls the response body that is surfaced back to the model/user — enabling response spoofing and, in an agentic setting, indirect prompt-injection content delivered under the guise of a trusted-portal tool. - Contributes to SSRF surface: while `makeCkanRequest` blocks private/internal IPs, this bypass removes the domain restriction that the code intends to enforce for these tools. The `@`-userinfo variant is the most severe form because validation passes on a string whose *actual* host is fully attacker-chosen. ## Proof of concept `poc/mqa-allowlist-poc.mjs` runs the verbatim regex over benign and malicious URLs: ``` accepted expected_legit url true true https://dati.gov.it/opendata <- legit true false https://dati.gov.it.attacker.com/x <- BYPASS true false http://dati.gov.it.evil.example/api <- BYPASS true false https://[email protected]/x <- BYPASS ``` ## Remediation Validate the parsed host, not the raw string. For example: ```js function isValidMqaServer(serverUrl) { let u; try { u = new URL(serverUrl); } catch { return false; } if (u.protocol !== "https:") return false; const h = u.hostname.toLowerCase(); return h === "dati.gov.it" || h === "www.dati.gov.it"; // or: h === "dati.gov.it" || h.endsWith(".dati.gov.it") } ``` Anchoring the regex end-to-end (`/^https:\/\/(www\.)?dati\.gov\.it(\/|$)/i`) also closes the suffix trick, but URL-parsing + exact host comparison is the robust fix and also neutralizes the `@`-userinfo variant.
- Source published
- 2 Sep 2026 14:52:21 UTC
- Source modified
- 2 Sep 2026 15:00:10 UTC
- Saved here
- 24 Oct 2026 13:17:17 UTC
- Source terms
- GitHub Advisory Database · CC-BY-4.0
Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON
Source: osv · GitHub Advisory Database · CC-BY-4.0. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.
CVSS_V3 · CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N
Publisher rating · MODERATE