Public mode

No access to your tenant or devices. Every item links to its source. What this means

Sources need attention Customize Public modeDiscuss ChangeIntel on Discord

seaweedfs · Vulnerability

CVSS 3.1 7.6 HIGHCheck source for fixed versionsKEV status unknown

Historical advisory recorded 23 Oct 2026 15:48:27 UTC. Read the latest advisory.

cve-program · CVE-2026-77368

Published

SeaweedFS is a distributed storage system for files and blobs. In version 4.39, the filer's TUS resumable-upload handler checks JWT allowed_prefixes scoping only when a session is created, letting a low-privilege tenant hijack another tenant's upload session to write content to filer paths their own token forbids. The HEAD, PATCH, and DELETE verbs that act on an existing session by its id never verify that the session's stored target path falls within the caller's allowed prefixes, so a tenant who obtains another upload's session identifier can PATCH attacker bytes into it and, on completion, have the file land at the victim's out-of-scope path. The same token can also DELETE other tenants' sessions and HEAD them to read upload progress and size, defeating the JWT prefix isolation. This vulnerability only affects deployments that configure filer JWT signing and have TUS uploads enabled. This issue is fixed in version 4.40.

Read the publisher's advisory

Affected versions, risk and source history

cve-program · CVE-2026-77368

Published

SeaweedFS: Authenticated Cross-Prefix IDOR in Filer TUS Handler Enables Arbitrary Write to Tenant-Forbidden Paths

SeaweedFS is a distributed storage system for files and blobs. In version 4.39, the filer's TUS resumable-upload handler checks JWT allowed_prefixes scoping only when a session is created, letting a low-privilege tenant hijack another tenant's upload session to write content to filer paths their own token forbids. The HEAD, PATCH, and DELETE verbs that act on an existing session by its id never verify that the session's stored target path falls within the caller's allowed prefixes, so a tenant who obtains another upload's session identifier can PATCH attacker bytes into it and, on completion, have the file land at the victim's out-of-scope path. The same token can also DELETE other tenants' sessions and HEAD them to read upload progress and size, defeating the JWT prefix isolation. This vulnerability only affects deployments that configure filer JWT signing and have TUS uploads enabled. This issue is fixed in version 4.40.

Source published
26 Aug 2026 21:07:57 UTC
Source modified
27 Aug 2026 14:32:40 UTC
Saved here
23 Oct 2026 15:48:27 UTC
Source terms
CVE Program Terms of Use

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

Source: cve-program · CVE Program Terms of Use. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.

CVSS 3.1 · 7.6 CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:H/A:L

ChangeIntel

An IT change radar: releases, security, known issues, retirements, documentation changes, and service status from public sources. Every item links to supporting evidence; dates and statuses can change after they are read.

Sources read 20 Nov 17:59 UTC · 274 of 275 readable · 270 fully read · documentation 469/469 current