libbpf: Reject non-exclusive metadata maps in the signed loader
cve-program · CVE-2026-80675
PublishedIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: libbpf: Reject non-exclusive metadata maps in the signed loader The loader verifies map->sha against the metadata hash in its instructions. map->sha is calculated when BPF_OBJ_GET_INFO_BY_FD is called on the frozen map. While the map is frozen, the /signed loader/ must also ensure the map is exclusive, as, without exclusivity (which a hostile host could just omit when loading the loader), another BPF program with map access can mutate the contents afterwards, so the check passes on stale data. With the extra check as part of the signed loader, it now refuses to move on with map->sha validation if the host set it up wrongly.
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cve-program · CVE-2026-80675
Publishedlibbpf: Reject non-exclusive metadata maps in the signed loader
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: libbpf: Reject non-exclusive metadata maps in the signed loader The loader verifies map->sha against the metadata hash in its instructions. map->sha is calculated when BPF_OBJ_GET_INFO_BY_FD is called on the frozen map. While the map is frozen, the /signed loader/ must also ensure the map is exclusive, as, without exclusivity (which a hostile host could just omit when loading the loader), another BPF program with map access can mutate the contents afterwards, so the check passes on stale data. With the extra check as part of the signed loader, it now refuses to move on with map->sha validation if the host set it up wrongly.
- Source published
- 28 Aug 2026 06:49:14 UTC
- Source modified
- 29 Aug 2026 06:22:02 UTC
- Saved here
- 23 Oct 2026 15:48:27 UTC
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- CVE Program Terms of Use
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CVSS 3.1 · 7.1 CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N