J2Store extension for Joomla · Vulnerability
cve-program · CVE-2026-81568
PublishedJoomla Extension - j2commerce.com - Arbitrary file read via `task=download` in J2Store 1.0.0-3.3.2, 4.0.0-4.0.22, 4.1.0-4.1.7 - `J2StoreModelOrderdownloads::getFilePath()` built the on-disk path to a purchased digital download by concatenating the configured attachment folder with the product file's stored `product_file_save_name`, using only `JPath::clean()` (which normalises separators but does not resolve or reject `..` segments) and a plain `JFile::exists()` check — never confirming the resolved path stayed inside the configured attachment folder. If a product file's `product_file_save_name` ever contained a `../` traversal segment — most plausibly via the CSRF-forgeable admin product-file save actions described in Issue 1, but equally by any future integration or bug that writes that field — any customer holding a valid download `token`/`pid` pair for that product file could have the traversal resolve to a path outside the attachment folder and download any file readable by the web server (e.g. `configuration.php`).
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cve-program · CVE-2026-81568
PublishedJoomla Extension - j2commerce.com - Arbitrary file read via `task=download` in J2Store 1.0.0-3.3.2, 4.0.0-4.0.22, 4.1.0-4.1.7
Joomla Extension - j2commerce.com - Arbitrary file read via `task=download` in J2Store 1.0.0-3.3.2, 4.0.0-4.0.22, 4.1.0-4.1.7 - `J2StoreModelOrderdownloads::getFilePath()` built the on-disk path to a purchased digital download by concatenating the configured attachment folder with the product file's stored `product_file_save_name`, using only `JPath::clean()` (which normalises separators but does not resolve or reject `..` segments) and a plain `JFile::exists()` check — never confirming the resolved path stayed inside the configured attachment folder. If a product file's `product_file_save_name` ever contained a `../` traversal segment — most plausibly via the CSRF-forgeable admin product-file save actions described in Issue 1, but equally by any future integration or bug that writes that field — any customer holding a valid download `token`/`pid` pair for that product file could have the traversal resolve to a path outside the attachment folder and download any file readable by the web server (e.g. `configuration.php`).
- Source published
- 15 Sep 2026 18:50:53 UTC
- Source modified
- 15 Sep 2026 19:29:50 UTC
- Saved here
- 23 Oct 2026 15:48:27 UTC
- Source terms
- CVE Program Terms of Use
Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON
Source: cve-program · CVE Program Terms of Use. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.
CVSS 4.0 · 8.7 CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N