Public mode

No access to your tenant or devices. Every item links to its source. What this means

Sources need attention Customize Public modeDiscuss ChangeIntel on Discord

gitoxide before 0.52.1 Repository Boundary Violation via symlinked .gitmodules

CVSS 4.0 8.7 HIGHCVSS 3.1 7.5 HIGHEUVD CVSS 4.0 8.7 CVSS 4.0 · [email protected] · Secondary 8.7 HIGHCVSS 3.1 · [email protected] · Secondary 7.5 HIGHCVSS_V4 Publisher rating HIGHFixed by gitoxide 0.52.1Fixed by gix 0.83.0KEV status unknown

cve-program · CVE-2026-82252

Published

gitoxide before 0.52.1 follows symlinks when reading the worktree .gitmodules file, allowing attackers to inject out-of-repository bytes into submodule metadata. Attackers can create a malicious repository with a symlinked .gitmodules pointing outside the repository tree, causing gitoxide to parse arbitrary external files as submodule configuration and expose attacker-controlled name, path, and url values.

Read the publisher's advisory

euvd · EUVD-2026-67704

Published

gitoxide before 0.52.1 follows symlinks when reading the worktree .gitmodules file, allowing attackers to inject out-of-repository bytes into submodule metadata. Attackers can create a malicious repository with a symlinked .gitmodules pointing outside the repository tree, causing gitoxide to parse arbitrary external files as submodule configuration and expose attacker-controlled name, path, and url values.

Read the publisher's advisory

nvd · CVE-2026-82252

Published

gitoxide before 0.52.1 follows symlinks when reading the worktree .gitmodules file, allowing attackers to inject out-of-repository bytes into submodule metadata. Attackers can create a malicious repository with a symlinked .gitmodules pointing outside the repository tree, causing gitoxide to parse arbitrary external files as submodule configuration and expose attacker-controlled name, path, and url values.

Read the publisher's advisory

osv · GHSA-pg4w-g64p-qwhj

Published

## Summary attachments: [pocs.zip](https://github.com/user-attachments/files/26431422/pocs.zip) When `Repository::submodules()` loads submodule metadata, it prefers the worktree `.gitmodules` file if that path exists. In the current implementation, the path is read with `std::fs::read()`, which follows symlinks. As a result, a repository can present a symlinked `.gitmodules` that points outside the repository, and gitoxide will parse the out-of-repository bytes as submodule configuration. This is a repository-boundary violation. A caller using the high-level submodule API can believe it is reading repository-local submodule metadata, while the bytes are actually coming from an arbitrary file outside the repository tree. ## Root cause analysis The relevant flow is: 1. [`gix/src/repository/location.rs`](https://github.com/GitoxideLabs/gitoxide/blob/v0.52.0/gix/src/repository/location.rs) derives the worktree `.gitmodules` path as `workdir/.gitmodules`. 2. [`gix/src/repository/submodule.rs`](https://github.com/GitoxideLabs/gitoxide/blob/v0.52.0/gix/src/repository/submodule.rs) reads that path with `std::fs::read(&path)` and immediately parses the bytes as a submodule configuration file. 3. `Repository::submodules()` exposes the parsed entries through the high-level API. The issue is not in the parser. The issue is that the worktree path is treated as an ordinary file without checking whether it is a symlink, and without checking whether the canonicalized target remains inside the repository worktree. Because `std::fs::read()` follows symlinks, a malicious repository can cause gitoxide to ingest bytes from an attacker-chosen location outside the repository. The resulting `Submodule` objects then expose `name`, `path`, and `url` values derived from that external file. ## Reproduction steps Use the attached PoC zip that contains the `pocs/` workspace. 1. Unzip the PoC archive. 2. Enter `pocs/F001`. 3. Run: ```bash cargo run --quiet ``` 4. Compare the output with `pocs/F001/result.txt`. Important outputs include: - `gitmodules_symlink=.../victim-repo/.gitmodules` - `symlink_target=.../outside/modules.conf` - `parsed_name=symlinked` - `parsed_path=deps/symlinked` - `parsed_url=https://attacker.example/symlinked.git` These outputs show that gitoxide parsed the submodule configuration from the symlink target outside the repository, not from repository-local bytes. ## Impact Confirmed impact: - out-of-repository bytes can be injected into the result of `Repository::submodules()`; - callers can be misled about submodule metadata such as `name`, `path`, and `url`; - any downstream workflow that uses those values to decide clone, fetch, update, or policy behavior is operating on attacker-controlled data that did not actually originate from the repository tree. This report does **not** claim direct command execution from this code path by itself. The demonstrated impact is metadata injection across the repository boundary. ## Recommended fix A safe fix is to stop silently following symlinks for the worktree `.gitmodules` path in this loading path. Reasonable options include: 1. use `symlink_metadata()` / `lstat`style checks and reject symlinked `.gitmodules` when loading from the worktree; 2. canonicalize the target and verify that it still resides under the repository worktree before reading it; 3. for security-sensitive callers, prefer loading `.gitmodules` from the index or `HEAD` tree rather than following the worktree path. At minimum, the worktree path should not silently follow symlinks to arbitrary external files.

Read the publisher's advisory

Affected versions, risk and source history

Related advisories and sources

Related changes

Linked by CVE identifier

No related changes are available here.

ChangeIntel

An IT change radar: releases, security, known issues, retirements, documentation changes, and service status from public sources. Every item links to supporting evidence; dates and statuses can change after they are read.

Sources read 16 Nov 08:58 UTC · 274 of 275 readable · 252 fully read · 18 waiting for GitHub's hourly limit · documentation 469/469 current