gitoxide (Rust crates gix <= 0.72.0 and gix-validate <= 0.10.0) contains a path traversal vulnerability. The submodule name validation function in gix-validate only checks the first occurrence of '..' via name.find(b".."), allowing crafted names such as 'a..b/../../../.git/' to bypass the check; additionally this validation is never invoked in production code paths. Combined with a trust inheritance flaw in Submodule::open(), where the parent repository's git_dir_trust (Trust::Full) is cloned and the ownership verification is skipped, an attacker can craft a malicious .gitmodules file so that a victim tool built on gitoxide reads arbitrary git repository configuration (including embedded credentials) with full trust, bypassing safe-directory protections. Fixed in gix 0.82.0 and gix-validate 0.11.1.
gitoxide (Rust crates gix <= 0.72.0 and gix-validate <= 0.10.0) contains a path traversal vulnerability. The submodule name validation function in gix-validate only checks the first occurrence of '..' via name.find(b".."), allowing crafted names such as 'a..b/../../../.git/' to bypass the check; additionally this validation is never invoked in production code paths. Combined with a trust inheritance flaw in Submodule::open(), where the parent repository's git_dir_trust (Trust::Full) is cloned and the ownership verification is skipped, an attacker can craft a malicious .gitmodules file so that a victim tool built on gitoxide reads arbitrary git repository configuration (including embedded credentials) with full trust, bypassing safe-directory protections. Fixed in gix 0.82.0 and gix-validate 0.11.1.
gitoxide (Rust crates gix <= 0.72.0 and gix-validate <= 0.10.0) contains a path traversal vulnerability. The submodule name validation function in gix-validate only checks the first occurrence of '..' via name.find(b".."), allowing crafted names such as 'a..b/../../../.git/' to bypass the check; additionally this validation is never invoked in production code paths. Combined with a trust inheritance flaw in Submodule::open(), where the parent repository's git_dir_trust (Trust::Full) is cloned and the ownership verification is skipped, an attacker can craft a malicious .gitmodules file so that a victim tool built on gitoxide reads arbitrary git repository configuration (including embedded credentials) with full trust, bypassing safe-directory protections. Fixed in gix 0.82.0 and gix-validate 0.11.1.
### Summary
Submodule name validation bypass plus missing validation in production code paths allows path traversal via crafted `.gitmodules`. Combined with a trust inheritance flaw in `Submodule::open()`, this enables reading arbitrary git repository configs (including credentials) from traversed paths with full trust (CWE-22, CWE-200).
### Details
**Bug 1: Validation bypass in `gix-validate/src/submodule.rs` (lines 27-42)**
The `name()` function uses `name.find(b"..")` which returns only the FIRST occurrence. If the first `..` is embedded in a non-traversal context, the function returns `Ok` without checking subsequent `../` sequences:
```rust
pub fn name(name: &BStr) -> Result<&BStr, name::Error> {
match name.find(b"..") {
Some(pos) => {
let &b = name.get(pos + 2).ok_or(name::Error::ParentComponent)?;
if b == b'/' || b == b'\\' {
Err(name::Error::ParentComponent)
} else {
Ok(name) // Returns Ok without checking rest of string
}
}
None => Ok(name),
}
}
```
Bypass: `a..b/../../../.git/` passes because `find(b"..")` returns position 1 (the `..` in `a..b`), checks `name[3] == b'b'`, and returns Ok. The real `/../../../` is never checked.
**Bug 2: Validation never called in production**
`gix_validate::submodule::name()` has zero production callers (only test code). The `names()` iterator in `gix-submodule/src/access.rs:29` explicitly documents it returns "unvalidated names."
`git_dir()` at `gix/src/submodule/mod.rs:198-204` constructs filesystem paths from raw names:
```rust
pub fn git_dir(&self) -> PathBuf {
self.state.repo.common_dir().join("modules").join(gix_path::from_bstr(self.name()))
}
```
**Bug 3: Trust inheritance bypass in `Submodule::open()`**
At `gix/src/submodule/mod.rs:270`, `open()` clones the parent repository's options:
```rust
match crate::open_opts(self.git_dir_try_old_form()?, self.state.repo.options.clone()) {
```
The parent's `options.git_dir_trust` is `Some(Trust::Full)`. At `gix/src/open/repository.rs:103-104`:
```rust
if options.git_dir_trust.is_none() {
options.git_dir_trust = gix_sec::Trust::from_path_ownership(&git_dir)?.into();
}
```
Since trust is already `Some(Full)`, the ownership check is **skipped entirely**. The traversed path is opened with `Trust::Full` regardless of ownership, bypassing gitoxide's safe-directory protections.
### PoC
Compiled and executed in Rust 1.94.1 `--release` mode. All bypass cases confirmed:
```
BYPASS a..b/../../../.git/ -> PASSED validation
git_dir = .git/modules/a..b/../../../.git/
normalized = .git/ (parent repo!)
BYPASS x..y/../../../.git/config -> PASSED validation
git_dir = .git/modules/x..y/../../../.git/config
normalized = .git/config
```
### Attack chain
1. Attacker crafts a repository with `.gitmodules`:
```ini
[submodule "x..y/../../.."]
path = innocent
url = https://attacker.com/repo.git
```
2. Victim clones the repository using a tool built on gitoxide.
3. When the tool iterates submodules and calls `submodule.open()` or `submodule.status()`:
- `git_dir()` returns `.git/modules/x..y/../../..` which resolves to the parent `.git/`
- `open_opts()` is called with `Trust::Full` (inherited from parent, ownership check skipped)
- The parent's `.git/config` is fully parsed
4. The returned `Repository` object exposes all config values from the traversed path:
- `remote.origin.url` (may contain `https://user:[email protected]/...`)
- `http.extraHeader` (often `Authorization: Bearer <token>`)
- `credential.*` sections
- `core.sshCommand`
5. Accessible via standard API: `repo.config_snapshot().string("http.extraHeader")`, `repo.find_remote("origin")`, etc.
### Impact
A crafted `.gitmodules` in a malicious repository causes gitoxide to open arbitrary git directories as submodule repositories with full trust, exposing their configuration including credentials. This is the same class of vulnerability as GHSA-7w47-3wg8-547c (path traversal), but through the submodule name vector with an additional trust bypass.
The trust inheritance is the critical amplifier: without it, the traversed path would undergo ownership checks that could block the attack. With it, any git directory reachable via `../` is opened with full trust.
### Honest limitations
- The traversed path must be a valid git directory (HEAD, objects/, refs/ must exist)
- The victim's tool must call `open()` or `status()` on submodules (tools that only list submodules are not affected)
- Credential exposure requires the target config to contain embedded credentials
- Submodule operations currently require explicit user action
### Suggested fix
1. Fix the validation to check ALL `..` occurrences (iterate, not single `find`)
2. Call `gix_validate::submodule::name()` in `git_dir()` before constructing the path
3. Do NOT inherit `git_dir_trust` from parent when opening submodule repos -- always re-derive trust from path ownership
### Severity
High. Network vector (via clone), requires user interaction (submodule operations). The trust bypass enables credential disclosure from traversed git directories. Confidentiality impact is high.
EUVD source date text has no stated timezone and is retained without inventing a UTC instant. Related bulletin membership is not an alias, common cause or applicability claim. A missing vector with a zero score is treated as unrated. Complete vendor/product and underlying source evidence remains in the original JSON.
Original publisher date fields
datePublished: Aug 28, 2026, 10:49:37 AM
dateUpdated: Aug 31, 2026, 6:34:55 PM
3 related source bulletins · separate from aliases
openSUSE-SU-2026:11741-1: cargo-c-0.10.25-1.1 on GA media
No normalized affected-package data is projected for this source revision. The original publisher record may contain additional product and version evidence; this does not establish that a package is unaffected.
NVD analysis and CPE criteria are source context, not proof that a package or your environment is affected. Complete affected data, logical configurations and SSVC are retained in the original JSON.
Source analysis status: Deferred
Weakness classifications: CWE-22
Original publisher date fields
published: 2026-08-28T12:16:38.027
lastModified: 2026-08-31T19:17:16.430
No normalized affected-package data is projected for this source revision. The original publisher record may contain additional product and version evidence; this does not establish that a package is unaffected.