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pnpm: Virtual store linker path traversal via unvalidated depPath name in lockfileToDepGraph

CVSS 3.1 7.1 HIGHEUVD CVSS 3.1 7.1 CVSS 3.1 · [email protected] · Secondary 7.1 HIGHCVSS_V3 Publisher rating HIGHFixed by pnpm 10.34.5Fixed by pnpm 11.11.0KEV status unknown

cve-program · CVE-2026-82392

Published

pnpm is a package manager. Prior to 10.34.5 and from 11.0.0 until 11.11.0, pnpm parses the package name from attacker-controlled pnpm-lock.yaml packages keys with dp.parse(depPath).name and uses it without validation in deps/graph-builder/src/lockfileToDepGraph.ts and pnpm11/deps/graph-builder/src/lockfileToDepGraph.ts. The name reaches path.join(modules, pkgName), storeController.importPackage, and pnpm11/lockfile/to-pnp/src/index.ts, allowing package contents to be written outside node_modules when a user runs pnpm install. When dangerouslyAllowAllBuilds or a matching allowBuilds entry permits lifecycle scripts, the escaped package can execute code with the user's privileges. This issue is fixed in versions 10.34.5 and 11.11.0.

Read the publisher's advisory

euvd · EUVD-2026-68816

Published

pnpm is a package manager. Prior to 10.34.5 and from 11.0.0 until 11.11.0, pnpm parses the package name from attacker-controlled pnpm-lock.yaml packages keys with dp.parse(depPath).name and uses it without validation in deps/graph-builder/src/lockfileToDepGraph.ts and pnpm11/deps/graph-builder/src/lockfileToDepGraph.ts. The name reaches path.join(modules, pkgName), storeController.importPackage, and pnpm11/lockfile/to-pnp/src/index.ts, allowing package contents to be written outside node_modules when a user runs pnpm install. When dangerouslyAllowAllBuilds or a matching allowBuilds entry permits lifecycle scripts, the escaped package can execute code with the user's privileges. This issue is fixed in versions 10.34.5 and 11.11.0.

Read the publisher's advisory

nvd · CVE-2026-82392

Published

pnpm is a package manager. Prior to 10.34.5 and from 11.0.0 until 11.11.0, pnpm parses the package name from attacker-controlled pnpm-lock.yaml packages keys with dp.parse(depPath).name and uses it without validation in deps/graph-builder/src/lockfileToDepGraph.ts and pnpm11/deps/graph-builder/src/lockfileToDepGraph.ts. The name reaches path.join(modules, pkgName), storeController.importPackage, and pnpm11/lockfile/to-pnp/src/index.ts, allowing package contents to be written outside node_modules when a user runs pnpm install. When dangerouslyAllowAllBuilds or a matching allowBuilds entry permits lifecycle scripts, the escaped package can execute code with the user's privileges. This issue is fixed in versions 10.34.5 and 11.11.0.

Read the publisher's advisory

osv · GHSA-c59q-g84q-2gj5

Published

## Summary The virtual store linker constructs package installation directories using `path.join(modules, pkgName)` where `pkgName` is extracted from lockfile `packages` keys via `dp.parse(depPath).name` without validation. A crafted `pnpm-lock.yaml` with traversal sequences in depPath keys (e.g., `../../../tmp/[email protected]`) causes package content to be written to arbitrary filesystem paths during `pnpm install`. This is an incomplete fix of GHSA-fr4h-3cph-29xv — the `safeJoinModulesDir` containment helper was applied to the hoisted linker and `symlinkDependency` but NOT to the virtual store linker's `lockfileToDepGraph.ts:233`. ## Details ### Root Cause `dp.parse()` at `pnpm11/deps/path/src/index.ts:135` extracts the package name as: ```typescript const name = dependencyPath.substring(0, sepIndex) ``` This is a raw substring operation with zero validation that `name` is a valid npm package name. A depPath of `../../../tmp/[email protected]` yields `name = '../../../tmp/pwned'`. ### Vulnerable Code Path 1. `pnpm-lock.yaml` → `lockfile.packages['../../../../../../../tmp/[email protected]']` (attacker-controlled lockfile key) 2. `nameVerFromPkgSnapshot(depPath, pkgSnapshot)` at `lockfile/utils/src/nameVerFromPkgSnapshot.ts:16` → calls `dp.parse(depPath)` → returns `{ name: '../../../../../../../tmp/pwned' }` 3. `lockfileToDepGraph.ts:232` → `modules = path.join(dirInVirtualStore, 'node_modules')` 4. `lockfileToDepGraph.ts:233` → `dir = path.join(modules, pkgName)` → resolves to `/tmp/pwned` (ESCAPES virtual store) 5. `storeController.importPackage(depNode.dir, ...)` → writes package content to the traversed path ### Why Existing Defenses Don't Catch It - **`depPathToFilename()`** — replaces `/` with `+` for the `dirInVirtualStore` path, but `pkgName` comes SEPARATELY from `dp.parse()` and is NOT passed through this function - **`verifyLockfileResolutions()`** — validates dependency map keys (aliases) via `isValidDependencyAlias()`, but never validates the depPath keys themselves - **Lockfile parser** — `yaml.load(lockfileRawContent)` with no schema validation on `packages` keys - **`importPackage()`** — accepts `targetDir` and passes it directly to `cafsStore.importPackage(targetDir, ...)` with zero containment check - **Integrity verification** — requires a real fetchable package but does not validate the destination path ### Escalation to RCE (non-default config) When `dangerouslyAllowAllBuilds: true` is configured (or the traversal package name is in the explicit `allowBuilds` list), the same traversed path is used in the rebuild phase at `after-install/src/index.ts:402,470`. The attacker's `postinstall` script then executes with the victim's shell access. Under default config, `allowBuild` returns false for unknown packages, limiting impact to arbitrary file write. ### Also Affected (PnP linker) When `nodeLinker: pnp` is configured, `lockfileToPackageRegistry()` at `lockfile/to-pnp/src/index.ts:105-110` uses the same unvalidated `dp.parse().name` in `packageLocation` construction, allowing the `.pnp.cjs` resolver map to point outside the virtual store. This is a lower-impact variant (PnP is not the default linker). ## Impact An attacker who can commit a crafted `pnpm-lock.yaml` to a repository (or supply one via a malicious package) can cause arbitrary file writes on the machine of any user who runs `pnpm install`. Written content is the actual package files from a real npm package (attacker controls which package and which destination). Targets for arbitrary file write include: - `.git/hooks/pre-commit` — code execution on next git operation - `~/.local/bin/` — binary hijacking - Project source files — supply chain injection ## Reproduction Craft a `pnpm-lock.yaml`: ```yaml lockfileVersion: '9.0' packages: ../../../../../../../tmp/[email protected]: resolution: {integrity: sha512-<real-package-integrity>} engines: {node: '>=14'} snapshots: ../../../../../../../tmp/[email protected]: {} importers: .: dependencies: legitimate-name: specifier: ^1.0.0 version: ../../../../../../../tmp/[email protected] ``` Run `pnpm install` — package content is written to `/tmp/pwned/` instead of the virtual store. ## Recommended Fix Apply `safeJoinModulesDir` (or equivalent validation) at: - `lockfileToDepGraph.ts:233` — `path.join(modules, pkgName)` - `after-install/src/index.ts:402` — `path.join(pkgModulesDir(depPath), pkgInfo.name)` - `lockfile/to-pnp/src/index.ts:105-110` — PnP `packageLocation` Alternatively, validate depPath keys during lockfile parsing to reject any that don't produce valid npm package names via `dp.parse()`. ## Relationship to GHSA-fr4h-3cph-29xv GHSA-fr4h-3cph-29xv fixed the hoisted linker path (`lockfileToHoistedDepGraph.ts:222`) by adding `safeJoinModulesDir`. The same fix was NOT applied to the virtual store linker, which uses the identical `dp.parse().name → path.join()` pattern at `lockfileToDepGraph.ts:233`.

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Affected versions, risk and source history

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17 Nov 2026 18:42:35 UTC

pnpm is a package manager. Prior to 10.34.5 and from 11.0.0 until 11.11.0, pnpm parses the package name from attacker-controlled pnpm-lock.yaml packages keys with dp.parse(depPath).name and uses it without validation in deps/graph-builder/s…

euvd · EUVD-2026-68816 · Published

15 Nov 2026 17:53:15 UTC

pnpm is a package manager. Prior to 10.34.5 and from 11.0.0 until 11.11.0, pnpm parses the package name from attacker-controlled pnpm-lock.yaml packages keys with dp.parse(depPath).name and uses it without validation in deps/graph-builder/s…

euvd · EUVD-2026-68816 · Published

13 Nov 2026 17:09:31 UTC

pnpm is a package manager. Prior to 10.34.5 and from 11.0.0 until 11.11.0, pnpm parses the package name from attacker-controlled pnpm-lock.yaml packages keys with dp.parse(depPath).name and uses it without validation in deps/graph-builder/s…

euvd · EUVD-2026-68816 · Published

11 Nov 2026 16:10:58 UTC

pnpm is a package manager. Prior to 10.34.5 and from 11.0.0 until 11.11.0, pnpm parses the package name from attacker-controlled pnpm-lock.yaml packages keys with dp.parse(depPath).name and uses it without validation in deps/graph-builder/s…

euvd · EUVD-2026-68816 · Published

9 Nov 2026 15:15:54 UTC

pnpm is a package manager. Prior to 10.34.5 and from 11.0.0 until 11.11.0, pnpm parses the package name from attacker-controlled pnpm-lock.yaml packages keys with dp.parse(depPath).name and uses it without validation in deps/graph-builder/s…

euvd · EUVD-2026-68816 · Published

7 Nov 2026 14:31:54 UTC

pnpm is a package manager. Prior to 10.34.5 and from 11.0.0 until 11.11.0, pnpm parses the package name from attacker-controlled pnpm-lock.yaml packages keys with dp.parse(depPath).name and uses it without validation in deps/graph-builder/s…

euvd · EUVD-2026-68816 · Published

5 Nov 2026 13:47:35 UTC

pnpm is a package manager. Prior to 10.34.5 and from 11.0.0 until 11.11.0, pnpm parses the package name from attacker-controlled pnpm-lock.yaml packages keys with dp.parse(depPath).name and uses it without validation in deps/graph-builder/s…

euvd · EUVD-2026-68816 · Published

3 Nov 2026 13:11:14 UTC

pnpm is a package manager. Prior to 10.34.5 and from 11.0.0 until 11.11.0, pnpm parses the package name from attacker-controlled pnpm-lock.yaml packages keys with dp.parse(depPath).name and uses it without validation in deps/graph-builder/s…

euvd · EUVD-2026-68816 · Published

1 Nov 2026 12:59:09 UTC

pnpm is a package manager. Prior to 10.34.5 and from 11.0.0 until 11.11.0, pnpm parses the package name from attacker-controlled pnpm-lock.yaml packages keys with dp.parse(depPath).name and uses it without validation in deps/graph-builder/s…

euvd · EUVD-2026-68816 · Published

30 Oct 2026 11:59:52 UTC

pnpm is a package manager. Prior to 10.34.5 and from 11.0.0 until 11.11.0, pnpm parses the package name from attacker-controlled pnpm-lock.yaml packages keys with dp.parse(depPath).name and uses it without validation in deps/graph-builder/s…

euvd · EUVD-2026-68816 · Published

28 Oct 2026 09:45:12 UTC

pnpm is a package manager. Prior to 10.34.5 and from 11.0.0 until 11.11.0, pnpm parses the package name from attacker-controlled pnpm-lock.yaml packages keys with dp.parse(depPath).name and uses it without validation in deps/graph-builder/s…

euvd · EUVD-2026-68816 · Published

25 Oct 2026 16:19:10 UTC

pnpm is a package manager. Prior to 10.34.5 and from 11.0.0 until 11.11.0, pnpm parses the package name from attacker-controlled pnpm-lock.yaml packages keys with dp.parse(depPath).name and uses it without validation in deps/graph-builder/s…

nvd · CVE-2026-82392 · Published

24 Oct 2026 13:17:17 UTC

pnpm: Virtual store linker path traversal via unvalidated depPath name in lockfileToDepGraph

osv · GHSA-c59q-g84q-2gj5 · Published

23 Oct 2026 15:48:27 UTC

pnpm: Virtual store linker path traversal via unvalidated depPath name in lockfileToDepGraph

cve-program · CVE-2026-82392 · Published

ChangeIntel

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Sources read 19 Nov 05:53 UTC · 273 of 275 readable · 269 fully read · documentation 469/469 current