nodemailer before 9.0.1 File Read and SSRF via raw option

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nodemailer before 9.0.1 File Read and SSRF via raw option

nodemailer before 9.0.1 fails to apply disableFileAccess and disableUrlAccess flags to message-level raw option, allowing authenticated attackers to read arbitrary files or perform server-side request forgery by supplying path or href properties. Attackers can exploit this by crafting raw messages with file paths or URLs that bypass the intended sandbox, with fetched content delivered in the outgoing message to attacker-controlled recipients.

Source published

31 Aug 2026 08:46:24 UTC

Source modified

31 Aug 2026 18:52:08 UTC

Saved here

23 Oct 2026 15:48:27 UTC

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CVE Program Terms of Use

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Source: cve-program · CVE Program Terms of Use. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.

CVSS 4.0 · 7.1 CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

CVSS 3.1 · 7.1 CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:L/A:N

nodemailer before 9.0.1 fails to apply disableFileAccess and disableUrlAccess flags to message-level raw option, allowing authenticated attackers to read arbitrary files or perform server-side request forgery by supplying path or href prope…

nodemailer before 9.0.1 fails to apply disableFileAccess and disableUrlAccess flags to message-level raw option, allowing authenticated attackers to read arbitrary files or perform server-side request forgery by supplying path or href properties. Attackers can exploit this by crafting raw messages with file paths or URLs that bypass the intended sandbox, with fetched content delivered in the outgoing message to attacker-controlled recipients.

Source published

Aug 31, 2026, 8:46:24 AM (timezone not stated)

Source modified

Aug 31, 2026, 6:52:08 PM (timezone not stated)

Saved here

13 Nov 2026 18:01:44 UTC

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ENISA EUVD · source terms and attribution apply

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Source: euvd · ENISA EUVD · source terms and attribution apply. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.

EUVD CVSS 4.0 · 7.1 CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

nodemailer before 9.0.1 fails to apply disableFileAccess and disableUrlAccess flags to message-level raw option, allowing authenticated attackers to read arbitrary files or perform server-side request forgery by supplying path or href prope…

nodemailer before 9.0.1 fails to apply disableFileAccess and disableUrlAccess flags to message-level raw option, allowing authenticated attackers to read arbitrary files or perform server-side request forgery by supplying path or href properties. Attackers can exploit this by crafting raw messages with file paths or URLs that bypass the intended sandbox, with fetched content delivered in the outgoing message to attacker-controlled recipients.

Source published

31 Aug 2026 09:17:03 UTC

Source modified

10 Sep 2026 15:48:28 UTC

Saved here

25 Oct 2026 16:19:10 UTC

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NIST NVD usage terms; underlying source attribution retained

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

Source: nvd · NIST NVD usage terms; underlying source attribution retained. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.

CVSS 4.0 · [email protected] · Secondary · 7.1 CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X

CVSS 3.1 · [email protected] · Secondary · 7.1 CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:L/A:N

Duplicate Advisory: Nodemailer: Message-level raw option bypasses disableFileAccess/disableUrlAccess, enabling arbitrary file read and full-response SSRF in the delivered message

## Duplicate Advisory This advisory has been withdrawn because it is a duplicate of GHSA-p6gq-j5cr-w38f. This link is maintained to preserve external references. ## Original Description nodemailer before 9.0.1 fails to apply disableFileAccess and disableUrlAccess flags to message-level raw option, allowing authenticated attackers to read arbitrary files or perform server-side request forgery by supplying path or href properties. Attackers can exploit this by crafting raw messages with file paths or URLs that bypass the intended sandbox, with fetched content delivered in the outgoing message to attacker-controlled recipients.

Source published

31 Aug 2026 09:30:29 UTC

Source modified

10 Sep 2026 03:51:14 UTC

Saved here

24 Oct 2026 13:17:17 UTC

Source terms

GitHub Advisory Database · CC-BY-4.0

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

Source: osv · GitHub Advisory Database · CC-BY-4.0. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.

CVSS_V3 · CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:L/A:N

CVSS_V4 · CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X

Publisher rating · HIGH

Nodemailer: Message-level raw option bypasses disableFileAccess/disableUrlAccess, enabling arbitrary file read and full-response SSRF in the delivered message

# Message-level `raw` option bypasses `disableFileAccess` / `disableUrlAccess`, enabling arbitrary file read and full-response SSRF in the sent message - **Target:** nodemailer/nodemailer, npm `nodemailer` **v9.0.0** (HEAD `4e58450eb490e5097a74b2b2cce35a8d9e21856e`) - **Verdict:** CONFIRMED (local PoC, no network) ## Summary Nodemailer exposes `disableFileAccess` and `disableUrlAccess` so an application that passes **untrusted** message data to the library can forbid that data from reading local files or fetching URLs. Every attachment, alternative, `html`/`text`/`watchHtml`/`amp` and `icalEvent` content node honors these flags. **The message-level `raw` option does not.** `MailComposer.compile()` builds the root MIME node for a `raw` message **without** threading the two flags, so a `raw: { path: '/etc/passwd' }` or `raw: { href: 'http://169.254.169.254/…' }` message is read / fetched anyway, and the file or HTTP-response bytes become the **actual message that is sent** by every transport (SMTP, SES, sendmail, stream, JSON). An actor whose input the application intended to sandbox therefore obtains arbitrary local-file disclosure and a full-response SSRF primitive, delivered to a recipient the same actor can choose. This is the same vulnerability class as the already-published jsonTransport advisory **GHSA-wqvq-jvpq-h66f**, but a **distinct code path** (`raw` root node, not `normalize()`), and strictly higher impact: the jsonTransport bug only affected the locally-returned JSON, whereas this affects the delivered RFC822 message for all transports. ## Affected component - `lib/mail-composer/index.js:34-35` — root cause: ```js if (this.mail.raw) { this.message = new MimeNode('message/rfc822', { newline: this.mail.newline }).setRaw(this.mail.raw); } ``` The `MimeNode` is constructed with only `{ newline }`. Compare the sibling node builders `_createMixed`/`_createAlternative`/`_createRelated`/`_createContentNode` (`lib/mail-composer/index.js:389-527`), which all pass `disableUrlAccess: this.mail.disableUrlAccess, disableFileAccess: this.mail.disableFileAccess`. - `lib/mime-node/index.js:51-52` — the constructor derives `this.disableFileAccess`/ `this.disableUrlAccess` solely from its own `options`; children do **not** inherit a parent's flags (`createChild`/`appendChild`, lines 175-194, pass options through verbatim). - `lib/mime-node/index.js:812` — `setRaw()` content is resolved through `this._getStream(this._raw)`. - `lib/mime-node/index.js:984-1010` — `_getStream` reads the file (`fs.createReadStream`, 995) or fetches the URL (`nmfetch`, 1009) **only guarded by `this.disableFileAccess`/`this.disableUrlAccess`**, which on the `raw` root node are `false`. - Reached from the normal send flow at `lib/mailer/index.js:188` (`mail.message = new MailComposer(mail.data).compile()`), so every transport is affected. ## Reachability gate (hop-by-hop) 1. **Source.** Application calls `transporter.sendMail({ raw: <userControlled> , to: <userControlled> })` with `disableFileAccess: true` and/or `disableUrlAccess: true` configured on the transporter (forced onto `mail.data` in `lib/mailer/mail-message.js:36-40`) or per message. This is the exact scenario the flags exist for — the same precondition under which GHSA-wqvq-jvpq-h66f was accepted. 2. **Guard — the access flags.** For attachments the flag is enforced: a node created by `_createContentNode` carries `disableFileAccess`, so `_getStream` throws `EFILEACCESS`. **Bypass:** the `raw` branch (`compile():34-35`) never sets the flag on its node, so `this.disableFileAccess === false` and the guard at `mime-node:985` / `:999` is skipped. There is no other validation between `mail.raw` and the read; `raw` content shapes (`{path}`, `{href}`, stream, string, buffer) are accepted as-is by `setRaw`/`_getStream`. 3. **Sink.** `fs.createReadStream(content.path)` (file disclosure) or `nmfetch(content.href, …)` (SSRF). The resulting bytes are emitted as the message body by `createReadStream()`, which every transport pipes to its destination (`smtp-transport:233`, `smtp-pool/pool-resource:208`, `ses-transport:96`, `sendmail-transport:184`, `stream-transport:67`). No guard blocks the chain; the only guard (the access flags) is structurally absent on this node. ## Root cause Inconsistent enforcement: the access policy is applied per-`MimeNode` via constructor options and must be re-passed at every node creation. The `raw`-message shortcut in `compile()` omits it, while all five other node builders include it. The flags are therefore enforced for every content type *except* the one that lets the caller supply a complete message body by path/URL. ## Exploit path Application that sandboxes untrusted mail input (`disableFileAccess`/`disableUrlAccess` set): 1. Untrusted actor supplies `raw: { path: '/proc/self/environ' }` (or any server file: `/app/.env`, key material, etc.) and `to: [email protected]`. 2. `compile()` builds the raw root node without the flags; the transport reads the file and sends its contents as the message → **arbitrary server-file exfiltration to an attacker-chosen mailbox.** 3. Alternatively `raw: { href: 'http://127.0.0.1:8080/admin' }` or a cloud metadata URL → Nodemailer fetches it server-side and delivers the full response body in the email → **full-response SSRF** (no blind-channel limitation). ## Impact - **Confidentiality (High):** arbitrary local file read disclosed in the outgoing message; full-response SSRF to internal/metadata endpoints, also disclosed in the message. - **Integrity (Low):** attacker-fetched/file content is injected into the delivered mail. - The two protective flags an application relies on to contain untrusted input are silently ineffective for `raw`. ## Preconditions The application (a) passes `disableFileAccess` and/or `disableUrlAccess` (the documented sandboxing flags) and (b) lets untrusted input influence the `raw` field (and, for maximal disclosure, `to`). No other configuration is required; all bundled transports are affected. This mirrors the accepted precondition of GHSA-wqvq-jvpq-h66f. ## Severity - **AV** — message data routinely originates over the network in the apps these flags protect. - **AC** — a single crafted `raw` object; deterministic. - **PR** — the actor is a user whose input the app already treats as untrusted (the reason the flags are set); not fully anonymous in the typical deployment. - **UI** — no victim interaction. - **S** — impact within Nodemailer's process scope. - **C** — arbitrary file read **and** full-response SSRF, both delivered to an attacker-chosen recipient. (The sibling jsonTransport advisory used C:L because its leak stayed in locally-returned JSON; here the bytes leave the system in the sent message, so C:H is warranted.) - **I** — attacker injects fetched/file bytes into the outgoing message. - **A**. Note: if a deployment fixes the recipient (`to` not attacker-controlled) the disclosure channel narrows and the rating degrades toward the sibling's Medium; the High rating reflects the reasonable worst case where `raw` and `to` are both untrusted. ## Adversarial re-read (attempts to refute) 1. **"`raw` content is by-design trusted, so the flags shouldn't apply."** Rejected: every other content path (attachments, alternatives, html/text, icalEvent) honors the flags, and the maintainer already accepted GHSA-wqvq-jvpq-h66f for exactly this "untrusted input + flag set" model. The asymmetry — attachment `{path}` is blocked but `raw:{path}` is not — is the bug, and the PoC's CONTROL case proves the flag is otherwise effective on the same file. 2. **"The raw node inherits the flags via rootNode."** Rejected by code and by PoC: `compile():35` constructs the node with `{ newline }` only; `MimeNode` constructor sets `this.disableFileAccess = !!options.disableFileAccess` → `false`; `rootNode` is itself; no inheritance exists. 3. **"The PoC leaks for an unrelated reason."** Rejected: the CONTROL message (`attachments:[{path}]`, same file, same transporter) returns `EFILEACCESS`; only the `raw:{path}` message leaks. The sentinel nonce exists solely in the temp file; the URL nonce is generated server-side and is only obtainable by an actual fetch. Both observables are uniquely bound to the bypass. 4. **"Maybe only jsonTransport (already reported) is affected."** Rejected: the PoC uses `streamTransport` and the root cause is in `MailComposer.compile()` (`mailer:188`), shared by all transports; jsonTransport is a different (already-fixed) path. I could not find any guard that blocks the chain; the finding survives. ## Proof of concept (safe, benign) `findings/nodemailer/raw/poc-raw-fileaccess-bypass.js` — local, no network egress (loopback only), no destructive action. Output: ``` [CONTROL] attachment path with disableFileAccess: BLOCKED (EFILEACCESS) — flag works here [ATTACK] raw:{path} with disableFileAccess=true: BYPASSED — sentinel file CONTENT present in message [ATTACK] raw:{href} with disableUrlAccess=true (loopback server): BYPASSED — fetched body present (SSRF) VERDICT: CONFIRMED ``` Run: `node findings/nodemailer/raw/poc-raw-fileaccess-bypass.js` (exit 0 = confirmed). ## Remediation Thread the access policy onto the `raw` root node, exactly as the other builders do: ```js if (this.mail.raw) { this.message = new MimeNode('message/rfc822', { newline: this.mail.newline, disableFileAccess: this.mail.disableFileAccess, disableUrlAccess: this.mail.disableUrlAccess }).setRaw(this.mail.raw); } ``` (Defense in depth: `setRaw`/`_getStream` could also refuse `{path}`/`{href}` raw content when either flag is set, regardless of how the node was constructed.) Add a regression test asserting that `raw:{path}` and `raw:{href}` reject with `EFILEACCESS`/`EURLACCESS` when the flags are set, mirroring the attachment tests.

Source published

18 Jun 2026 14:28:05 UTC

Source modified

10 Sep 2026 03:51:09 UTC

Saved here

24 Oct 2026 13:17:17 UTC

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GitHub Advisory Database · CC-BY-4.0

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

Source: osv · GitHub Advisory Database · CC-BY-4.0. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.

CVSS_V3 · CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:L/A:N

Publisher rating · HIGH