Public mode

No access to your tenant or devices. Every item links to its source. What this means

Sources need attention Customize Public modeDiscuss ChangeIntel on Discord

xmldom: XML fragment injection via invalid EntityReference.nodeName during requireWellFormed serialization

No KEV listing collectedCVSS not publishedFix not stated

Assessment

Severity
Moderate
CVSS base score
Not published
Impact
Not stated
Exploitation detected
Unknown: not stated by MSRC
Exploitability
Not assessed
Publicly disclosed
Unknown: not stated by MSRC
EPSS · 30-day forecast
No EPSS score collected
Customer action
Required: follow the MSRC remediation guidance
More details
Public detection template
No Nuclei template is listed in the current collected catalog
Component
Mariner
Weakness
CWE-116: Improper Encoding or Escaping of Output
Issued by
GitHub_M
Published
7 Sep 2026 · September 2026
Last revised
7 Sep 2026

Updates that fix it

0 KBs

No KB listed

No KB update is listed in the collected MSRC record. Check the MSRC advisory for product releases and other remedies.

Affected products

1 affected product
  • azl3 python-tensorboard 2.16.2-6 on Azure Linux 3.0

What changed

  1. Detection template: Unknown: detection-template evidence is incomplete or retained → No Nuclei template listed
  2. Detection template: No Nuclei template listed → Unknown: detection-template evidence is incomplete or retained
  3. Detection template: Unknown: detection-template evidence is incomplete or retained → No Nuclei template listed
  4. Detection template: No Nuclei template listed → Unknown: detection-template evidence is incomplete or retained
  5. Detection template: Unknown: detection-template evidence is incomplete or retained → No Nuclei template listed
  6. Detection template: No Nuclei template listed → Unknown: detection-template evidence is incomplete or retained
  7. Detection template: No Nuclei template listed · Customer action: Required: apply the update → Required: follow the MSRC remediation guidance · Public disclosure: No → Unknown: not stated by MSRC · Exploitation detected: Not reported by MSRC → Unknown: not stated by MSRC
  8. Detection template: Unknown: exploit-code evidence is incomplete or retained → No Nuclei template listed · CISA KEV: Unknown: catalog evidence is incomplete or retained → Not listed in the collected catalog
  9. Detection template: No Nuclei template listed → Unknown: exploit-code evidence is incomplete or retained · CISA KEV: Not listed in the collected catalog → Unknown: catalog evidence is incomplete or retained
Page history

Changes are dated when recorded; day views use the last saved version from that UTC day, and citations stay fixed.

Cite this version
Field-level log (43)

Up to 100 recent field edits are shown; older edits may be outside retention.

  1. 13 Nov 2026 · 12:10:20 UTC Public detection templateUnknown: detection-template evidence is incomplete or retained → No Nuclei template listed
  2. 13 Nov 2026 · 12:10:20 UTC Source coverage: public-exploit-codeIncomplete → Current
  3. 13 Nov 2026 · 12:10:20 UTC Source coverage: first-epssIncomplete → Current
  4. 13 Nov 2026 · 12:10:20 UTC Source coverage: msrc-cvrfIncomplete → Current
  5. 13 Nov 2026 · 11:07:20 UTC Public detection templateNo Nuclei template listed → Unknown: detection-template evidence is incomplete or retained
  6. 13 Nov 2026 · 11:07:20 UTC Source coverage: public-exploit-codeCurrent → Incomplete
  7. 13 Nov 2026 · 11:07:20 UTC Source coverage: first-epssCurrent → Incomplete
  8. 13 Nov 2026 · 11:07:20 UTC Source coverage: msrc-cvrfCurrent → Incomplete
  9. 6 Nov 2026 · 17:32:22 UTC Public detection templateUnknown: detection-template evidence is incomplete or retained → No Nuclei template listed
  10. 6 Nov 2026 · 17:32:22 UTC Source coverage: public-exploit-codeIncomplete → Current
  11. 6 Nov 2026 · 17:32:22 UTC Source coverage: first-epssIncomplete → Current
  12. 6 Nov 2026 · 17:32:22 UTC Source coverage: msrc-cvrfIncomplete → Current
  13. 6 Nov 2026 · 16:31:02 UTC Public detection templateNo Nuclei template listed → Unknown: detection-template evidence is incomplete or retained
  14. 6 Nov 2026 · 16:31:02 UTC Source coverage: public-exploit-codeCurrent → Incomplete
  15. 6 Nov 2026 · 16:31:02 UTC Source coverage: first-epssCurrent → Incomplete
  16. 6 Nov 2026 · 16:31:02 UTC Source coverage: msrc-cvrfCurrent → Incomplete
  17. 2 Nov 2026 · 17:30:39 UTC Public detection templateUnknown: detection-template evidence is incomplete or retained → No Nuclei template listed
  18. 2 Nov 2026 · 17:30:39 UTC Source coverage: public-exploit-codeIncomplete → Current
  19. 2 Nov 2026 · 17:30:39 UTC Source coverage: first-epssIncomplete → Current
  20. 2 Nov 2026 · 17:30:39 UTC Source coverage: msrc-cvrfIncomplete → Current
  21. 2 Nov 2026 · 16:27:39 UTC Public detection templateNo Nuclei template listed → Unknown: detection-template evidence is incomplete or retained
  22. 2 Nov 2026 · 16:27:39 UTC Source coverage: public-exploit-codeCurrent → Incomplete
  23. 2 Nov 2026 · 16:27:39 UTC Source coverage: first-epssCurrent → Incomplete
  24. 2 Nov 2026 · 16:27:39 UTC Source coverage: msrc-cvrfCurrent → Incomplete
  25. 29 Oct 2026 · 20:19:26 UTC Public detection templateNo Nuclei template listed
  26. 29 Oct 2026 · 20:19:26 UTC EPSSNot scored → No EPSS score collected
  27. 29 Oct 2026 · 20:19:26 UTC Customer actionRequired: apply the update → Required: follow the MSRC remediation guidance
  28. 29 Oct 2026 · 20:19:26 UTC Publicly disclosedNo → Unknown: not stated by MSRC
  29. 29 Oct 2026 · 20:19:26 UTC Exploitation detectedNot reported by MSRC → Unknown: not stated by MSRC
  30. 23 Oct 2026 · 09:33:49 UTC Public exploit codeUnknown: exploit-code evidence is incomplete or retained → No Nuclei template listed
  31. 23 Oct 2026 · 09:33:49 UTC CISA KEVUnknown: catalog evidence is incomplete or retained → Not listed in the collected catalog
  32. 23 Oct 2026 · 09:33:49 UTC Source coverage: public-exploit-codeIncomplete → Current
  33. 23 Oct 2026 · 09:33:49 UTC Source coverage: first-epssIncomplete → Current
  34. 23 Oct 2026 · 09:33:49 UTC Source coverage: cisa-kevIncomplete → Current
  35. 23 Oct 2026 · 09:33:49 UTC Source coverage: msrc-cvrfIncomplete → Current
  36. 23 Oct 2026 · 08:31:50 UTC Public exploit codeNo Nuclei template listed → Unknown: exploit-code evidence is incomplete or retained
  37. 23 Oct 2026 · 08:31:50 UTC CISA KEVNot listed in the collected catalog → Unknown: catalog evidence is incomplete or retained
  38. 23 Oct 2026 · 08:31:50 UTC Source coverage: public-exploit-codeCurrent → Incomplete
  39. 23 Oct 2026 · 08:31:50 UTC Source coverage: first-epssCurrent → Incomplete
  40. 23 Oct 2026 · 08:31:50 UTC Source coverage: cisa-kevCurrent → Incomplete
  41. 23 Oct 2026 · 08:31:50 UTC Source coverage: msrc-cvrfCurrent → Incomplete
  42. 18 Oct 2026 · 14:54:30 UTC Link: September 2026/security?release=2026-Sep#cves
  43. 14 Oct 2026 · 11:22:42 UTC Source coverage: msrc-cvrfIncomplete → Current

Explore global source statements, affected packages and advisory history for CVE-2026-83610. The catalog has a separate collection scope from Microsoft release records.

More advisories, affected versions and source history

Exploitation and risk

Source status

CISA KEV lists vulnerabilities known to be exploited. FIRST EPSS estimates the likelihood of exploitation in the next 30 days. An unavailable score does not mean zero risk.

Which CVEs have scores here?

This view includes predictions for CVE identifiers explicitly listed in public NuGet advisories. Microsoft release pages have their own prediction coverage. Check source status for the scope and latest checks.

No exploitation or prediction data is available here for these CVEs. This does not mean they are safe or unlikely to be exploited.

cve-program · CVE-2026-83610

Published

xmldom: XML fragment injection via invalid EntityReference.nodeName during requireWellFormed serialization

xmldom is a pure JavaScript W3C standard-based (XML DOM Level 2 Core) DOMParser and XMLSerializer module. Prior to @xmldom/xmldom versions 0.8.15 and 0.9.12, and in xmldom version 0.6.0 and earlier, Document.createEntityReference(name) accepts an invalid name and the ENTITY_REFERENCE_NODE serializer emits the resulting nodeName directly in &name; form. Directly serializing the node or fragment with XMLSerializer.serializeToString() and requireWellFormed: true can therefore break the entity-reference boundary and produce attacker-controlled XML markup when reparsed. The parser does not ordinarily create these nodes, and element-child insertion is rejected, so exploitation requires an application to create and directly serialize an EntityReference. This issue is fixed in @xmldom/xmldom versions 0.8.15 and 0.9.12; no fixed version is available for xmldom.

Source published
1 Sep 2026 14:31:49 UTC
Source modified
3 Sep 2026 16:00:03 UTC
Saved here
23 Oct 2026 15:48:27 UTC
Source terms
CVE Program Terms of Use

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

Source: cve-program · CVE Program Terms of Use. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.

CVSS 4.0 · 6.3 CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

euvd · EUVD-2026-69222

Published

xmldom is a pure JavaScript W3C standard-based (XML DOM Level 2 Core) DOMParser and XMLSerializer module. Prior to @xmldom/xmldom versions 0.8.15 and 0.9.12, and in xmldom version 0.6.0 and earlier, Document.createEntityReference(name) acce…

xmldom is a pure JavaScript W3C standard-based (XML DOM Level 2 Core) DOMParser and XMLSerializer module. Prior to @xmldom/xmldom versions 0.8.15 and 0.9.12, and in xmldom version 0.6.0 and earlier, Document.createEntityReference(name) accepts an invalid name and the ENTITY_REFERENCE_NODE serializer emits the resulting nodeName directly in &name; form. Directly serializing the node or fragment with XMLSerializer.serializeToString() and requireWellFormed: true can therefore break the entity-reference boundary and produce attacker-controlled XML markup when reparsed. The parser does not ordinarily create these nodes, and element-child insertion is rejected, so exploitation requires an application to create and directly serialize an EntityReference. This issue is fixed in @xmldom/xmldom versions 0.8.15 and 0.9.12; no fixed version is available for xmldom.

Additional publisher context

EUVD source date text has no stated timezone and is retained without inventing a UTC instant. Related bulletin membership is not an alias, common cause or applicability claim. A missing vector with a zero score is treated as unrated. Complete vendor/product and underlying source evidence remains in the original JSON.

Original publisher date fields

datePublished: Sep 1, 2026, 2:31:49 PM

dateUpdated: Sep 3, 2026, 4:00:03 PM

2 related source bulletins · separate from aliases

msrc_CVE-2026-83610: xmldom: XML fragment injection via invalid EntityReference.nodeName during requireWellFormed serialization

CVE-2026-83610

WID-SEC-W-2026-3596: IBM App Connect Enterprise: Mehrere Schwachstellen

CVE-2022-35948 · CVE-2026-13149 · CVE-2026-14257 · CVE-2026-15157 · CVE-2026-1527 · CVE-2026-16728 · CVE-2026-16729 · CVE-2026-18149 · CVE-2026-18540 · CVE-2026-19534 · CVE-2026-2391 · CVE-2026-45820 · CVE-2026-54272 · CVE-2026-63670 · CVE-2026-67213 · CVE-2026-67214 · CVE-2026-69152 · CVE-2026-69192 · CVE-2026-69198 · CVE-2026-73566 · CVE-2026-73646 · CVE-2026-77037 · CVE-2026-77063 · CVE-2026-77078 · CVE-2026-82333 · CVE-2026-82417 · CVE-2026-82562 · CVE-2026-83605 · CVE-2026-83606 · CVE-2026-83607 · CVE-2026-83608 · CVE-2026-83609 · CVE-2026-83610 · CVE-2026-83611 · CVE-2026-83612 · CVE-2026-83613 · CVE-2026-83614 · CVE-2026-83615 · CVE-2026-83616 · CVE-2026-83618 · CVE-2026-83619 · CVE-2026-84292 · CVE-2026-84371 · CVE-2026-84375 · CVE-2026-84890 · CVE-2026-84933 · CVE-2026-84947 · CVE-2026-84961 · CVE-2026-85008 · CVE-2026-85014 · CVE-2026-85024 · CVE-2026-85152

Source published
Sep 1, 2026, 2:31:49 PM (timezone not stated)
Source modified
Sep 3, 2026, 4:00:03 PM (timezone not stated)
Saved here
15 Nov 2026 18:45:42 UTC
Source terms
ENISA EUVD · source terms and attribution apply

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

Source: euvd · ENISA EUVD · source terms and attribution apply. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.

EUVD CVSS 4.0 · 6.3 CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

nvd · CVE-2026-83610

Published

xmldom is a pure JavaScript W3C standard-based (XML DOM Level 2 Core) DOMParser and XMLSerializer module. Prior to @xmldom/xmldom versions 0.8.15 and 0.9.12, and in xmldom version 0.6.0 and earlier, Document.createEntityReference(name) acce…

xmldom is a pure JavaScript W3C standard-based (XML DOM Level 2 Core) DOMParser and XMLSerializer module. Prior to @xmldom/xmldom versions 0.8.15 and 0.9.12, and in xmldom version 0.6.0 and earlier, Document.createEntityReference(name) accepts an invalid name and the ENTITY_REFERENCE_NODE serializer emits the resulting nodeName directly in &name; form. Directly serializing the node or fragment with XMLSerializer.serializeToString() and requireWellFormed: true can therefore break the entity-reference boundary and produce attacker-controlled XML markup when reparsed. The parser does not ordinarily create these nodes, and element-child insertion is rejected, so exploitation requires an application to create and directly serialize an EntityReference. This issue is fixed in @xmldom/xmldom versions 0.8.15 and 0.9.12; no fixed version is available for xmldom.

Additional publisher context

NVD analysis and CPE criteria are source context, not proof that a package or your environment is affected. Complete affected data, logical configurations and SSVC are retained in the original JSON.

Source analysis status: Deferred

Weakness classifications: CWE-116

Original publisher date fields

published: 2026-09-01T15:17:39.107

lastModified: 2026-09-08T21:11:31.703

Source published
1 Sep 2026 15:17:39 UTC
Source modified
8 Sep 2026 21:11:31 UTC
Saved here
25 Oct 2026 16:19:10 UTC
Source terms
NIST NVD usage terms; underlying source attribution retained

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

Source: nvd · NIST NVD usage terms; underlying source attribution retained. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.

CVSS 4.0 · [email protected] · Secondary · 6.3 CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X

osv · GHSA-6gmq-8vp8-gcm6

Published

xmldom: XML fragment injection via invalid EntityReference.nodeName during requireWellFormed serialization

## Summary An `EntityReference` node can be created with an invalid, attacker-controlled name through `Document.createEntityReference(name)`. When this node is serialized directly with: ```js serializer.serializeToString(ref, { requireWellFormed: true }) ``` the invalid `nodeName` is emitted into the serialized XML fragment without validation or escaping. This can produce real XML markup in the serialized output. In the proof of concept below, the serialized fragment contains `<injected/>`, and reparsing the fragment creates a real `injected` element. --- ## Details The issue appears to be in the serialization path for `ENTITY_REFERENCE_NODE`. For several other node types, `requireWellFormed: true` performs specific validation checks before serialization. For example, comments, processing instructions, document types, and some character data cases are checked before being emitted. However, for `ENTITY_REFERENCE_NODE`, the serializer appears to emit the node name directly in entity reference form: ```js case ENTITY_REFERENCE_NODE: buf.push('&', n.nodeName, ';'); return null; ``` As a result, if `nodeName` contains characters that break out of the intended `&name;` structure, the serializer can emit additional XML markup. For example, an entity reference created with the name: ```text safe; <injected/> &x ``` is serialized as: ```xml &safe; <injected/> &x; ``` When this fragment is later parsed in an XML context, `<injected/>` becomes a real element. This is especially surprising when `{ requireWellFormed: true }` is used, because applications may reasonably treat this mode as the stricter or safer XML serialization mode. --- ## Proof of Concept Tested with: ```text @xmldom/[email protected] Node.js v24.18.0 Windows 10 / PowerShell ``` ```js 'use strict'; const { DOMImplementation, XMLSerializer, DOMParser } = require('@xmldom/xmldom'); const impl = new DOMImplementation(); const doc = impl.createDocument(null, 'root', null); const serializer = new XMLSerializer(); function countInjected(fragment) { try { const parsed = new DOMParser().parseFromString(`<root>${fragment}</root>`, 'application/xml'); return parsed.getElementsByTagName('injected').length; } catch (e) { return `PARSE_THROW ${e.name}: ${e.message}`; } } for (const name of [ 'safe', 'safe; <injected/> &x', 'x<injected', 'x y' ]) { try { const ref = doc.createEntityReference(name); const xml = serializer.serializeToString(ref, { requireWellFormed: true }); console.log(`[SERIALIZED] ${JSON.stringify(name)}: ${xml}`); console.log(`[INJECTED_COUNT] ${JSON.stringify(name)}: ${countInjected(xml)}`); } catch (e) { console.log(`[THROW] ${JSON.stringify(name)}: ${e.name}: ${e.message}`); } } ``` Observed output: ```text [SERIALIZED] "safe": &safe; [INJECTED_COUNT] "safe": 0 [SERIALIZED] "safe; <injected/> &x": &safe; <injected/> &x; [INJECTED_COUNT] "safe; <injected/> &x": 1 [SERIALIZED] "x<injected": &x<injected; [INJECTED_COUNT] "x<injected": 0 [SERIALIZED] "x y": &x y; [INJECTED_COUNT] "x y": 0 ``` --- ## Impact An application that creates an `EntityReference` from attacker-controlled input and then serializes that node or XML fragment with `requireWellFormed: true` may produce XML containing attacker-controlled markup. The impact is limited by two observations: 1. The parser does not create `EntityReference` nodes from ordinary XML entity references. 2. Appending an `EntityReference` node as an element child is rejected with a `HierarchyRequestError`. The main affected scenario is applications that directly use `createEntityReference(name)` and then serialize the resulting node or fragment. ## Fix Applied Two complementary, non-breaking fixes. (1) `document.createEntityReference(name)` rejects an invalid `Name` at creation, closing the reachable creation vector by default — the opt-in serializer check alone cannot, since a later `nodeName` mutation would bypass a creation-only guard. (2) Under `requireWellFormed`, the serializer validates the `EntityReference` `nodeName` as a well-formed XML `Name` and throws `InvalidStateError` when it is not; a valid reference still serializes as `&name;`. Both ship on both maintained versions. The `EntityReference` / `createEntityReference` docs note that under `requireWellFormed` the `nodeName` is validated as an XML `Name`, and that xmldom does not expand entities. See the [XML `Name` production](https://www.w3.org/TR/xml/#NT-Name). > **⚠ Opt-in required.** Protection is not automatic. Existing serialization calls remain > vulnerable unless `{ requireWellFormed: true }` is explicitly passed. Applications that > serialize untrusted DOM content should audit all `serializeToString()` call sites and add it. ### Proof of Concept - fixed path ```js 'use strict'; const { DOMImplementation, XMLSerializer } = require('@xmldom/xmldom'); const impl = new DOMImplementation(); const doc = impl.createDocument(null, 'root', null); const serializer = new XMLSerializer(); // Creation-time anchor (applied by default): an invalid XML Name is rejected at creation. try { doc.createEntityReference('safe; <injected/> &x'); } catch (e) { console.log(`${e.name}`); // rejected at creation } // Default path (requireWellFormed omitted): because creation now rejects an ill-formed name, // an ill-formed nodeName is only reachable via a post-creation mutation — and is emitted verbatim. const ref = doc.createEntityReference('safe'); ref.nodeName = 'safe; <injected/> &x'; console.log(serializer.serializeToString(ref)); // -> &safe; <injected/> &x; (injection present on the default path) // Opt-in path: throws on the invalid nodeName. try { serializer.serializeToString(ref, { requireWellFormed: true }); } catch (e) { console.log(`${e.name}`); // InvalidStateError } // A valid name still serializes as &name; under requireWellFormed. const ok = doc.createEntityReference('valid'); console.log(serializer.serializeToString(ok, { requireWellFormed: true })); // -> &valid; ``` ### Why the default stays verbatim The creation-time anchor is applied by default, because it is classified non-breaking. The serializer check, by contrast, stays gated behind `{ requireWellFormed: true }`: W3C DOM Parsing's require-well-formed flag defaults to `false`, and the browser `XMLSerializer` emits the `nodeName` verbatim in that default mode, so unconditionally throwing for an ill-formed `EntityReference.nodeName` would be an unjustified breaking change — which is why the default serialization path stays verbatim. ### Residual limitation The creation vector is closed by default — the non-breaking creation-time anchor — with no further deferred work. The residual is at serialization: the default path still emits an ill-formed `nodeName` verbatim, because the serializer check is opt-in via `{ requireWellFormed: true }`.

Source published
2 Sep 2026 15:18:20 UTC
Source modified
10 Sep 2026 03:51:15 UTC
Saved here
24 Oct 2026 13:17:17 UTC
Source terms
GitHub Advisory Database · CC-BY-4.0

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

Source: osv · GitHub Advisory Database · CC-BY-4.0. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.

CVSS_V4 · CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

Publisher rating · MODERATE

ChangeIntel

An IT change radar: releases, security, known issues, retirements, documentation changes, and service status from public sources. Every item links to supporting evidence; dates and statuses can change after they are read.

Sources read 17 Nov 03:50 UTC · 274 of 275 readable · 250 fully read · 20 waiting for GitHub's hourly limit · documentation 469/469 current