xmldom: requireWellFormed element/attribute name validation is bypassable via an embedded line terminator
cve-program · CVE-2026-83617
Publishedxmldom is a pure JavaScript W3C standard-based (XML DOM Level 2 Core) DOMParser and XMLSerializer module. From 0.9.11 until 0.9.12, the requireWellFormed: true element and attribute name checks use the anchored QName_exact expression produced by reg() in lib/grammar.js, which inherits the multiline flag. A name with a valid first line followed by U+000A, U+000D, U+2028, or U+2029 and breakout markup therefore passes validation and is emitted verbatim in element start and end tags or attribute names. This bypasses the strict-serialization checks introduced for the earlier element-name and attribute-name injection advisories, while the default serialization path remains outside the strict guarantee. This issue is fixed in @xmldom/xmldom version 0.9.12.
Read the publisher's advisoryeuvd · EUVD-2026-69241
Publishedxmldom is a pure JavaScript W3C standard-based (XML DOM Level 2 Core) DOMParser and XMLSerializer module. From 0.9.11 until 0.9.12, the requireWellFormed: true element and attribute name checks use the anchored QName_exact expression produced by reg() in lib/grammar.js, which inherits the multiline flag. A name with a valid first line followed by U+000A, U+000D, U+2028, or U+2029 and breakout markup therefore passes validation and is emitted verbatim in element start and end tags or attribute names. This bypasses the strict-serialization checks introduced for the earlier element-name and attribute-name injection advisories, while the default serialization path remains outside the strict guarantee. This issue is fixed in @xmldom/xmldom version 0.9.12.
Read the publisher's advisorynvd · CVE-2026-83617
Publishedxmldom is a pure JavaScript W3C standard-based (XML DOM Level 2 Core) DOMParser and XMLSerializer module. From 0.9.11 until 0.9.12, the requireWellFormed: true element and attribute name checks use the anchored QName_exact expression produced by reg() in lib/grammar.js, which inherits the multiline flag. A name with a valid first line followed by U+000A, U+000D, U+2028, or U+2029 and breakout markup therefore passes validation and is emitted verbatim in element start and end tags or attribute names. This bypasses the strict-serialization checks introduced for the earlier element-name and attribute-name injection advisories, while the default serialization path remains outside the strict guarantee. This issue is fixed in @xmldom/xmldom version 0.9.12.
Read the publisher's advisoryosv · GHSA-jxjr-3g7g-3944
Published## Summary An embedded line terminator bypasses the `requireWellFormed` serializer check for element and attribute names. The check was added to fix GHSA-w2rr-34g9-rvrj and GHSA-4w3w-2rp5-g8jm; a name whose first line is well-formed slips past it and is serialized verbatim, so the characters after the line terminator break out of the start/end tag or attribute. Callers who enabled `requireWellFormed` specifically to neutralize those name-injection issues remain exposed. ## Details xmldom builds every grammar production through a shared regexp builder that compiles with the `m` flag. The anchored full-string matcher used for element and attribute names, `QName_exact = reg('^', QName, '$')`, therefore inherits `m`. When it is applied as `QName_exact.test(name)` against an already-assembled node name, the `m` flag makes `$` match at an interior line terminator, so the matcher accepts any value in which **at least one line** is a valid `QName`; the other lines are never constrained. A payload whose first line is a valid `QName`, followed by a line terminator and breakout markup, is what yields a working injection. The serializer emits the accepted name verbatim into element start/end tags and attribute names, so the bytes after the line terminator break out of the intended syntactic position. The check is reached whenever a caller serializes, with `requireWellFormed: true`, a node whose name was set through programmatic DOM construction (`createElement`, `createElementNS`, `createAttribute`, `createAttributeNS`) with attacker-influenced input. ### Root Cause 1. A shared regexp builder compiles anchored productions with the `m` flag. 2. `^…$` under `m` are line anchors, not string anchors. 3. A full-string validator built on such a production (`.test()`) accepts any string with one conforming line, so a line terminator followed by breakout markup passes. The triggering line terminators are the ECMAScript `LineTerminator` set: U+000A, U+000D, U+2028, U+2029. ## Proof of Concept ```js const { DOMImplementation, XMLSerializer } = require('@xmldom/xmldom'); // Element name carrying an embedded line terminator + breakout markup: const doc = new DOMImplementation().createDocument(null, 'root', null); const el = doc.createElement('a\n><script>alert(1)</script'); doc.documentElement.appendChild(el); // Caller opted into well-formed serialization, expecting invalid names to be rejected: console.log(new XMLSerializer().serializeToString(doc, { requireWellFormed: true })); // Observed on the affected version: NO throw; the output contains the injected `><script>…` // breakout, because the name's first line ("a") satisfies the m-anchored QName check. // Expected: InvalidStateError (the name is not a valid XML QName). // Control — a single-line invalid name IS correctly rejected, proving the check is active and // that only the line terminator defeats it: const ctrl = new DOMImplementation().createDocument(null, 'root', null); ctrl.documentElement.appendChild(ctrl.createElement('a b')); new XMLSerializer().serializeToString(ctrl, { requireWellFormed: true }); // => throws InvalidStateError: The element name "a b" is not a valid XML QName ``` ## Impact - **Bypass of a previously shipped security mitigation.** Applications that adopted `requireWellFormed: true` specifically to neutralize GHSA-w2rr-34g9-rvrj / GHSA-4w3w-2rp5-g8jm remain exposed to element/attribute name injection. - **XML / markup structure injection**, and, where the serialized output is placed into an HTML context, downstream XSS. ## Fix Applied The anchored XML `Name`/`QName` validators used by the `requireWellFormed` serializer no longer treat interior line terminators as satisfying the anchors, so a name is validated against the whole string. A name containing a line terminator is rejected with `InvalidStateError`, closing the bypass for element and attribute names. The default serialization path is unchanged. > **⚠ Opt-in required.** Protection is not automatic. Existing serialization calls remain > vulnerable unless `{ requireWellFormed: true }` is explicitly passed. Applications that > serialize untrusted DOM content should audit all `serializeToString()` call sites and add it. ### Proof of Concept - fixed path ```js const { DOMImplementation, XMLSerializer } = require('@xmldom/xmldom'); const doc = new DOMImplementation().createDocument(null, 'root', null); const el = doc.createElement('a\n><script>alert(1)</script'); doc.documentElement.appendChild(el); // Default path (require-well-formed off) — unchanged, still emits the name verbatim, // so the `><script>…` bytes break out of the start tag: new XMLSerializer().serializeToString(doc); // Opted-in path — now rejected: new XMLSerializer().serializeToString(doc, { requireWellFormed: true }); // throws InvalidStateError: The element name "a\n><script>alert(1)</script" is not a valid XML QName ``` ### Why the default stays verbatim The W3C DOM Parsing require-well-formed flag defaults to false, and browser `XMLSerializer` emits names verbatim when it is unset. Throwing unconditionally would be an unjustified breaking change, so the check stays gated on the caller opting in with `{ requireWellFormed: true }`. ### Residual limitation The default serialization path (no `requireWellFormed`) still emits names verbatim by design (above). Names introduced through `createElement` / `setAttribute` are never validated at creation — those APIs store the name unchecked by design — so the opt-in serializer check remains the only guard on that path.
Read the publisher's advisoryAffected versions, risk and source history
Related advisories and sources
Publishers link these advisories through the identifiers shown below. A shared identifier or date alone does not tell you whether your software is affected or whether the advisories describe the same cause.
CVE-2026-83617 · CVE overview and exploitation status
cve-program · CVE-2026-83617
- https://github.com/xmldom/xmldom/security/advisories/GHSA-jxjr-3g7g-3944
- https://github.com/xmldom/xmldom/pull/1071
- https://github.com/xmldom/xmldom/commit/7b2ec67e1750daadd0bb06c92e875e726544a362
- https://github.com/xmldom/xmldom/releases/tag/0.9.12
euvd · EUVD-2026-69241
- https://github.com/xmldom/xmldom/security/advisories/GHSA-jxjr-3g7g-3944
- https://github.com/xmldom/xmldom/pull/1071
- https://github.com/xmldom/xmldom/commit/7b2ec67e1750daadd0bb06c92e875e726544a362
- https://github.com/xmldom/xmldom/releases/tag/0.9.12
nvd · CVE-2026-83617
- https://github.com/xmldom/xmldom/commit/7b2ec67e1750daadd0bb06c92e875e726544a362
- https://github.com/xmldom/xmldom/pull/1071
- https://github.com/xmldom/xmldom/releases/tag/0.9.12
- https://github.com/xmldom/xmldom/security/advisories/GHSA-jxjr-3g7g-3944
osv · GHSA-jxjr-3g7g-3944
- https://github.com/xmldom/xmldom/security/advisories/GHSA-jxjr-3g7g-3944
- https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-83617
- https://github.com/xmldom/xmldom/pull/1071
- https://github.com/xmldom/xmldom/commit/7b2ec67e1750daadd0bb06c92e875e726544a362
- https://github.com/xmldom/xmldom
- https://github.com/xmldom/xmldom/releases/tag/0.9.12
Related changes
Linked by CVE identifierNo related changes are available here.