xmldom is a pure JavaScript W3C standard-based (XML DOM Level 2 Core) DOMParser and XMLSerializer module. From 0.9.10 until 0.9.12, the requireWellFormed: true serializer validates DocumentType.publicId and DocumentType.systemId with PubidLiteral_match and SystemLiteral_match expressions produced by reg() in lib/grammar.js, which inherit the multiline flag. A complete valid literal on the first line can therefore satisfy the matcher while U+000A, U+000D, U+2028, or U+2029 and breakout markup remain in the emitted <!DOCTYPE ...> declaration. This bypasses the strict-serialization mitigation for the earlier DocumentType injection advisory; creation and direct property assignment remain unvalidated by design. This issue is fixed in @xmldom/xmldom version 0.9.12.
xmldom is a pure JavaScript W3C standard-based (XML DOM Level 2 Core) DOMParser and XMLSerializer module. From 0.9.10 until 0.9.12, the requireWellFormed: true serializer validates DocumentType.publicId and DocumentType.systemId with PubidLiteral_match and SystemLiteral_match expressions produced by reg() in lib/grammar.js, which inherit the multiline flag. A complete valid literal on the first line can therefore satisfy the matcher while U+000A, U+000D, U+2028, or U+2029 and breakout markup remain in the emitted <!DOCTYPE ...> declaration. This bypasses the strict-serialization mitigation for the earlier DocumentType injection advisory; creation and direct property assignment remain unvalidated by design. This issue is fixed in @xmldom/xmldom version 0.9.12.
xmldom is a pure JavaScript W3C standard-based (XML DOM Level 2 Core) DOMParser and XMLSerializer module. From 0.9.10 until 0.9.12, the requireWellFormed: true serializer validates DocumentType.publicId and DocumentType.systemId with PubidLiteral_match and SystemLiteral_match expressions produced by reg() in lib/grammar.js, which inherit the multiline flag. A complete valid literal on the first line can therefore satisfy the matcher while U+000A, U+000D, U+2028, or U+2029 and breakout markup remain in the emitted <!DOCTYPE ...> declaration. This bypasses the strict-serialization mitigation for the earlier DocumentType injection advisory; creation and direct property assignment remain unvalidated by design. This issue is fixed in @xmldom/xmldom version 0.9.12.
## Summary
An embedded line terminator bypasses the `requireWellFormed` serializer check for a `DocumentType`'s
publicId and systemId. The check was added to fix GHSA-f6ww-3ggp-fr8h; an id whose first line is a
valid literal slips past it and is emitted verbatim into the `<!DOCTYPE …>` declaration, so the markup
after the line terminator breaks out into the surrounding document. Callers who enabled
`requireWellFormed` to neutralize DocumentType injection remain exposed.
## Details
`publicId` and `systemId` are stored as raw values **including their surrounding quotes**, and the
`PubidLiteral`/`SystemLiteral` productions include those quotes. The serializer validates them with
`g.PubidLiteral_match.test(publicId)` and `g.SystemLiteral_match.test(systemId)`, where both matchers
are `reg('^', …, '$')` and inherit the `m` flag from xmldom's shared regexp builder. Under `m`, `$`
matches at an interior line terminator, so a value such as `"valid pubid"\n"><!ENTITY …>` satisfies
the matcher on its first line (`"valid pubid"` is a complete `PubidLiteral`) and the whole value —
including the post-newline breakout — is emitted after `PUBLIC`/`SYSTEM`.
### Root Cause
1. A shared regexp builder compiles anchored productions with the `m` flag.
2. `^…$` under `m` are line anchors, not string anchors.
3. A full-string validator built on such a production (`.test()`) accepts any string with one
conforming line, so a complete, valid literal on the first line passes even though a line terminator
and breakout markup follow. `PubidChar` excluding `<`/`>` does not prevent it — the breakout is
appended *after* the literal, not embedded inside it.
The triggering line terminators are the ECMAScript `LineTerminator` set: U+000A, U+000D, U+2028, U+2029.
## Affected Versions
Only `@xmldom/xmldom` 0.9.x is affected. The vulnerable matchers are built by `lib/grammar.js`'s
`m`-flagged `reg()` builder, and the DocType `publicId`/`systemId` `requireWellFormed` check that
consumes them was introduced in 0.9.10 (the GHSA-f6ww-3ggp-fr8h fix); 0.9.10 and 0.9.11 carry it.
`0.8.x` performs the same `requireWellFormed` check with inline, non-`m` regular expressions and is not
affected. The unscoped `xmldom` package has no `grammar.js` and no `requireWellFormed` serializer, so
there is no check to bypass.
## Proof of Concept
```js
const { DOMImplementation, XMLSerializer } = require('@xmldom/xmldom');
const impl = new DOMImplementation();
// publicId: complete literal on line 1, then newline + breakout
const dt = impl.createDocumentType('html', '"valid pubid"\n"><!ENTITY xxe SYSTEM "file:///etc/passwd">', '');
const doc = impl.createDocument(null, 'root', dt);
console.log(new XMLSerializer().serializeToString(doc, { requireWellFormed: true }));
// Observed (no throw):
// <!DOCTYPE html PUBLIC "valid pubid"
// "><!ENTITY xxe SYSTEM "file:///etc/passwd">><root/>
// Expected: InvalidStateError (publicId is not a valid PubidLiteral).
// Control: a single-line invalid publicId ("no-surrounding-quotes<>") DOES throw InvalidStateError,
// confirming the check is active and specifically bypassed by the line terminator.
```
## Impact
- **Bypass of the GHSA-f6ww-3ggp-fr8h mitigation.** Applications that adopted `requireWellFormed:
true` to neutralize DocumentType injection remain exposed.
- **XML structure injection into the DOCTYPE**, including injected markup / entity declarations after
the public or system identifier.
## Fix Applied
The anchored `PubidLiteral`/`SystemLiteral` validators used by the `requireWellFormed`
serializer no longer treat an interior line terminator as satisfying the `$` anchor, so a `publicId`
or `systemId` containing any ECMAScript `LineTerminator` (U+000A, U+000D, U+2028, U+2029) is rejected
with `InvalidStateError`. Valid single-line identifiers serialize unchanged, and the default
serialization path is unaffected.
> **⚠ Opt-in required.** Protection is not automatic. Existing serialization calls remain vulnerable
> unless `{ requireWellFormed: true }` is explicitly passed. Applications that serialize untrusted DOM
> content should audit all `serializeToString()` call sites and add it.
### Proof of Concept - fixed path
```js
const { DOMImplementation, XMLSerializer } = require('@xmldom/xmldom');
const impl = new DOMImplementation();
const dt = impl.createDocumentType('html', '"valid pubid"\n"><!ENTITY xxe SYSTEM "file:///etc/passwd">', '');
const doc = impl.createDocument(null, 'root', dt);
// Default path (requireWellFormed off) — unchanged, still emits verbatim:
console.log(new XMLSerializer().serializeToString(doc));
// <!DOCTYPE html PUBLIC "valid pubid"
// "><!ENTITY xxe SYSTEM "file:///etc/passwd">><root/>
// Opt-in path — now throws instead of emitting the breakout:
new XMLSerializer().serializeToString(doc, { requireWellFormed: true });
// InvalidStateError: DocumentType publicId is not a valid PubidLiteral
```
### Why the default stays verbatim
The W3C DOM Parsing "require well-formed" flag defaults to false, and a browser `XMLSerializer` emits
the DOCTYPE verbatim. Unconditionally throwing on a malformed `publicId`/`systemId` would be an
unjustified breaking change to the default path, so the fix tightens only the opt-in
`requireWellFormed` validator, matching browser and spec defaults.
### Residual limitation
The guarantee holds only for callers that pass `{ requireWellFormed: true }`; the default
serialization path still emits `publicId`/`systemId` verbatim. `publicId` and `systemId` are not
validated at creation (`createDocumentType`) or on direct property assignment
(`documentType.publicId = …`) — the WHATWG DOM specification places no well-formedness constraint on
these fields at creation time, so the serializer is the spec-aligned enforcement point.
EUVD source date text has no stated timezone and is retained without inventing a UTC instant. Related bulletin membership is not an alias, common cause or applicability claim. A missing vector with a zero score is treated as unrated. Complete vendor/product and underlying source evidence remains in the original JSON.
Original publisher date fields
datePublished: Sep 1, 2026, 2:49:46 PM
dateUpdated: Sep 4, 2026, 1:59:23 AM
1 related source bulletins · separate from aliases
WID-SEC-W-2026-3596: IBM App Connect Enterprise: Mehrere Schwachstellen
No normalized affected-package data is projected for this source revision. The original publisher record may contain additional product and version evidence; this does not establish that a package is unaffected.
NVD analysis and CPE criteria are source context, not proof that a package or your environment is affected. Complete affected data, logical configurations and SSVC are retained in the original JSON.
Source analysis status: Deferred
Weakness classifications: CWE-91 · CWE-625
Original publisher date fields
published: 2026-09-01T15:17:40.480
lastModified: 2026-09-08T21:11:31.703
No normalized affected-package data is projected for this source revision. The original publisher record may contain additional product and version evidence; this does not establish that a package is unaffected.