Apache Camel: Camel-OAuth Login Cross-Site Request Forgery via Missing State Binding in the Authorization Code Flow
Collected exploitation and prediction evidence
Risk source coverageCISA KEV is observed exploitation evidence. FIRST EPSS is a dated prediction of exploitation in the next 30 days. Missing scores are unknown. This collector requests predictions only for explicit CVE aliases in the public NuGet archive; Microsoft release views retain their existing prediction scope.
No collected risk observation for these identifiers. This does not establish absence of exploitation or a zero probability.
cve-program · CVE-2026-84178
PublishedCross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF) vulnerability in Apache Camel OAuth component. This issue affects Apache Camel: from 4.11.0 before 4.18.5, from 4.19.0 before 4.22.1. The authorization code callback did not carry a state parameter binding it to the authorization request that started the flow, and the callback did not verify one. An authorization code obtained in any browser could therefore be redeemed at the callback and associated with whichever session presented it, which is login cross-site request forgery: a victim can be silently signed in as an identity the attacker controls, so that actions the victim then performs, and data they then submit, land in the attacker's account. The same unvalidated callback handling also allowed the post-authentication redirect target to be influenced, giving an open redirect from a trusted origin. The state check runs before the authorization code is redeemed, so these paths are reachable without any interaction with the identity provider. Upgrade to Apache Camel 4.23.0, which fixes the issue. Users on the 4.18.x LTS releases stream should upgrade to 4.18.5. Users on the 4.22.x LTS releases stream should upgrade to 4.22.1. The authorization request now issues a state value bound to the session, and the callback rejects a request whose state is absent or does not match, stopping the route with a 400 response. For deployments that cannot upgrade immediately, terminate the authorization code flow in a component that performs its own state binding rather than relying on the Camel callback. Note that after upgrading, a deployment behind a proxy that drops or rewrites the callback query string will begin to see 400 responses, because the state parameter must survive the round trip.
- Source published
- 19 Oct 2026 10:30:42 UTC
- Source modified
- 19 Oct 2026 18:40:29 UTC
- Observed here
- 23 Oct 2026 15:48:27 UTC
- Source terms
- CVE Program Terms of Use
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CVSS 3.1 · 6.1 CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:N