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Vitest: Path Traversal / Arbitrary File Read via @vitest/mocker Redirect Mock

CVSS 3.1 5.9 MEDIUMEUVD CVSS 3.1 5.9 CVSS 3.1 · [email protected] · Secondary 5.9 MEDIUMCVSS_V3 Publisher rating MODERATEFixed by @vitest/mocker 4.1.11Fixed by vitest 4.1.11Fixed by vitest 5.0.0-rc.2Fixed by @vitest/mocker 5.0.0-rc.2KEV status unknown

cve-program · CVE-2026-84373

Published

Vitest is a testing framework powered by Vite. From 2.1.0 until 4.1.11 and 5.0.0-rc.2, the public mockerPlugin and standalone interceptorPlugin exports in packages/mocker/src/node/interceptorPlugin.ts register the vitest:interceptor:register handler on Vite's unauthenticated HMR WebSocket without validating redirect targets against the file-serving allowlist. The implementation processes event.redirect without enforcing server.fs.allow and server.fs.deny through isFileLoadingAllowed. A remote client that can reach an exposed development server can submit an opaque URL scheme preserving .. segments, causing join(server.config.root, redirectUrl.pathname) to resolve outside the project root. The plugin's load hook then returns readFile(mock.redirect, 'utf-8') as module source, disclosing local files readable by the dev-server process. Vitest browser mode uses a token-authenticated RPC and is not remotely unauthenticated by default, although the same boundary check was missing on that path. This issue is fixed in versions 4.1.11 and 5.0.0-rc.2.

Read the publisher's advisory

euvd · EUVD-2026-69705

Published

Vitest is a testing framework powered by Vite. From 2.1.0 until 4.1.11 and 5.0.0-rc.2, the public mockerPlugin and standalone interceptorPlugin exports in packages/mocker/src/node/interceptorPlugin.ts register the vitest:interceptor:register handler on Vite's unauthenticated HMR WebSocket without validating redirect targets against the file-serving allowlist. The implementation processes event.redirect without enforcing server.fs.allow and server.fs.deny through isFileLoadingAllowed. A remote client that can reach an exposed development server can submit an opaque URL scheme preserving .. segments, causing join(server.config.root, redirectUrl.pathname) to resolve outside the project root. The plugin's load hook then returns readFile(mock.redirect, 'utf-8') as module source, disclosing local files readable by the dev-server process. Vitest browser mode uses a token-authenticated RPC and is not remotely unauthenticated by default, although the same boundary check was missing on that path. This issue is fixed in versions 4.1.11 and 5.0.0-rc.2.

Read the publisher's advisory

nvd · CVE-2026-84373

Published

Vitest is a testing framework powered by Vite. From 2.1.0 until 4.1.11 and 5.0.0-rc.2, the public mockerPlugin and standalone interceptorPlugin exports in packages/mocker/src/node/interceptorPlugin.ts register the vitest:interceptor:register handler on Vite's unauthenticated HMR WebSocket without validating redirect targets against the file-serving allowlist. The implementation processes event.redirect without enforcing server.fs.allow and server.fs.deny through isFileLoadingAllowed. A remote client that can reach an exposed development server can submit an opaque URL scheme preserving .. segments, causing join(server.config.root, redirectUrl.pathname) to resolve outside the project root. The plugin's load hook then returns readFile(mock.redirect, 'utf-8') as module source, disclosing local files readable by the dev-server process. Vitest browser mode uses a token-authenticated RPC and is not remotely unauthenticated by default, although the same boundary check was missing on that path. This issue is fixed in versions 4.1.11 and 5.0.0-rc.2.

Read the publisher's advisory

osv · GHSA-82fw-gwwq-j7x9

Published

## Summary `@vitest/mocker` registers a redirect mock's target path without validating it against the dev server's file-serving allowlist. An attacker who can reach the dev server's WebSocket can register a redirect mock pointing outside the project root; when the mocked module is requested, the plugin's `load` hook returns `readFile(<attacker path>)` as the module source, disclosing local files. This is exploitable **without authentication** only through the public `mockerPlugin` / standalone `interceptorPlugin` exports (used by third-party dev servers), which register the handler on Vite's unauthenticated HMR socket. Vitest's own browser mode registers mocks over a **token-authenticated** RPC and is not remotely reachable by default (see Scope). ## Affected code `packages/mocker/src/node/interceptorPlugin.ts`. The `load` hook is the file-read sink: ```ts if (mock.type === 'redirect') { return readFile(mock.redirect, 'utf-8') } ``` `mock.redirect` is derived from client input at registration time with no boundary check: ```ts if (event.type === 'redirect') { const redirectUrl = new URL(event.redirect) event.redirect = join(server.config.root, redirectUrl.pathname) } registry.register(event) ``` There is no `server.fs.allow` / `server.fs.deny` check and no assertion that the resolved path stays within the project root. ## Registration paths and trust boundaries - **Public `mockerPlugin` / `interceptorPlugin` (unauthenticated).** In `configureServer`, the plugin registers `server.ws.on('vitest:interceptor:register', …)` on Vite's HMR WebSocket. That socket performs no token, Origin, or same-origin check, so any client that can reach it can register a redirect mock. This is the path the "unauthenticated" impact applies to. - **Vitest browser mode (authenticated).** Mocks register over the browser RPC (`registerMock`), which sits behind a per-run token (`isValidApiRequest`, a random `api.token`). The interceptor's `configureServer` socket is not used for registration here (in v5 it does not run at all, as the plugin is injected per environment). The same missing boundary check exists on the authenticated RPC path, but reaching it requires the token, so it is not a remote-unauthenticated read. ## Path handling `new URL(redirect).pathname` combined with `join(root, pathname)` does **not** confine reads to the root: - Special/hierarchical schemes (`file:`, `http:`) are normalized by WHATWG URL, so `..` segments are collapsed and the result stays under the root. Payloads of the form `file:///../../etc/passwd` do **not** escape. - A non-special (opaque) scheme preserves `..` in `pathname`, so `join(root, "../../…/etc/passwd")` resolves outside the root and reads an arbitrary file. Even without escaping the root, the missing `server.fs` check allows reading any in-root file the dev server would otherwise refuse to serve (for example an in-root `.env` or source that is denied by `server.fs.deny`). ## Scope / preconditions - This is a **development-server** issue. The dev server binds to `localhost` by default and is not reachable from the network unless the developer exposes it (`server.host` / `0.0.0.0`, a LAN bind, or a proxy). - A raw (non-browser) client against a reachable server bypasses browser origin and CORS protections entirely and can both register the mock and read the response. - A browser-based drive-by against a localhost server is substantially mitigated by Vite defaults: the default CORS origin allowlist is limited to `localhost` origins, and `server.allowedHosts` blocks DNS-rebinding, so a cross-origin page cannot read the file contents back. ## Impact Disclosure of local files readable by the dev-server process (source, in-root `.env`/secrets, and, via the opaque-scheme payload, files outside the project root). No integrity or availability impact. ## Affected versions Present since `@vitest/mocker` was introduced. - **Affected: `@vitest/mocker` >= 2.1.0** (shipped in `vitest` and `@vitest/browser` >= 2.1.0), through 4.1.x and the 5.0.0 pre-releases. - **Fixed:** Vitest 4.1.11 and 5.0.0. Older majors (2.1.x, 3.x) are not maintained and are not planned to receive the fix. ## Fix Validate the resolved redirect target against Vite's file-serving allowlist (`isFileLoadingAllowed`) before registering it, at every registration site, and stop registering the interceptor WebSocket events in Vitest's browser mode (mocks there flow through the authenticated RPC).

Read the publisher's advisory

Affected versions, risk and source history

Exploitation and risk

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cve-program · CVE-2026-84373

Published

Vitest: Path Traversal / Arbitrary File Read via @vitest/mocker Redirect Mock

Vitest is a testing framework powered by Vite. From 2.1.0 until 4.1.11 and 5.0.0-rc.2, the public mockerPlugin and standalone interceptorPlugin exports in packages/mocker/src/node/interceptorPlugin.ts register the vitest:interceptor:register handler on Vite's unauthenticated HMR WebSocket without validating redirect targets against the file-serving allowlist. The implementation processes event.redirect without enforcing server.fs.allow and server.fs.deny through isFileLoadingAllowed. A remote client that can reach an exposed development server can submit an opaque URL scheme preserving .. segments, causing join(server.config.root, redirectUrl.pathname) to resolve outside the project root. The plugin's load hook then returns readFile(mock.redirect, 'utf-8') as module source, disclosing local files readable by the dev-server process. Vitest browser mode uses a token-authenticated RPC and is not remotely unauthenticated by default, although the same boundary check was missing on that path. This issue is fixed in versions 4.1.11 and 5.0.0-rc.2.

Source published
1 Sep 2026 21:26:26 UTC
Source modified
2 Sep 2026 13:22:16 UTC
Saved here
23 Oct 2026 15:48:27 UTC
Source terms
CVE Program Terms of Use

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

Source: cve-program · CVE Program Terms of Use. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.

CVSS 3.1 · 5.9 CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N

euvd · EUVD-2026-69705

Published

Vitest is a testing framework powered by Vite. From 2.1.0 until 4.1.11 and 5.0.0-rc.2, the public mockerPlugin and standalone interceptorPlugin exports in packages/mocker/src/node/interceptorPlugin.ts register the vitest:interceptor:registe…

Vitest is a testing framework powered by Vite. From 2.1.0 until 4.1.11 and 5.0.0-rc.2, the public mockerPlugin and standalone interceptorPlugin exports in packages/mocker/src/node/interceptorPlugin.ts register the vitest:interceptor:register handler on Vite's unauthenticated HMR WebSocket without validating redirect targets against the file-serving allowlist. The implementation processes event.redirect without enforcing server.fs.allow and server.fs.deny through isFileLoadingAllowed. A remote client that can reach an exposed development server can submit an opaque URL scheme preserving .. segments, causing join(server.config.root, redirectUrl.pathname) to resolve outside the project root. The plugin's load hook then returns readFile(mock.redirect, 'utf-8') as module source, disclosing local files readable by the dev-server process. Vitest browser mode uses a token-authenticated RPC and is not remotely unauthenticated by default, although the same boundary check was missing on that path. This issue is fixed in versions 4.1.11 and 5.0.0-rc.2.

Additional publisher context

EUVD source date text has no stated timezone and is retained without inventing a UTC instant. Related bulletin membership is not an alias, common cause or applicability claim. A missing vector with a zero score is treated as unrated. Complete vendor/product and underlying source evidence remains in the original JSON.

Original publisher date fields

datePublished: Sep 1, 2026, 9:26:26 PM

dateUpdated: Sep 2, 2026, 1:22:16 PM

Source published
Sep 1, 2026, 9:26:26 PM (timezone not stated)
Source modified
Sep 2, 2026, 1:22:16 PM (timezone not stated)
Saved here
17 Nov 2026 19:31:49 UTC
Source terms
ENISA EUVD · source terms and attribution apply

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

Source: euvd · ENISA EUVD · source terms and attribution apply. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.

EUVD CVSS 3.1 · 5.9 CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N

nvd · CVE-2026-84373

Published

Vitest is a testing framework powered by Vite. From 2.1.0 until 4.1.11 and 5.0.0-rc.2, the public mockerPlugin and standalone interceptorPlugin exports in packages/mocker/src/node/interceptorPlugin.ts register the vitest:interceptor:registe…

Vitest is a testing framework powered by Vite. From 2.1.0 until 4.1.11 and 5.0.0-rc.2, the public mockerPlugin and standalone interceptorPlugin exports in packages/mocker/src/node/interceptorPlugin.ts register the vitest:interceptor:register handler on Vite's unauthenticated HMR WebSocket without validating redirect targets against the file-serving allowlist. The implementation processes event.redirect without enforcing server.fs.allow and server.fs.deny through isFileLoadingAllowed. A remote client that can reach an exposed development server can submit an opaque URL scheme preserving .. segments, causing join(server.config.root, redirectUrl.pathname) to resolve outside the project root. The plugin's load hook then returns readFile(mock.redirect, 'utf-8') as module source, disclosing local files readable by the dev-server process. Vitest browser mode uses a token-authenticated RPC and is not remotely unauthenticated by default, although the same boundary check was missing on that path. This issue is fixed in versions 4.1.11 and 5.0.0-rc.2.

Additional publisher context

NVD analysis and CPE criteria are source context, not proof that a package or your environment is affected. Complete affected data, logical configurations and SSVC are retained in the original JSON.

Source analysis status: Deferred

Weakness classifications: CWE-22

Original publisher date fields

published: 2026-09-01T22:17:19.143

lastModified: 2026-09-09T21:09:13.080

Source published
1 Sep 2026 22:17:19 UTC
Source modified
9 Sep 2026 21:09:13 UTC
Saved here
25 Oct 2026 16:19:16 UTC
Source terms
NIST NVD usage terms; underlying source attribution retained

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

Source: nvd · NIST NVD usage terms; underlying source attribution retained. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.

CVSS 3.1 · [email protected] · Secondary · 5.9 CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N

osv · GHSA-82fw-gwwq-j7x9

Published

Vitest: Path Traversal / Arbitrary File Read via @vitest/mocker Redirect Mock

## Summary `@vitest/mocker` registers a redirect mock's target path without validating it against the dev server's file-serving allowlist. An attacker who can reach the dev server's WebSocket can register a redirect mock pointing outside the project root; when the mocked module is requested, the plugin's `load` hook returns `readFile(<attacker path>)` as the module source, disclosing local files. This is exploitable **without authentication** only through the public `mockerPlugin` / standalone `interceptorPlugin` exports (used by third-party dev servers), which register the handler on Vite's unauthenticated HMR socket. Vitest's own browser mode registers mocks over a **token-authenticated** RPC and is not remotely reachable by default (see Scope). ## Affected code `packages/mocker/src/node/interceptorPlugin.ts`. The `load` hook is the file-read sink: ```ts if (mock.type === 'redirect') { return readFile(mock.redirect, 'utf-8') } ``` `mock.redirect` is derived from client input at registration time with no boundary check: ```ts if (event.type === 'redirect') { const redirectUrl = new URL(event.redirect) event.redirect = join(server.config.root, redirectUrl.pathname) } registry.register(event) ``` There is no `server.fs.allow` / `server.fs.deny` check and no assertion that the resolved path stays within the project root. ## Registration paths and trust boundaries - **Public `mockerPlugin` / `interceptorPlugin` (unauthenticated).** In `configureServer`, the plugin registers `server.ws.on('vitest:interceptor:register', …)` on Vite's HMR WebSocket. That socket performs no token, Origin, or same-origin check, so any client that can reach it can register a redirect mock. This is the path the "unauthenticated" impact applies to. - **Vitest browser mode (authenticated).** Mocks register over the browser RPC (`registerMock`), which sits behind a per-run token (`isValidApiRequest`, a random `api.token`). The interceptor's `configureServer` socket is not used for registration here (in v5 it does not run at all, as the plugin is injected per environment). The same missing boundary check exists on the authenticated RPC path, but reaching it requires the token, so it is not a remote-unauthenticated read. ## Path handling `new URL(redirect).pathname` combined with `join(root, pathname)` does **not** confine reads to the root: - Special/hierarchical schemes (`file:`, `http:`) are normalized by WHATWG URL, so `..` segments are collapsed and the result stays under the root. Payloads of the form `file:///../../etc/passwd` do **not** escape. - A non-special (opaque) scheme preserves `..` in `pathname`, so `join(root, "../../…/etc/passwd")` resolves outside the root and reads an arbitrary file. Even without escaping the root, the missing `server.fs` check allows reading any in-root file the dev server would otherwise refuse to serve (for example an in-root `.env` or source that is denied by `server.fs.deny`). ## Scope / preconditions - This is a **development-server** issue. The dev server binds to `localhost` by default and is not reachable from the network unless the developer exposes it (`server.host` / `0.0.0.0`, a LAN bind, or a proxy). - A raw (non-browser) client against a reachable server bypasses browser origin and CORS protections entirely and can both register the mock and read the response. - A browser-based drive-by against a localhost server is substantially mitigated by Vite defaults: the default CORS origin allowlist is limited to `localhost` origins, and `server.allowedHosts` blocks DNS-rebinding, so a cross-origin page cannot read the file contents back. ## Impact Disclosure of local files readable by the dev-server process (source, in-root `.env`/secrets, and, via the opaque-scheme payload, files outside the project root). No integrity or availability impact. ## Affected versions Present since `@vitest/mocker` was introduced. - **Affected: `@vitest/mocker` >= 2.1.0** (shipped in `vitest` and `@vitest/browser` >= 2.1.0), through 4.1.x and the 5.0.0 pre-releases. - **Fixed:** Vitest 4.1.11 and 5.0.0. Older majors (2.1.x, 3.x) are not maintained and are not planned to receive the fix. ## Fix Validate the resolved redirect target against Vite's file-serving allowlist (`isFileLoadingAllowed`) before registering it, at every registration site, and stop registering the interceptor WebSocket events in Vitest's browser mode (mocks there flow through the authenticated RPC).

Source published
8 Sep 2026 20:46:45 UTC
Source modified
8 Sep 2026 21:00:07 UTC
Saved here
24 Oct 2026 13:17:17 UTC
Source terms
GitHub Advisory Database · CC-BY-4.0

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

Source: osv · GitHub Advisory Database · CC-BY-4.0. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.

CVSS_V3 · CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N

Publisher rating · MODERATE

ChangeIntel

An IT change radar: releases, security, known issues, retirements, documentation changes, and service status from public sources. Every item links to supporting evidence; dates and statuses can change after they are read.

Sources read 19 Nov 05:53 UTC · 273 of 275 readable · 269 fully read · documentation 469/469 current