oras-go: Arbitrary file write outside file.Store root via symlink-chain bypass in tar extraction (pushDir)
Exact source revision recorded 23 Oct 2026 15:48:27 UTC. It does not establish the source's current position. Latest evidence.
cve-program · CVE-2026-85731
Publishedoras-go is a Go library for managing OCI artifacts. Prior to 2.6.2, content/file.Store extraction of OCI layers marked with io.deis.oras.content.unpack=true can write outside the store working directory. The pushDir path through extractTarDirectory and ensureLinkPath validates symlink targets lexically, resolveRelToBase skips its parent-symlink walk for root-level entries, and writeFile follows a terminal symlink when opening a regular file. A malicious archive can therefore create a symlink chain whose lexical target remains inside the extraction root but whose resolved target is an attacker-selected absolute path, then overwrite that target with a same-named regular-file entry even when AllowPathTraversalOnWrite is false. Pulling an attacker-controlled artifact can create or overwrite any file writable by the process and may lead to code execution. This issue is fixed in version 2.6.2.
- Source published
- 16 Sep 2026 16:24:48 UTC
- Source modified
- 16 Sep 2026 17:25:07 UTC
- Observed here
- 23 Oct 2026 15:48:27 UTC
- Source terms
- CVE Program Terms of Use
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CVSS 3.1 · 8.8 CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H