ezBookkeeping: Source-IP allowlist (MCP & API token) is bypassable via a spoofed `X-Forwarded-For` header
cve-program · CVE-2026-86041
PublishedezBookkeeping is an open source, self-hosted personal finance application. From 0.10.0 until 1.6.0, ezBookkeeping constructs its Gin router with gin.New() without configuring SetTrustedProxies, causing c.ClientIP() to trust a spoofed X-Forwarded-For value. An unauthenticated remote attacker can supply an allowlisted address to bypass the mcp_allowed_remote_ips or api_token_allowed_remote_ips gate. A valid MCP or API token remains required for protected actions. When such actions occur, the same spoofed value is stored in Transaction.CreatedIp and the request log, attributing activity to the trusted host instead of the attacker. This issue is fixed in version 1.6.0.
Read the publisher's advisoryeuvd · EUVD-2026-117162
PublishedezBookkeeping is an open source, self-hosted personal finance application. From 0.10.0 until 1.6.0, ezBookkeeping constructs its Gin router with gin.New() without configuring SetTrustedProxies, causing c.ClientIP() to trust a spoofed X-Forwarded-For value. An unauthenticated remote attacker can supply an allowlisted address to bypass the mcp_allowed_remote_ips or api_token_allowed_remote_ips gate. A valid MCP or API token remains required for protected actions. When such actions occur, the same spoofed value is stored in Transaction.CreatedIp and the request log, attributing activity to the trusted host instead of the attacker. This issue is fixed in version 1.6.0.
Read the publisher's advisorynvd · CVE-2026-86041
PublishedezBookkeeping is an open source, self-hosted personal finance application. From 0.10.0 until 1.6.0, ezBookkeeping constructs its Gin router with gin.New() without configuring SetTrustedProxies, causing c.ClientIP() to trust a spoofed X-Forwarded-For value. An unauthenticated remote attacker can supply an allowlisted address to bypass the mcp_allowed_remote_ips or api_token_allowed_remote_ips gate. A valid MCP or API token remains required for protected actions. When such actions occur, the same spoofed value is stored in Transaction.CreatedIp and the request log, attributing activity to the trusted host instead of the attacker. This issue is fixed in version 1.6.0.
Read the publisher's advisoryosv · GHSA-wchh-mrv2-5h4q
Published### Summary A remote attacker from any IP address defeats the operator-configured source-IP allowlist (`mcp_allowed_remote_ips` / `api_token_allowed_remote_ips`) by sending a single `X-Forwarded-For: <allowlisted-ip>` header. The router is created with `gin.New()` and never calls `SetTrustedProxies`, so gin trusts every proxy by default and `c.ClientIP()` returns the attacker-supplied header verbatim. The same forged value is also written to `Transaction.CreatedIp` and the access log, so the attacker's real IP never appears in any record. ### Details `cmd/webserver.go:104` builds the router with `gin.New()`. A grep of `cmd/` and `pkg/` confirms `SetTrustedProxies` is never called, leaving gin's default trusted-proxy range of `0.0.0.0/0` and `::/0`. `WebContext` (`pkg/core/context_web.go:39`) embeds `*gin.Context` and does not override `ClientIP()`. Both allowlist middlewares match the operator allowlist against this attacker-controlled value: ```go // pkg/middlewares/mcp_server_ip_limit.go:19 if config.MCPAllowedRemoteIPs[i].Match(c.ClientIP()) { c.Next(); return } ``` The identical `c.ClientIP()` is consumed by the audit trail at `pkg/api/transactions.go:1078` (`createNewTransactionModel(..., c.ClientIP())` → `CreatedIp`) and the access log (`pkg/middlewares/request_log.go:28`), so one header both bypasses the gate and forges attribution. ### PoC Runtime PoC (no live deployment required) — `pkg/middlewares/xff_bypass_runtime_test.go`, `pkg/middlewares/xff_chain_runtime_test.go`: ``` go test ./pkg/middlewares/ -run 'TestACCESSCONTROL001_XFFBypass|TestCHAIN_AllowlistBypass' -v ``` Output: ``` [control] no XFF, RemoteAddr=1.2.3.4 -> status=400 (correctly blocked) [exploit] XFF=10.0.0.1, RemoteAddr=1.2.3.4 -> status=200, ClientIP=10.0.0.1 (bypassed) gate status = 200 | created_ip that would be persisted = "10.0.0.1" ``` Against a live instance with `mcp_allowed_remote_ips=10.0.0.1`: ``` curl -s -o /dev/null -w "%{http_code}\n" https://target/mcp # 403 (blocked) curl -s -o /dev/null -w "%{http_code}\n" -H "X-Forwarded-For: 10.0.0.1" https://target/mcp # passes IP gate ``` ### Impact Defeats an explicitly advertised, operator-configured security control on the MCP and API-token surfaces, from any source IP, with a single header and no authentication to the gate itself. It also destroys non-repudiation: every action is logged under the spoofed allowlisted IP, so audit trails point at the trusted host instead of the attacker. (The MCP/API actions themselves still require a valid token — this neutralizes the compensating IP control, not the JWT layer.)
Read the publisher's advisoryAffected versions, risk and source history
Related advisories and sources
Publishers link these advisories through the identifiers shown below. A shared identifier or date alone does not tell you whether your software is affected or whether the advisories describe the same cause.
CVE-2026-86041 · CVE overview and exploitation status
cve-program · CVE-2026-86041
- https://github.com/mayswind/ezbookkeeping/security/advisories/GHSA-wchh-mrv2-5h4q
- https://github.com/mayswind/ezbookkeeping/commit/d79a5beb8037e529dc4dc64a6d22bd2d02b2e986
- https://github.com/mayswind/ezbookkeeping/releases/tag/v1.6.0
euvd · EUVD-2026-117162
- https://github.com/mayswind/ezbookkeeping/security/advisories/GHSA-wchh-mrv2-5h4q
- https://github.com/mayswind/ezbookkeeping/commit/d79a5beb8037e529dc4dc64a6d22bd2d02b2e986
- https://github.com/mayswind/ezbookkeeping/releases/tag/v1.6.0
nvd · CVE-2026-86041
- https://github.com/mayswind/ezbookkeeping/commit/d79a5beb8037e529dc4dc64a6d22bd2d02b2e986
- https://github.com/mayswind/ezbookkeeping/releases/tag/v1.6.0
- https://github.com/mayswind/ezbookkeeping/security/advisories/GHSA-wchh-mrv2-5h4q
osv · GHSA-wchh-mrv2-5h4q
- https://github.com/mayswind/ezbookkeeping/security/advisories/GHSA-wchh-mrv2-5h4q
- https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-86041
- https://github.com/mayswind/ezbookkeeping/commit/d79a5beb8037e529dc4dc64a6d22bd2d02b2e986
- https://github.com/mayswind/ezbookkeeping
- https://github.com/mayswind/ezbookkeeping/releases/tag/v1.6.0
Related changes
Linked by CVE identifier- ezBookkeeping is an open source, self-hosted personal finance application. From 0.10.0 until 1.6.0, ezBookkeeping constructs its Gin router with gin.New() without configuring SetTrustedProxies, causing c.ClientIP() to trust a spoofed X-Forw… · Advisory content revised · 13 Nov 2026
- ezBookkeeping is an open source, self-hosted personal finance application. From 0.10.0 until 1.6.0, ezBookkeeping constructs its Gin router with gin.New() without configuring SetTrustedProxies, causing c.ClientIP() to trust a spoofed X-Forw… · Advisory content revised · 11 Nov 2026
- ezBookkeeping: Source-IP allowlist (MCP & API token) is bypassable via a spoofed `X-Forwarded-For` header · Newly collected advisory · 9 Nov 2026
- ezBookkeeping: Source-IP allowlist (MCP & API token) is bypassable via a spoofed `X-Forwarded-For` header · Newly collected advisory · 4 Nov 2026