CVE-2026-86074

n8n: Instance AI Credential Setup Accepts Unvalidated Probe URL from Fetched Content

CVSS 4.0 5.9 MEDIUMEUVD CVSS 4.0 5.9 CVSS 4.0 · [email protected] · Secondary 5.9 MEDIUMCVSS 3.1 · [email protected] · Primary 7.1 HIGHCVSS_V4 Publisher rating MODERATEFixed by n8n 2.38.2 Fixed by n8n 2.37.7KEV status unknown

Original advisory

cve-program · CVE-2026-86074

Published

n8n is an open source workflow automation platform. Prior to 2.37.7 and 2.38.2, the Instance AI credential setup flow accepted a credential test or verification URL without checking that it matched the workflow node's origin. Attacker-controlled fetched content could influence that URL after a user injected it into the setup flow, causing authenticated requests, redirects, or probes to reach another origin. The affected logic includes packages/@n8n/instance-ai/src/tools/workflows/credential-utils.ts and the extractServiceOrigin origin derivation. This issue is fixed in versions 2.37.7 and 2.38.2.

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euvd · EUVD-2026-73930

Published

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nvd · CVE-2026-86074

Published

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osv · GHSA-q5wm-mgqx-fv2f

Published

## Impact Instance AI credential setup accepted a credential test/verification URL without checking it matched the workflow node's origin. Exfiltration required the user to actively inject an attacker-controlled URL into the setup flow. The patch derives the credential destination from the node's own URL and confines authenticated requests, redirects and probes to that origin. ## Patches The issue has been fixed in n8n versions 2.38.2 and 2.37.7. Users should upgrade to one of these versions or later to remediate the vulnerability. ## Workarounds If upgrading is not immediately possible, administrators should consider the following temporary mitigations: - Disable the Instance AI module by removing `instance-ai` from the `N8N_ENABLED_MODULES` environment variable if it is not required. - Restrict n8n instance access to fully trusted users only. - Rotate any third-party API credentials that were set up using the Instance AI credential-setup flow on affected versions. These workarounds do not fully remediate the risk and should only be used as short-term mitigation measures.

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Affected versions, risk and source history

Exploitation and risk

Source status

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Risk history

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Advisory history

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13 Nov 2026 18:03:57 UTC