Busybox: busybox: udhcpc integer underflow in dhcp packet length calculation causes denial of service
Exact source revision recorded 23 Oct 2026 15:48:27 UTC. It does not establish the source's current position. Latest evidence.
cve-program · CVE-2026-88833
PublishedA flaw was found in BusyBox's udhcpc DHCP client. When processing raw DHCP packets, the client replaces the validated packet length with an attacker-controlled value from the IP header without re-validating the minimum size. This leads to an integer underflow when subtracting header sizes, causing a subsequent memory copy with a massively oversized length. An attacker on the same network segment can send a specially crafted packet to crash the DHCP client, resulting in denial of service and loss of network connectivity.
- Source published
- 13 Oct 2026 16:56:11 UTC
- Source modified
- 16 Oct 2026 22:22:10 UTC
- Observed here
- 23 Oct 2026 15:48:27 UTC
- Source terms
- CVE Program Terms of Use
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CVSS 3.1 · 6.5 CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H