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SUNRPC: harden gss_unwrap_resp_priv length checks

Collected exploitation and prediction evidence

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cve-program · CVE-2026-89541

Published

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: SUNRPC: harden gss_unwrap_resp_priv length checks gss_unwrap_resp_priv() validates the RPCSEC_GSS opaque length with offset = (u8 *)(p) - (u8 *)head->iov_base; if (offset + opaque_len > rcv_buf->len) goto unwrap_failed; maj_stat = gss_unwrap(ctx->gc_gss_ctx, offset, offset + opaque_len, rcv_buf); Both operands are u32 and the sum is computed in u32. A reply with opaque_len near 0xffffffff makes offset + opaque_len wrap to a small value that is below rcv_buf->len, so the bound check passes and gss_unwrap() is called with end < begin. The check also lacks a lower bound, so any opaque_len in [0, GSS_KRB5_TOK_HDR_LEN) is accepted and forwarded to gss_krb5_unwrap_v2(), whose pre-decrypt header reads at ptr+4 and ptr+6 then run past the token. A krb5p NFS server returning a crafted RPCSEC_GSS reply can drive the client into out-of-bounds reads in gss_krb5_unwrap_v2() and the rotate_left() loop that follows. Fix by replacing the single combined check with three guards that are safe in u32 arithmetic and that enforce the RFC 4121 minimum outer token length: if (offset > rcv_buf->len) goto unwrap_failed; if (opaque_len > rcv_buf->len - offset) goto unwrap_failed; if (opaque_len < GSS_KRB5_TOK_HDR_LEN) goto unwrap_failed; The first guard makes the subtraction in the second guard unconditionally safe; offset is derived from a successful xdr_inline_decode() in the head kvec, so in practice it already satisfies the bound. The floor mirrors the server-side check added in commit 5b757c2e57a5 ("SUNRPC: svcauth_gss: enforce krb5 token minimum length").

Source published
11 Sep 2026 19:44:18 UTC
Source modified
19 Oct 2026 08:48:32 UTC
Observed here
23 Oct 2026 15:48:27 UTC
Source terms
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CVSS 3.1 · 9.8 CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

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Sources read 9 Nov 04:29 UTC · 275 of 275 readable · 273 fully read · documentation 469/469 current