Tauri framework v2 missing updater signature version number validation can be exploited into forced downgrade

Tauri framework v2 missing updater signature version number validation can be exploited into forced downgrade

The Tauri updater plugin verifies update binaries using minisign signatures, but the signature covers only the raw binary bytes. The update manifest -- which contains the version number, download URL, and signature -- is fetched over TLS but is never itself signed or authenticated. Because the only anti-rollback check compares the manifest's version field against the current version, and that field is unsigned, an attacker who can serve a crafted manifest can force installation of any older signed release without possessing the developer's private key.

Source published

23 Sep 2026 08:51:53 UTC

Source modified

23 Sep 2026 14:10:35 UTC

Saved here

23 Oct 2026 15:48:27 UTC

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CVSS 3.1 · 5.9 CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N