Tauri framework v2 missing updater signature version number validation can be exploited into forced downgrade
cve-program · CVE-2026-95625
PublishedThe Tauri updater plugin verifies update binaries using minisign signatures, but the signature covers only the raw binary bytes. The update manifest -- which contains the version number, download URL, and signature -- is fetched over TLS but is never itself signed or authenticated. Because the only anti-rollback check compares the manifest's version field against the current version, and that field is unsigned, an attacker who can serve a crafted manifest can force installation of any older signed release without possessing the developer's private key.
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CVE-2026-95625 · CVE overview and exploitation status
cve-program · CVE-2026-95625
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