ALSA: usbusx2y: validate URB actual_length in interrupt callback
Exact source revision recorded 23 Oct 2026 15:48:27 UTC. It does not establish the source's current position. Latest evidence.
cve-program · CVE-2026-97929
PublishedIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ALSA: usbusx2y: validate URB actual_length in interrupt callback i_usx2y_in04_int() processes the interrupt URB data without checking urb->actual_length. A short transfer from a malfunctioning device would cause the handler to process uninitialized heap data from the kmalloc-allocated in04_buf, which is then copied to the mmap-accessible ctl_snapshot[] array. Fix by using kzalloc() for in04_buf to zero-initialize the buffer, and adding an actual_length check to skip processing on short transfers while still resubmitting the URB.
- Source published
- 25 Sep 2026 10:22:46 UTC
- Source modified
- 21 Oct 2026 12:53:41 UTC
- Observed here
- 23 Oct 2026 15:48:27 UTC
- Source terms
- CVE Program Terms of Use
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