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net/rds: acquire the fastpath locks in rds_conn_shutdown()

Assessment

Severity
Important
CVSS base score
8.1CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H/E:U
Impact
Not stated
EPSS · 30-day forecast
No EPSS score collected
Public detection template
No Nuclei template is listed in the current collected catalog
Exploitation detected
Unknown: not stated by MSRC
Exploitability
Not assessed
Publicly disclosed
Unknown: not stated by MSRC
Customer action
Required: follow the MSRC remediation guidance
Component
Mariner
Weakness
—
Issued by
Linux
Published
27 Sep 2026 · September 2026
Last revised
21 Oct 2026Information published.
CVSS 3.1 base metricsRed raises the risk · green lowers it
Attack vector
NetworkAV:N
Attack complexity
HighAC:H
Privileges required
NonePR:N
User interaction
NoneUI:N
Scope
UnchangedS:U
Confidentiality
HighC:H
Integrity
HighI:H
Availability
HighA:H

Updates that fix it

0 KBs

No KB listed

No KB update is listed in the collected MSRC record. Check the MSRC advisory for product releases and other remedies.

Affected products

Open Source Software
1 affected product
  • azl3 kernel 6.6.157.1-1 on Azure Linux 3.0

What changed

  1. Detection template: Unknown: detection-template evidence is incomplete or retained → No Nuclei template listed
  2. Detection template: No Nuclei template listed → Unknown: detection-template evidence is incomplete or retained
  3. Detection template: Unknown: detection-template evidence is incomplete or retained → No Nuclei template listed
  4. Detection template: No Nuclei template listed → Unknown: detection-template evidence is incomplete or retained
  5. Detection template: No Nuclei template listed · Customer action: Required: apply the update → Required: follow the MSRC remediation guidance · Public disclosure: No → Unknown: not stated by MSRC · Exploitation detected: Not reported by MSRC → Unknown: not stated by MSRC
  6. Detection template: Unknown: exploit-code evidence is incomplete or retained → No Nuclei template listed · CISA KEV: Unknown: catalog evidence is incomplete or retained → Not listed in the collected catalog
  7. Detection template: No Nuclei template listed → Unknown: exploit-code evidence is incomplete or retained · CISA KEV: Not listed in the collected catalog → Unknown: catalog evidence is incomplete or retained
Page history

Changes are dated when recorded; day views use the last saved version from that UTC day, and citations stay fixed.

Cite this version
Field-level log (37)

Up to 100 recent field edits are shown; older edits may be outside retention.

  1. 6 Nov 2026 · 17:32:22 UTC Public detection templateUnknown: detection-template evidence is incomplete or retained → No Nuclei template listed
  2. 6 Nov 2026 · 17:32:22 UTC Source coverage: public-exploit-codeIncomplete → Current
  3. 6 Nov 2026 · 17:32:22 UTC Source coverage: first-epssIncomplete → Current
  4. 6 Nov 2026 · 17:32:22 UTC Source coverage: msrc-cvrfIncomplete → Current
  5. 6 Nov 2026 · 16:31:02 UTC Public detection templateNo Nuclei template listed → Unknown: detection-template evidence is incomplete or retained
  6. 6 Nov 2026 · 16:31:02 UTC Source coverage: public-exploit-codeCurrent → Incomplete
  7. 6 Nov 2026 · 16:31:02 UTC Source coverage: first-epssCurrent → Incomplete
  8. 6 Nov 2026 · 16:31:02 UTC Source coverage: msrc-cvrfCurrent → Incomplete
  9. 2 Nov 2026 · 17:30:39 UTC Public detection templateUnknown: detection-template evidence is incomplete or retained → No Nuclei template listed
  10. 2 Nov 2026 · 17:30:39 UTC Source coverage: public-exploit-codeIncomplete → Current
  11. 2 Nov 2026 · 17:30:39 UTC Source coverage: first-epssIncomplete → Current
  12. 2 Nov 2026 · 17:30:39 UTC Source coverage: msrc-cvrfIncomplete → Current
  13. 2 Nov 2026 · 16:27:39 UTC Public detection templateNo Nuclei template listed → Unknown: detection-template evidence is incomplete or retained
  14. 2 Nov 2026 · 16:27:39 UTC Source coverage: public-exploit-codeCurrent → Incomplete
  15. 2 Nov 2026 · 16:27:39 UTC Source coverage: first-epssCurrent → Incomplete
  16. 2 Nov 2026 · 16:27:39 UTC Source coverage: msrc-cvrfCurrent → Incomplete
  17. 29 Oct 2026 · 20:19:26 UTC Public detection templateNo Nuclei template listed
  18. 29 Oct 2026 · 20:19:26 UTC EPSSNot scored → No EPSS score collected
  19. 29 Oct 2026 · 20:19:26 UTC Customer actionRequired: apply the update → Required: follow the MSRC remediation guidance
  20. 29 Oct 2026 · 20:19:26 UTC Publicly disclosedNo → Unknown: not stated by MSRC
  21. 29 Oct 2026 · 20:19:26 UTC Exploitation detectedNot reported by MSRC → Unknown: not stated by MSRC
  22. 23 Oct 2026 · 09:33:49 UTC Public exploit codeUnknown: exploit-code evidence is incomplete or retained → No Nuclei template listed
  23. 23 Oct 2026 · 09:33:49 UTC CISA KEVUnknown: catalog evidence is incomplete or retained → Not listed in the collected catalog
  24. 23 Oct 2026 · 09:33:49 UTC Source coverage: public-exploit-codeIncomplete → Current
  25. 23 Oct 2026 · 09:33:49 UTC Source coverage: first-epssIncomplete → Current
  26. 23 Oct 2026 · 09:33:49 UTC Source coverage: cisa-kevIncomplete → Current
  27. 23 Oct 2026 · 09:33:49 UTC Source coverage: msrc-cvrfIncomplete → Current
  28. 23 Oct 2026 · 08:31:50 UTC Public exploit codeNo Nuclei template listed → Unknown: exploit-code evidence is incomplete or retained
  29. 23 Oct 2026 · 08:31:50 UTC CISA KEVNot listed in the collected catalog → Unknown: catalog evidence is incomplete or retained
  30. 23 Oct 2026 · 08:31:50 UTC Source coverage: public-exploit-codeCurrent → Incomplete
  31. 23 Oct 2026 · 08:31:50 UTC Source coverage: first-epssCurrent → Incomplete
  32. 23 Oct 2026 · 08:31:50 UTC Source coverage: cisa-kevCurrent → Incomplete
  33. 23 Oct 2026 · 08:31:50 UTC Source coverage: msrc-cvrfCurrent → Incomplete
  34. 21 Oct 2026 · 20:45:25 UTC Last revised15 Oct 2026 02:21 UTC → 21 Oct 2026 18:42 UTC
  35. 18 Oct 2026 · 14:54:30 UTC Link: September 2026/security?release=2026-Sep#cves
  36. 15 Oct 2026 · 07:14:54 UTC Last revised13 Oct 2026 17:48 UTC → 15 Oct 2026 02:21 UTC
  37. 14 Oct 2026 · 11:22:42 UTC Source coverage: msrc-cvrfIncomplete → Current

Explore global source statements, affected packages and advisory history for CVE-2026-98069. The catalog has a separate collection scope from Microsoft release records.

Collected exploitation and prediction evidence

Risk source coverage

CISA KEV is observed exploitation evidence. FIRST EPSS is a dated prediction of exploitation in the next 30 days. Missing scores are unknown. This collector requests predictions only for explicit CVE aliases in the public NuGet archive; Microsoft release views retain their existing prediction scope.

No collected risk observation for these identifiers. This does not establish absence of exploitation or a zero probability.

cve-program · CVE-2026-98069

Published

net/rds: acquire the fastpath locks in rds_conn_shutdown()

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net/rds: acquire the fastpath locks in rds_conn_shutdown() rds_conn_shutdown() quiesces the transmit and receive-refill paths by waiting for RDS_IN_XMIT and RDS_RECV_REFILL to be sampled clear, and then runs the transport shutdown and rds_conn_path_reset(). Sampling the bits clear is not the same as owning them: the moment after the wait_event() returns, rds_send_xmit() can re-acquire RDS_IN_XMIT (or rds_ib_recv_refill() can re-acquire RDS_RECV_REFILL) and run concurrently with the teardown. The sender does recheck the connection state after taking the lock, but that recheck is a classic store-buffering pattern: teardown writes the state and reads the bit while the sender writes the bit and reads the state. acquire_in_xmit() is only an acquire operation, so on weakly ordered architectures both sides can miss each other's write, and the transmit path then runs while the transport zeroes its rings (e.g. rds_ib_ring_init()) and rds_send_path_reset() rewrites the transmit state under it. Oracle UEK fixed the same class of crashes - a 14-year tail of BUG_ON()s in rds_ib_sub_signaled(), unexpected op-codes and NULL dereferences in rds_ib_send_cqe_handler() during failover testing - by making the teardown path *acquire* the fastpath bit locks instead of testing them ("rds: Make sure transmit path and connection tear-down does not run concurrently"). Ownership of a single word is decided by RMW atomicity, so no cross-variable ordering is needed. Do the same here: take both locks before calling the transport shutdown, hold them across rds_conn_path_reset(), and release them explicitly with a wake-up afterwards. Both are released with clear_bit_unlock(), so that the ring re-initialization done by the transport shutdown and the transmit state rewritten by rds_send_path_reset() are ordered before either bit is seen clear by the next acquire_in_xmit() or acquire_refill(). The fastpath users of these bits - rds_send_xmit() and rds_ib_recv_refill() - are trylock style and back off while teardown owns the locks, so no new lock dependency is introduced for them. rds_tcp_reset_callbacks() is different: since the previous patch it acquires RDS_IN_XMIT as well, and it blocks doing so, so its wait now spans the teardown instead of at most one send batch. That waiter runs from rds_tcp_accept_one() on the single-threaded krdsd workqueue and holds rds_tcp_accept_lock and t_conn_path_lock while it waits, so a duelling SYN accepted while its path is being torn down parks accept processing for the duration of the teardown - for TCP bounded by the (up to 5 s) drain loop in rds_tcp_conn_path_shutdown(). An IB path's drain in rds_ib_conn_path_shutdown() has no round cap, but no blocking waiter either: rds_tcp_reset_callbacks() is the only blocking acquirer of these bits and waits only on its own TCP path, and the fastpaths are trylock-and-back-off on both transports, so a long IB drain lengthens only that path's own quiesce. The window is narrow: the accept-side state check has to pass before the teardown moves the path to RDS_CONN_DISCONNECTING. Because krdsd is a single global workqueue, everything else queued there - accept processing for other connections and network namespaces, and the flush_workqueue(rds_wq) in rds_tcp_listen_stop() during namespace teardown - waits behind the parked accept worker for that time. It cannot deadlock, although the waits do point at each other: the teardown blocks until the bit's holder releases it, and the holder may be that krdsd accept worker. The holder finishes without needing anything the teardown owns: the sync cancels rds_tcp_reset_callbacks() issues target cp_send_w and cp_recv_w on the path's ordered cp_wq, whose only execution slot is occupied by the blocked cp_down_w itself, so they are pending at most and cancel without flushing - a reliance on cp_wq being ordered that is now noted next to those cancels (on ---truncated---

Source published
25 Sep 2026 10:24:10 UTC
Source modified
19 Oct 2026 09:13:18 UTC
Observed here
23 Oct 2026 15:48:27 UTC
Source terms
CVE Program Terms of Use

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CVSS 3.1 · 8.1 CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

ChangeIntel

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Sources read 9 Nov 01:18 UTC · 275 of 275 readable · 272 fully read · documentation 469/469 current