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namespace: handle mount locking for automounts correctly

Assessment

Severity
Moderate
CVSS base score
4.2CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:N/I:L/A:L
Impact
Not stated
EPSS, next 30 days
Not scored yet
Public exploit code
No Nuclei template lists it
Exploitability
Not assessed
Publicly disclosed
No
Customer action
Required: apply the update
Component
Mariner
Weakness
—
Issued by
Linux
Published
24 Oct 2026 · October 2026
Last revised
26 Oct 2026Information published.
CVSS 3.1 base metricsRed raises the risk · green lowers it
Attack vector
LocalAV:L
Attack complexity
HighAC:H
Privileges required
LowPR:L
User interaction
NoneUI:N
Scope
ChangedS:C
Confidentiality
NoneC:N
Integrity
LowI:L
Availability
LowA:L

Updates that fix it

0 KBs

No KB listed

MSRC lists no downloadable update, which usually means a service-side fix or a release-notes update. Check the MSRC advisory.

Affected products

1 affected product
  • azl3 kernel 6.6.157.1-1 on Azure Linux 3.0
Page history

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Explore global source statements, affected packages and advisory history for CVE-2026-98977. The catalog has a separate collection scope from Microsoft release records.

Collected exploitation and prediction evidence

Risk source coverage

CISA KEV is observed exploitation evidence. FIRST EPSS is a dated prediction of exploitation in the next 30 days. Missing scores are unknown. This collector requests predictions only for explicit CVE aliases in the public NuGet archive; Microsoft release views retain their existing prediction scope.

No collected risk observation for these identifiers. This does not establish absence of exploitation or a zero probability.

cve-program · CVE-2026-98977

Published

namespace: handle mount locking for automounts correctly

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: namespace: handle mount locking for automounts correctly If mounts are propagated across user namespaces, attach_recursive_mnt() locks every copy of the source mount to protect overmounts from vanishing and revealing the underlying files or directories. The user namespace is taken from the caller's mount namespaces since this is where the mounts end up. Except, that's not always true. Automounts may legitimately get popped in by tasks located in a different mount and user namespace during path lookup. Then check doesn't make sense at that point. The copy in the namespace of the parent - which may be the host's - is now locked and the host cannot change the flags of its own mounts anymore. Here's the reproducer: - host has debugfs mounted nosuid,nodev,noexec and shared - tracefs automount below it is not yet active - hand a child process a directory descriptor on that mount - child process enters auser and mount namespace - child process' namespace now holds a locked copy of the host's debugfs mount that receives propagation from it - child process stats "tracing/." through the descriptor - lookup runs on the host's mount so the automount lands below the host's mount - propagation puts a copy below the child's copy - both try to clear the flags on the mount they got, with a bind remount: host, on its own automount: MS_REMOUNT|MS_BIND = EPERM child, on the copy in its namespace: MS_REMOUNT|MS_BIND = 0 So the lock landed on the host's mount instead of the child's copy. Congrats. So we need to compare with the owner of the namespace the mount actually gets mounted on. For all regular cases that is the caller's mount namespace and so nothing changes. Detached trees in anonymous mount namespaces by be handed over via SCM_RIGHTS or inherited in other ways on purpose so the attaching task's mount namespace is authoritative, not the creator of the detached tree.

Source published
23 Oct 2026 12:19:50 UTC
Source modified
23 Oct 2026 12:19:50 UTC
Observed here
23 Oct 2026 16:01:20 UTC
Source terms
CVE Program Terms of Use

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