xfs: fix capability check in xfs

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: xfs: fix capability check in xfs An user reported a bug where he managed to evade group's quota by changing a file's gid to a different group id the same user belonged to, even though quotas were enforced on both gids and the file's size was big enough to exceed the quota's hardlimit. Commit eba0549bc7d1 replaced a capable() call by a has_capability_noaudit() to prevent unnecessary selinux audit messages. Turns out that both calls have slightly different semantics even though their documentation seems similar. Where in a nutshell: capable() - Tests the task's effective credentials has_ns_capability_noaudit() - Tests the task's real credentials This most of the time has no practical difference but in some cases like changing attrs (specifically group id in this case) through a NFS client this will allow the quota code to use XFS_QMOPT_FORCE_RES, effectively bypassing quota accounting checks. Using instead ns_capable_noaudit() should fix this issue and prevent selinux audit messages. This also fix the remaining calls to has_capability_noaudit()

Source published

28 Oct 2026 10:34:45 UTC

Source modified

30 Oct 2026 12:42:04 UTC

Observed here

30 Oct 2026 13:45:33 UTC

Source terms

CVE Program Terms of Use

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

This view projects the publisher's source fields for reading; the original JSON retains additional fields and CVE enrichment containers. Attribution: cve-program · CVE Program Terms of Use. Source text is retained; field grouping and change labels are provided by ChangeIntel.