io_uring/waitid: prevent cancel reference wrap
Historical advisory recorded 2 Nov 2026 17:57:17 UTC. Read the latest advisory.
cve-program · CVE-2026-99227
PublishedIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: io_uring/waitid: prevent cancel reference wrap io_waitid packs the cancellation state into bit 31 of ->refs and uses bits 30:0 as a 31-bit reference counter: #define IO_WAITID_CANCEL_FLAG BIT(31) #define IO_WAITID_REF_MASK GENMASK(30, 0) __io_waitid_cancel() marks a request canceled, then increments the low bits of ->refs to claim completion ownership. When another path owns the request, the increment remains even though cancellation returns false. The request remains discoverable by cancellation, so repeated failed attempts can wrap the 31-bit reference field to zero. A later cancellation can claim ownership and complete the request a second time. Use atomic_fetch_or() when setting the cancel flag and inspect the old flag value. The first cancel attempt continues to the existing ownership increment, preserving its wake and issuer handoff semantics. Later attempts see the cancel flag and return without incrementing the reference field. This makes repeated failed cancellation attempts idempotent while leaving the first-cancel state transitions unchanged.
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cve-program · CVE-2026-99227
Publishedio_uring/waitid: prevent cancel reference wrap
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: io_uring/waitid: prevent cancel reference wrap io_waitid packs the cancellation state into bit 31 of ->refs and uses bits 30:0 as a 31-bit reference counter: #define IO_WAITID_CANCEL_FLAG BIT(31) #define IO_WAITID_REF_MASK GENMASK(30, 0) __io_waitid_cancel() marks a request canceled, then increments the low bits of ->refs to claim completion ownership. When another path owns the request, the increment remains even though cancellation returns false. The request remains discoverable by cancellation, so repeated failed attempts can wrap the 31-bit reference field to zero. A later cancellation can claim ownership and complete the request a second time. Use atomic_fetch_or() when setting the cancel flag and inspect the old flag value. The first cancel attempt continues to the existing ownership increment, preserving its wake and issuer handoff semantics. Later attempts see the cancel flag and return without incrementing the reference field. This makes repeated failed cancellation attempts idempotent while leaving the first-cancel state transitions unchanged.
- Source published
- 2 Nov 2026 16:06:36 UTC
- Source modified
- 2 Nov 2026 16:06:36 UTC
- Saved here
- 2 Nov 2026 17:57:17 UTC
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CVSS 3.1 · 7.8 CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H