Hatchet: SSRF via Unsigned UnsubscribeURL in SNS UnsubscribeConfirmation Handler
Historical advisory saved 24 Oct 2026 13:19:41 UTC. The publisher may have updated it since then. Latest advisory.
osv · GHSA-fjwv-jf2v-j499
Published### Summary The SNS `UnsubscribeConfirmation` handler in `internal/integrations/ingestors/sns/sns.go` makes an unvalidated `http.Get()` call to `payload.UnsubscribeURL` without any URL restriction. Because `UnsubscribeURL` is intentionally excluded from the `BuildSignature()` signed field list, an attacker can replace this field in a legitimately AWS-signed message with an arbitrary internal URL, bypassing the `VerifyPayload()` signature check entirely and triggering a Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) against internal infrastructure — including the EC2 Instance Metadata Service (IMDS) at `169.254.169.254`. ### Impact This is a Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) vulnerability. An attacker with a Hatchet account and an AWS Free Tier account can: - Reach the EC2 IMDS endpoint and retrieve IAM temporary credentials if Hatchet is deployed on AWS - Port-scan and probe internal services not exposed to the internet - Access internal HTTP APIs (e.g., Kubernetes API server, internal dashboards) from the Hatchet server's network context
- Source published
- 22 Sep 2026 20:34:12 UTC
- Source modified
- 1 Oct 2026 20:55:40 UTC
- Saved here
- 24 Oct 2026 13:19:41 UTC
- Source terms
- GitHub Advisory Database · CC-BY-4.0
Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON
Source: osv · GitHub Advisory Database · CC-BY-4.0. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.
CVSS_V3 · CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:C/C:L/I:N/A:N
Publisher rating · MODERATE